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strength and structure of the CEO’s overall connectedness. I find that both types of
connectedness add to traditional turnover and compensation variables in distinct and
economically significant ways. Specific connectedness increases CEO entrenchment.
Greater overall CEO connectedness on the employment network results in greater
likelihood of CEO departure, greater turnover-performance sensitivity, and more
rapid re-employment of a departed CEO. The existence of specific links between the
CEO candidate and the board of directors enhances the chances of appointment in
the event a company chooses to appoint an outsider as the CEO. Finally, CEOs
with better overall connectedness enjoy higher total compensation. The evidence
suggests that the general connectedness of a CEO in the employment network has
significant and distinct economic effects beyond those of the connections between
the CEO and the board in the current firm.
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Essay 1:
The Impact of Networks on
CEO Turnover, Appointment, and Compensation
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Abstract
I study the influence of networks and connectedness on CEO labor market outcomes,
including new CEO appointments, CEO termination, and CEO compensation. I dis-
tinguish between the pairwise specific CEO-board connectedness and the strength
and structure of the CEO’s overall connectedness. I find that both types of con-
nectedness add to traditional turnover and compensation variables in distinct and
economically significant ways. Specific connectedness increases CEO entrenchment.
Greater overall CEO connectedness on the employment network results in greater
likelihood of CEO departure, greater turnover-performance sensitivity, and more
rapid re-employment of a departed CEO. The existence of specific links between the
CEO candidate and the board of directors enhances the chances of appointment in
the event a company chooses to appoint an outsider as the CEO. Finally, CEOs
with better overall connectedness enjoy higher total compensation. The evidence
suggests that the general connectedness of a CEO in the employment network has
significant and distinct economic effects beyond those of the connections between
the CEO and the board in the current firm.
2
1 Introduction
Innovations in technology have made networking a crucial part of everyday life and
business activities. Social networking services such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and
Twitter were nonexistent until the early 2000s, but today they have hundreds of
millions of users. The impact of networks on economic outcomes have attracted
considerable and growing attention from researchers (Granovetter (2005)). This
paper focuses on the role of networks in the labor markets for chief executive officers
(CEOs).
Networks play an important role in the decision to hire, let go, or retain a
CEO and in decisions about how to compensate the CEO. Links between the CEO
and the board could prevent the board of directors from effectively monitoring and
objectively disciplining the CEO. Board directors who are not socially independent
from the CEO may retain a poorly performing CEO or agree to high compensation
without justification (Hwang and Kim (2009b) and Kramarz and Thesmar (2006)).
In addition, the strength and structure of the CEO’s overall connectedness repre-
sents his or her social capital and outside employment opportunities (Burt (1992)
and Granovetter (1995)). A better-connected CEO is more likely to find a good new
position after departure from the current firm. As a result, overall connectedness
could affect CEO turnover and compensation in different ways than the pairwise
specific CEO-board connectedness. Most prior empirical studies on CEO and direc-
tor networks ignore the general connectedness. This paper shows that both types
of connectedness are important in multiple key functions of the board of directors:
CEO firing, CEO appointment, and CEO compensation.
Using the biographical data of executives and directors in more than 5,000
U.S. companies from 1990 to 2007, I construct annual networks resulting from over-
lapping employment affiliations. I evaluate an individual’s overall connectedness by
borrowing four measures from the science and sociology literature. These measures
capture different aspects of an individual’s prominence on a network. For each pair
of CEO and board of directors, I count the specific ties between them. Controlling
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for other determinants of CEO turnover, CEO appointment, and CEO compensa-
tion, I test whether, how, and in what direction the two types of connectedness
variables affect these decisions.
I first examine the impact of the incumbent CEO’s network connectedness on
the likelihood of a turnover event. I find that the existence of ties between the
CEO and the board directors decreases both the probability of CEO turnover and
the turnover-performance sensitivity. This evidence suggests that a CEO linked
to the board is entrenched in the current position, even if he performs poorly. In
contrast, the general connectedness of the CEO is related to a higher probability
of turnover and stronger turnover-performance sensitivity. This result implies that
more outside opportunities make it easier for the CEO to depart. The board’s
disciplinary replacement decision faces less resistance from the incumbent CEO with
better job market insurance.
A follow-up question is whether the overall connectedness measures indeed
represent the CEO’s outside opportunities. My second test examines how the type
of new position assumed by the departed CEO is related to his connectedness.
I find that greater connectedness on the overall employment network leads to a
better chance of becoming a top executive or director in another company after
CEO departure. However, the pairwise connections to the old company’s board
of directors does not help the departed CEO in getting a good outside position.
This result highlights the distinct effect of general connectedness on CEO outside
opportunities, which is ignored by prior work such as Hwang and Kim (2009b).
I then address the issue of new CEO appointments. Controlling for other ob-
servable characteristics of CEO candidates, I test whether the likelihood of being
selected as the new CEO is a function of the candidate’s connectedness. For the
subsample of companies that choose to recruit an outsider as the new CEO, I find
that pairwise connectedness between the CEO candidate and the board of directors
boosts the chances of appointment. This finding is consistent with survey results
suggesting that companies searching for a new CEO from outside largely rely on
board member references. Connections to the board members reduce the uncer-
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tainty about the candidate’s quality. For the subsample of companies that choose
to promote an insider as the new CEO, I find that overall connectedness of the can-
didate has a negative effect on the likelihood of appointment. The costs of hiring
a busy networking CEO appear to outweigh the potential benefits derived from the
candidate’s overall connectedness.
Finally, I examine whether the CEO’s social network explains compensation.
I again differentiate between the specific CEO-board connectedness and the CEO
general connectedness. Each of them could have its own effect. Pairwise connect-
edness may increase CEO compensation due to the board members’ attachments
to the CEO. General connectedness reflects the CEO’s outside opportunities and
helps to bid up the market price of his human capital. My findings show that the
overall connectedness has a bigger impact on CEO compensation than the pairwise
connectedness. Omitting the CEO’s general connectedness when considering the
specific CEO-board connectedness could incorrectly attribute the higher compensa-
tion enjoyed by well-connected CEOs to director nepotism only.
This paper makes several contributions. First, I bring out the contrast between
the notions of a CEO’s specific connectedness to the board of directors and his gen-
eral connectedness on the overall executive and director network. This dichotomy
allows me to disentangle potential entrenchment effects resulting from pairwise con-
nectedness from the impact of outside opportunities created by overall connected-
ness. Related studies on social networks and corporate governance look at only one
type of the connectedness. For examples, Hwang and Kim (2009b) and Kramarz
and Thesmar (2006) focus on the mutual affinity between the CEO and the board
of directors but ignore CEO overall connectedness. They argue that CEO-board
connectedness reduces the board’s monitory and disciplinary effectiveness and thus
is detrimental to the firm. On the other hand, Ang, Nagel, and Yang (2009) con-
sider the CEO’s social interactions outside the company but not those within the
company. They suggest that well-connected CEOs demand higher compensation
due to peer pressure. My results show that it is important to consider both types of
connectedness because each has significant and distinct economic effects on multiple
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important corporate decisions regarding CEOs.
Moreover, my empirical tests provide evidence on the importance of connect-
edness in all critical choice variables pertaining to the CEO. Therefore, this paper
contributes to the literature of CEO turnover, CEO appointment, and CEO com-
pensation. For CEO turnover, I clarify some findings reported in prior work. For
example, Kramarz and Thesmar (2006) document that well-connected CEOs are
less likely to be replaced and exhibit weaker turnover-performance sensitivity. I
point out that it is the internal connectedness that entrenches the incumbent CEO
and that CEO overall connectedness increases the turnover-performance sensitivity.
I report several new findings on CEO appointments. Prior empirical studies such
as Parrino (1997) examine the industry and company characteristics that affect a
company’s decision to appoint a new CEO from inside or outside the firm. My
analysis explores the characteristics of a CEO candidate that influence his chance of
being appointed. In particular, I find that pairwise connectedness between the CEO
candidate and the board of directors is important, especially for companies that hire
from outside. For CEO compensation, my results show that CEO overall connected-
ness increases his compensation, controlling for specific CEO-board connectedness
and other conventional determinants. Therefore, the higher compensation enjoyed
by a well-connected CEO could be a result of more bidders for his human capital.
This result adds to related studies suggesting that connected CEOs receive higher
compensation due to bad governance (e.g., Hwang and Kim (2009b)).
Also, the network measures used in this paper are more encompassing than
those used in other studies on CEO connectedness. I define various senses of con-
nectedness. I distinguish the pairwise connectedness from the overall connectedness.
To further clarify what “overall connectedness” means, I borrow four measures from
the graph theory, each capturing one aspect of the concept. The four measures
take into consideration direct ties, indirect ties, the quality of ties, and the strategic
position based on the pattern of ties.
Finally, the sample used in this paper includes a large set of executives and
directors. I study the extensive social networks formed by CEOs, and by other
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executives and directors in more than 5,000 U.S. companies. The network formation
includes links established in an even greater range of public and private companies,
and foreign countries. Related studies on social networks in the field of corporate
finance typically study a much smaller sample of companies (e.g., Hwang and Kim
(2009b) focus on the Fortune 100 companies.) Moreover, since the analytical unit
in this paper is a single executive or director, the size of networks is an order of
magnitude larger than those in papers focusing on a set of firms or boards (e.g.,
Fracassi (2008)).
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3 introduces different network measures and related concepts,
and Section 4 describes the data. Sections 5 - 7 present main empirical results, and
Section 8 offers conclusions.
2 Literature
There are a few recent papers on the impact of social networks on CEO turnover
and compensation. In a closely related paper, Hwang and Kim (2009b) find that
firms whose boards have social ties to the CEOs award a significantly higher level of
compensation, exhibit weaker pay-performance sensitivity, and have a lower CEO
turnover probability than firms whose boards are conventionally and socially inde-
pendent. In contrast with these authors, this paper asks different questions, uses
different connectedness measures, and goes beyond their sample of Fortune 100 com-
panies. Hwang and Kim focus on a new board independence measure that takes
social ties into consideration and how it affects the effectiveness of board monitor-
ing. I approach the issue from the CEO perspective and ask how different types of
connectedness influence CEO labor market outcomes. Previous authors define social
ties through shared background such as same regional origin or academic discipline,
which are essentially a similarity measure between the CEO and the board directors
indicating the probability of a social connection through homohpily–love of the same.
I define connectedness more directly through overlapped employment as directors or
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executives in a same company at a same point in time, which ensures actual inter-
actions generating information that is relevant to the CEO position. Furthermore, I
differentiate between general and specific connectedness, while the previous authors
do not even look at specific connectedness directly. In addition, I add new results
regarding departed CEO subsequent positions and new CEO appointment.
Other work in this area includes Kramarz and Thesmar (2006), Barnea and
Guedj (2006) and Ang, Nagel, and Yang (2009). Kramarz and Thesmar analyze
social networks in the boardroom using a sample of French firms. They document
that CEOs who belong to the network of former civil servants are less likely to
be fired for bad performance. Only a few papers consider the connections to indi-
viduals outside the company. From the directors’ perspectives, Barnea and Guedj
find that firms with boards that are more connected to other directors award their
CEOs higher compensation. They suggest that the exposure of directors to other
companies’ practices may change their perceptions of what is an acceptable com-
pensation. From the CEOs’ perspectives, Ang et al. analyze the effect of social
pressures on CEO compensation, focusing on social interactions within 60 miles of
the firm. They show that there are significant social premiums for well-connected
CEOs, who are motivated to demand higer pay in order to secure or improve their
social ranking. A common feature of these studies is that they each focus on one
type of connectedness. My study considers both pairwise CEO-board connectedness
and CEO overall connectedness. Also, the common theme in these papers is that
social networks jeopardize corporate governance either by distorting the incentives
or abilities of the boards of directors to effectively monitor the CEOs, or by magni-
fying CEO greed. Consequently, connected CEOs receive higher compensation and
are less likely to be subject to turnover. This paper provides evidence that connect-
edness has other implications–such as more outside employment opportunities–than
just being an indicator of bad governance.
One part of this study adds to the work on determinants of CEO turnover.
Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) examine the association between a firm’s stock
performance and subsequent top management changes, including changes in CEO,
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president, and chairman of the board. They find that there is a negative relationship
between the probability of a top management change and a firm’s stock returns. In
another earlier study, Weisbach (1988) documents similar results for CEO changes.
In addition to stock returns, he reports that prior accounting performance is also
negatively associated with the likelihood of CEO turnover. Furthermore, he finds
that the turnover-performance relationship is stronger for companies with outsider-
dominated boards. In this paper, I introduce and explain the role of a new determi-
nant of CEO turnover: network connectedness. More recently, Parrino (1997) finds
that the probability of turnover is greater in industries that consist of similar firms as
compared with heterogeneous industries. He argues that the availability of a strong
outside candidate is an important consideration in the decision to replace a CEO.
In the same spirit, but from a different angle, I argue that the availability of good
outside positions for the CEO is also an important factor in CEO turnover events.
Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) investigate the incidence of CEO turnover during
the 1971-1994 period. They find that the turnover-performance relationship does
not change significantly from the beginning to the end of the period they examine,
despite substantial changes in internal governance mechanisms and the intensity of
the takeover market. The findings in my paper show that CEO connectedness is
important in explaining the cross-sectional variation in the turnover-performance
sensitivity.
Besides CEO turnover, Parrino (1997), and Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001)
also look at CEO succession decisions. Both papers categorize succession outcomes
based on whether the newly appointed CEO is an insider or from outside the firm.
Parrino finds that firms in homogeneous industries are more likely to hire replace-
ment CEOs from outside. Huson et al. document an increase in the percentage of
outside successions over the sample period of 1971 to 1994. They suggest that the
trend in outside hiring reflects greater board diligence in monitoring CEOs. My pa-
per asks a follow-up question: which candidate does the company choose? I explore
the importance of many observable characteristics of CEO candidates and focus on
the role of candidate connectedness in the CEO appointment process. Based on
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prior work, I examine separately the choices made by the companies that hire from
outside and those that hire from inside separately.
This paper also adds to the vast literature on CEO compensation by intro-
ducing CEO connectedness as an additional determinant beyond those previously
documented. The traditional explanatory variables include firm size (e.g., Rosen
(1982)), firm performance (e.g., Jensen and Murphy (1990)), firm risk (e.g., Aggar-
wal and Samwick (1999)), board and ownership structure (e.g., Core, Holthausen,
and Larcker (1999)), regulatory environment (e.g., Perry and Zenner (2001)), etc.
Prior studies also indicate that CEO personal characteristics are important. For ex-
ample, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that manager fixed effects matter for a wide
range of corporate practices. In particular, they show that managers with higher
performance fixed effects receive higher salary and total compensation, and they
tie the findings to the manager’s age and educational background. The evidence
presented in this paper suggest that both the pairwise and general connectedness of
the CEO have distinct and significant effects on compensation, controlling for the
traditional variables.
More broadly, this study joins the emerging literature on the role of social
networks in finance and economics. Researchers find that connections among firms,
managers, board directors, investors, and analysts affect a wide variety of business
activities. Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2005) study the co-investment networks
that venture capital syndication gives rise to and find that better network position
of the venture capital firm leads to better fund performance. Cohen, Frazzini, and
Malloy (2008) focus on connections between mutual fund managers and corporate
directors via shared education networks. They find that portfolio managers place
larger bets and earn higher returns on firms to which they are connected. Cohen,
Frazzini, and Malloy (2009) analyze the effect of educational networks between sell-
side equity analysts and senior officers of firms. They show that the educational
connection enables analysts to gather more information about the firm, which results
in better stock recommendations. Stuart and Yim (2008) examine how director
networks are associated with the generation of private equity transactions targeted
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at U.S. public companies. They find that if a company has a director who has had
leverage-buy-out experience through outside board service, this company is more
likely to receive a private equity offer. This paper shows that networks also feature
prominently in the CEO labor market.
The current study draws on tools developed in the science and sociology liter-
atures. Newman (2003) provides a comprehensive review of academic developments
in the field of complex networks. He notes that one of the important issues ad-
dressed in social network studies is identifying which individuals are most central,
best connected to others, or most influential. Researchers typically use mathematical
graph theory to quantify the notion of “centrality.” The most noteworthy centrality
measures include degree (Proctor and Loomis (1951)), closeness (Sabidussi (1966)),
betweenness (Freeman (1977)), and eigenvector (Bonacich (1972)). I borrow these
four metrics to describe an individual’s overall connectedness on U.S. executive and
director networks. The definitions of these measures are explained in Section 3
below.
3 Network Analysis Tools
As everyday concepts, “networks” or “connectedness” are quite complicated and
allow for multiple interpretations. To quantify such concepts in an empirical study
requires more specific definitions. I use network analysis tools developed in the
science and sociology literatures to construct executive and director networks and
to evaluate individual positions on them.
In graph theory, a network is a set of units and the connections between them,
and the units are often referred to as vertices or nodes. The connections are called
edges or links. Figure 1 shows a simple network with 10 nodes and 9 edges. Various
“centrality measures” are develped to describe the relative prominence of a vertex
on a network. In the context of this paper, centrality measures help to quantify
how connected an executive or director is on the network of corporate leaders. In
contrast to the internal connections that only reflect how the managers are connected
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to the board of directors in a particular company, centrality measures characterize
the overall embeddedness of an individual in the network that consists of all the
business leaders.
Using multiple measures instead of a single one has the advantage of capturing
different aspects of the concept “connectedness” and allowing the comparison of their
effects. As argued in Wasserman and Faust (1997), page 218, one measure “... is
just one–of many–manifestations of the primary centrality concept. One should not
utilize any single centrality measure. Each has its virtues and utility.” I choose four
commonly used centrality measures for my study: degree, closeness, betweenness,
and eigenvector.
Briefly, the degree centrality is simply the number of direct links a node has;
the closeness centrality is the inverse of the average distance between a node and all
other nodes on the network; the betweenness centrality captures how important a
node is in reducing the distance between all pairs of other nodes; and the eigenvector
centrality is a weighted sum of the direct links a node has, with the weights being
the importance of the linked nodes. I define these four measures mathematically in
the following subsection.
3.1 Definitions of centrality measures
The first and most straightforward centrality measure is degree. It was first sug-
gested by Proctor and Loomis (1951) to indicate how active a node is. The absolute
degree cD(x) of a node x is simply the number of edges connecting x with other
nodes.
Second, the closeness centrality measure indicates a person’s ability to quickly
interact with all others on the network. This measure, offered by Sabidussi (1966),
is different from the degree centrality because it takes into account not only direct
connections among units but also indirect connections. The absolute closeness of a






where U represents the set of all nodes on the network, and d(x, y) is the number
of edges in a shortest path connecting units x and y.
Third, the betweenness centrality measure was introduced by Freeman (1977)
to indicate a person’s ability to act as an intermediary, bringing people together.
A person is central, if he or she lies on several shortest paths among other pairs of
persons. Such persons have control over the flow of information in the network. The







where m(y, z; x) is the number of shortest paths between y and z through unit x,
and m(y, z) is the number of shortest paths between y and z.
Finally, Bonacich (1972) suggests the eigenvector centrality measure that po-
tentially takes into account the “quality” of a link. The basic idea is that a link to
a central node is more important than a link to a node on the fringe. Let the n ×
n matrix M be the adjacency matrix of the network. That is, Mij = 1 if there is
a link between node i and node j, and Mij = 0 otherwise. Let the n × 1 vector p
satisfy the following conditions:
1. Mp = ap, where a is the largest eigenvalue of M ;
2. maxi(pi) = 1.
Then, the eigenvector centrality measure of node x, CE(x) corresponds to the x
th
element of p. In essence, eigenvector centrality is a recursive measure of degree,
whereby the node’s centrality is defined as the sum of its links to other nodes,
weighted by their respective centrality measures.
3.2 Normalization
Absolute degree centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality are cor-
related with the size of the network. A central node in a small network would have
a smaller value of absolute centrality measure than a peripheral person in a big
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network. To allow comparison of connectedness across different networks, it is im-
portant to normalize these measures by the size of the network. Therefore, I define
the relative centrality measures below.





where cD(x) is the absolute degree centrality, and n represents the number of nodes
in a network.
The relative closeness of a node x is defined by
CC(x) = (n − 1) × cC(x), (4)
where cC(x) is the absolute degree centrality, and n represents the number of nodes
in a network.
The relative betweenness of a node x is defined by
CB(x) =
cB(x)
(n − 1)(n − 2)/2
, (5)
where cB(x) is the absolute degree centrality, and n represents the number of nodes
in a network.
Notice that the theoretical maximums of all relative measures are 1.
3.3 Components
The definitions of several network measures are problematic if not all nodes in a net-
work can be reached from one another. Such networks have multiple “components.”
A component of a network is defined as the subset of nodes that can be reached
from one another by paths running along connections. The largest component is
the component consisting of the largest number of nodes. For example, Figure 1
represents a network consisting of three components. One consists of nodes v1 and
v2. One consists of nodes v3, v4, and v5. All other nodes belong to the largest
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component.
Problems arise because the shortest distance d is undefined for unconnected
pairs. Conventionally, one assigns infinite d to the unconnected pairs, but then the
mean value of d also becomes infinite, the value of closeness measures as defined
in Equation 1 becomes zero for all nodes, and the betweenness measures as defined
in Definition 2 are not calculable. To circumvent these problems in this paper, I
calculate the closeness and betweenness measures over the component to which this
person belongs, and then scale by the ratio of the size of this component and the
size of the whole network. This method was proposed by Sabidussi (1966).
3.4 An example
Consider a simple network illustrated in Figure 2, developed by Krackhardt (1990).
It has only 10 nodes and 18 edges. But it brings out the distinction of different
centrality measures. Table 1 lists the values of normalized degree centrality, closeness
centrality, betweenness centrality, and eigenvector centrality as defined in Section
3.2 for each node.
In Figure 2, Diane has the highest degree measure. She is directly connected
to 6 persons, and thus has the highest normalized degree measure of 6
(10−1)
= 0.667.
However, she does not have the highest closeness measure in this network when
both direct and indirect contacts are considered. It takes Diane at least four steps
to reach Jane, three steps to reach Ian, two steps to reach Heather, and one step to
reach everyone else. Therefore, cC(Diane) =
1
4+3+2+1×6
= 0.067 and CC(Diane) =
(10 − 1) × 0.067 = 0.600. Gary and Frank have the highest closeness measures
(0.643). Although they have fewer direct connections than Diane does, the pattern
of their direct and indirect links allows them to quickly reach everyone else in the
network.
The eigenvector centrality extends the degree measure in another way. It is
a weighted sum of direct links. For example, in Figure 2, Carol and Heather have
the same number of direct contacts, cD(Carol) = cD(Heather) = 3. But they are
connected to different persons. Carol is connected to Andy, Diane, and Frank.
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Heather is connected to Ian, Gary, and Frank. Comparing their contacts, we see
that Andy’s degree measure (4) is higher than Ian’s (2), and Diane’s degree measure
(6) is higher than Gary’s (5). Therefore, in a sense, the “quality” of Carol’s contacts
is higher than Heather’s. This is reflected in the values of eigenvector centrality:
CE(Carol) = 0.594 and CE(Heather) = 0.407.
The calculation of betweenness centrality involves identifying the shortest
paths between all other pairs on the network. Take Andy in Figure 2 as an exam-
ple. Excluding him, there are (n − 1)(n − 2)/2 = 36 pairs of nodes on the network,
and Andy lies on one of the two shortest paths between Brad and Carol. That is,
m(Brad, Carol) = 2 and m(Brad, Carol; Andy) = 1. Andy also lies on one of the
three shortest paths between Brad and Frank. No other shortest path runs through









turns out that Heather has the highest betweenness measure. She acts as a “bro-
ker,” joining two parts of the network together. Her connections are fewer but more
important, because they give Heather the control over the information flow from
one end of the network to the other. Betweenness centrality can also be viewed as a
measure of network resilience — it tells us how many shortest paths will get longer
when a vertex is removed from the network. In our example, without Heather, Ian
and Jane will be cut off from the rest of the network.
To summarize, each of these four centrality measure reflects a distinct and
important facet of connectedness. The degree centrality is most intuitive and can
be easily interpreted. It is directly related to how busy a person is in networking,
but it does not consider indirect contacts and treats each connection equally. The
closeness centrality considers every potential contact on the entire network and
measures how many steps one has to take to reach all of them. But one may
argue that those who are more than 2 steps away do not matter. The eigenvector
centrality uses recursively defined weights to evaluate the “quality” of links, but
it is less straightforward to interpret. The betweenness centrality emphasizes the
connections to different parts of the network. A node with a higher betweenness
measure has access to richer and more differentiated information.
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4 Data
This section discusses sources of data and regression variables.
4.1 Sources
The data used to construct executive and director networks is provided by BoardEx,
a corporate research company that specializes in social network data on business
leaders. BoardEx consolidates information concerning the board of directors and
senior management of publicly quoted and large private companies from various
public-domain sources. For each individual covered, BoardEx provides his employ-
ment history, educational background, and other activities such as club membership.
Personal biographical information in BoardEx dates back to as early as 1926.
Stock return and accounting data are from CRSP and COMPUSTAT, respec-
tively. BoardEx provides CUSIP and ticker symbol for companies that are currently
trading. Therefore, I first find corresponding GVKEYs for these companies by
matching CUSIPs and ticker symbols. For the rest of the BoardEx companies, I
manually look up similar company names in the COMPUSTAT database. I verify
such matches by checking company locations and histories from company Web sites
and other sources. Most of the unmatched companies are either private, short listed,
or not traded in North America.
For the tests examining whether the CEO’s social network explains compen-
sation, I use EXECUCOMP, which provides executive compensation for S&P 1500
companies starting from 1992. EXECUCOMP annual CEO flag “CEOANN” iden-
tifies the CEO for each company in each year. I match the CEOs identified in
EXECUCOMP to those in BoardEx by name, age, and employment history. Due
to the limit of EXECUCOMP coverage, compensation data are only available for a




I use dummy variables to indicate the pairwise connection between an individual
and a board of directors. An outsider who is not currently employed by the company
is classified as “linked to the board” if he worked in a same company as directors or
top executives in the same year with any of the board members. An insider who is
currently employed by the company is classified as “linked to the board” if he had
additional employment overlaps with the board members outside the company in
question.
In addition to the pairwise connection measures, I define general connectedness
measures on the overall network. To calculate the centrality measures described in
Section 3, I first construct an annual network for each year during the 1990-2007
sample period. For each year t, the annual network includes all individuals who are
reported by BoardEx as a board director or a disclosed earner of a U.S. company
from year t − 5 to year t. If two people were employed by a same company as
directors or were disclosed earners in a same year during the 6-year window, a link
is established between them. The rolling window approach has the advantage of
preserving information from the relevant past, while at the same time alleviating
the correlation between a person’s network measure and the number of years since
he or she first appeared in the data set. The results in this paper are not sensitive
to the choice of a 6-year window.
Table 2 describes the overall structures of the 18 annual networks. This table
lists the total number of individuals on a network, the sizes of the two largest
components, the number of components with size greater than or equal to 30, and the
number of CEOs for public companies. One observation is that the networks grew
larger each year from 20,151 in 1990 to 59,751 in 2007. Therefore, in the following
analysis I use relative centrality measures to allow comparison across time. Another
observation is that the largest component always has a decisively larger size than
all other components. For instance, in year 2003, 45,379 out of 52,209 individuals
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were in the largest component, and all other components consisted of less than 30
individuals.
For each of the 18 annual networks, I calculate four centrality measures for
every executive and director using the definitions described in Section 3. Table 3a
presents the summary statistics of degree centrality (both absolute and relative), rel-
ative closeness centrality, relative betweenness centrality, and eigenvector centrality.
The relative degree and betweenness measures are multiplied by 104. The closeness
and eigenvector measures are multiplied by 102.
As indicated by the mean of absolute degree centrality, an average director or
executive has 13.8 direct contacts resulting from employment overlaps. The mean of
relative degree centrality suggests that on average an individual on the network has
direct connections to 0.0295% of all other business leaders. Closeness, betweenness,
and eigenvector centrality average 12.34%, 0.0054%, and 0.0133% of their respective
theoretical maximum. The median of betweenness centrality is 0, which suggests
that a majority of individuals does not lie on any shortest path of other pairs and
would have no effect at all on the overall connectivity of the network when singled
out and removed. The standard deviations of all measures except for the closeness
centrality are greater than their respective mean, indicating substantial differences
in connectedness among individuals.
Except for the closeness centrality, all measures are right skewed, as reflected
by the high skewness statistics. This is due to the existence of some extremely con-
nected people. Comparing the summary statistics for those who are CEOs of public
companies and those who are not, the CEO group has a higher mean centrality in
all five measures. Table 4 lists the most connected CEOs of public companies for
each year based on various centrality measures. There are overlaps across measures.
For example, Andrew Lewis Jr. of the Union Pacific Corp. scored the highest in
year 1996 based on all four centrality measures. This observation suggests that the
four centrality measures are capturing similar effects. Table 5 confirms that the four
centrality measures are highly correlated. The correlation coefficients range from
0.19 (between the closeness and betweenness measure) to 0.78 (between the degree
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and betweenness measure). In my analysis, I will use the closeness measure as the
proxy for overall connectedness because it is least correlated with other characteris-
tics such as CEO age and firm size, as shown in Table 5. I will use the other three
centrality measures as robustness checks for the effects of overall connectedness.
4.2.2 Personal and firm characteristics
Prior work such as Bertrand and Schoar (2003) suggests that CEO personal char-
acteristics matter for a wide range of corporate practices. I use several personal
characteristics besides the network measures as explanatory variables in the regres-
sion analyses: age, tenure as CEO in a particular firm, a dummy indicating whether
an individual had ever been a CEO, the number of years since an individual first
became a CEO, the number of years since an individual joined a particular firm, and
a dummy indicating whether an individual had earned an MBA degree. I generate
these variables using the biographical information provided by BoardEx.
Firm characteristics also affect the decisions about CEOs. I measure firm size
as the natural logarithm of sales (COMPUSTAT data item 12), and I measure firm
age as the number of years since the firm’s share price first appeared in the CRSP
database. Firm risk is measured as the stock price volatility calculated over the past
60 months (EXECUCOMP data item BS VOLATILITY). The industry-adjusted
annual return is the difference between the firm-specific buy-and-hold annual stock
return and the value-weighted industry portfolio return in the same 12-month period.
Industry grouping is based on the Fama-French 48-industry classification.1
4.2.3 Dependent variables
I look at the impact of connectedness on three outcomes in the CEO labor market–
CEO turnover, CEO appointment, and CEO compensation–and I define each of the
dependent variables in sequence below.
Using BoardEx data, I identify turnover events during the period 1991-2007
1Industry classification is obtained from the Ken French Web site:
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html.
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with the following rules:
1. If individual i ended his only CEO tenure at company j in year t and company
j continued to exist in year t + 1, observation ijt is marked as a turnover;
2. If individual i ended one of his multiple CEO tenures at company j in year
t and his next CEO tenure at company j started more than 730 days later,
observation ijt is marked as a turnover.
I identify new CEO appointments that occurred during the period 1991-2007
with the following rules:
1. If individual i started his only CEO tenure at company j in year t, observation
ijt is marked as a hiring event;
2. If individual i started one of his multiple CEO tenures at company j in year
t and his previous CEO tenure at company j ended more than 730 days ago,
observation ijt is marked as a hiring event.
Three levels of CEO compensation are examined in this paper. CEO to-
tal compensation (EXECUCOMP data item TDC1) comprises salary, bonus, other
annual, total value of restricted stock granted, total Black-Scholes value of stock
options granted, long-term incentive payouts, and all other total. CEO salary (EX-
ECUCOMP data item Salary) is defined as the dollar value of the base salary (cash
and non-cash). CEO stock-based compensation (EXECUCOMP data item RSTK-
GRNT plus BLK VALUE) includes the value of restricted stock granted and the
Black-Scholes value of stock options granted. I winsorize all three compensation
variables at the 1% level.
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the data. It is broken into sev-
eral subtables because I use different samples to analyze CEO turnover, CEO ap-
pointment, and CEO compensation. In the following sections, I describe sample
construction for each regression before discussing the empirical results.
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5 Networks and CEO turnover
5.1 CEO turnover decisions
The departure of a CEO has profound implications for a company. Previous studies
identified executive age and prior firm performance as the primary factors affecting
the CEO turnover decisions (e.g., Murphy (1999) and Kaplan and Minton (2006)).
I consider networks as an additional determinant of turnover. There are at least
two reasons why the networks of the incumbent CEO could be influential. One the
one hand, a CEO with social ties to the board directors is potentially entrenched
in the position even when it is not in the shareholders’ best interests. On the other
hand, more outside opportunities are available for a CEO who is well connected on
the network that consists of other top-level executives and directors. Such a CEO
could resist less strongly when facing pressure to leave, because there are compet-
itive alternatives elsewhere, and he could even voluntarily depart for a tempting
new position. The former effect is related to the CEO’s connections to the board
members that are supposed to monitor and discipline him, and the latter is related
to the CEO’s position in the overall network in the business world. Both effects are
empirically tested here.
I start with all CEO-company-year observations reported in BoardEx. Reg-
ulated companies (utilities and financial companies) are excluded from the sample
because CEO turnover decisions in such firms might be heavily affected by the gov-
ernment.2 Moreover, for an observation of company j in year t to be included in
any of the samples, the accounting and stock return of company j must be available
for the fiscal year ended in year t − 1. Also, the CEO must started his tenure at
company j no later than t − 1, which ensures that the CEO was responsible for
the company performance prior to the event year. The resulting sample consists
of 40,208 CEO-firm-year observations for the 17-year period 1991-2007. It involves
5,160 companies and 7,447 CEOs. There are 4,445 turnover events, which account
2Note that I do not delete the experiences formed in these companies when constructing the
connectedness measures.
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for 11.06% of all observations.
I estimate logit models to examine the impact of networks on CEO turnover.
The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes value 1 when there is a
turnover event and 0 otherwise. The key explanatory variables are CEO centrality,
a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO had additional connections to the
board outside the company, and their interaction terms with the industry-adjusted
stock returns. The control variables include CEO age, tenure as CEO, company
size, and industry-adjusted stock returns. I also control for year and industry fixed
effects. All explanatory variables are lagged as their values in the prior year. The
left panel of Table 3b reports the summary statistics for the data used in these
regressions.
Table 6a reports estimated marginal effects for the CEO turnover logit re-
gression. The marginal effects are partial derivatives of turnover probabilities with
respect to the independent variables. To compare the magnitudes of impacts of
different independent variables, which are in different units of measurement, I also
calculate the standardized marginal effect by multiplying the raw marginal effect
with the independent variable’s standard deviations.
The signs of marginal effects for control variables are as expected and are
consistent with the results reported by prior empirical studies such as Parrino
(1997). Higher industry-adjusted stock returns are related to significantly lower
CEO turnover probabilities. Smaller firms do not change CEOs as frequently as
larger firms. Also, when the CEO is getting older, a turnover is more likely to oc-
cur. However, a CEO with longer tenure could have established a power base over
time and may thus be less likely to depart. These effects are statistically significant
at the 1% or 5% level. A one-standard-deviation increase in company performance,
company size, CEO age, and CEO tenure is associated with a -0.6%, 0.4%, 3.2%,
and -1.4% change in CEO turnover probability, respectively. The magnitudes of
all marginal effects appear to be small. But they are economically significant con-
sidering that the average turnover rate in this sample is only 11.06%. This order
of magnitude is also similar to what Murphy (1999) found for the 1969-1983 U.S.
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sample and what Kramarz and Thesmar (2006) found for their 1992-2003 French
sample.
The results show that a CEO is less likely to depart if he and any of the board
members both had top-level positions in a same outside company. The impact of
the internal connection dummy on CEO turnover is negative at the 1% level. The
marginal effect of the internal connection dummy is -1.4%, with the z-statistic equal
to 4.58. Furthermore, the sign of the interaction term of the internal connection
dummy and the industry-adjusted stock return is positive. Though not statistically
significant at the conventional level, it suggests a reduced turnover-performance
sensitivity. These findings about the CEO-board connection are consistent with
Hwang and Kim (2009b), in which they document that a socially dependent board
is less likely to fire the CEO for bad performance.
In contrast, the CEO’s overall connectedness is positively associated with the
likelihood of turnover. The statistical significance of the centrality measure is at the
1% level, with the z-statistic equal to 8.24. A one standard deviation increase in
the CEO’s overall connectedness is related to a 2.4% increase in the probability of
turnover. The economic magnitudes for the marginal effects of the connectedness
measures are bigger than most of the control variables. Furthermore, the interaction
term of the centrality measures and the company performance is negative, with z-
statistics equal to -2.50, significant at the 5% level. These findings indicate that
a CEO’s overall connectedness strengthens the negative relation between company
performance and CEO turnover. Table 6b reports estimated marginal effects for
three logit specifications, each based on an alternative centrality measures. The
results are robust to these alternative measures.
The findings confirm that pairwise CEO-board connections have entrenchment
effects–that is, the CEO is less likely to depart, even with poor performance. In
contrast, overall connectedness is associated with greater probabilities of turnover
and stronger turnover-performance sensitivity. The evidence suggests that a good
network position creates outside opportunities, and therefore increases the likelihood
of CEO turnover. Moreover, a CEO with more outside opportunities potentially
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suffers less from the termination of the current employment, and thus would be
more likely to leave facing pressure.
Presumably, the effect of pairwise connections could be more pronounced in the
cases of forced CEO turnover, and overall connectedness should be more influential
for voluntary turnover. I use the new position assumed by a departed CEO as a
proxy for “forced” Vs. “voluntary” turnover. I look at all 4,445 turnover events
identified in the sample and document the new positions assumed by the departed
CEOs within 2 years from the departure. Because some individuals left multiple
CEO positions in a particular year, there are 4,423 unique CEO-year observations,
which I categorize into three groups based on the new jobs taken by the departed
CEOs. In the 2-year windows from the turnover dates, 645 (%14.58) departed CEOs
did not have any new employment, while another 2,000 (%45.22) became either a
director or a disclosed earner of another company, and the remaining 1,778 (%40.20)
assumed other positions, typically staying in the old company as a director or an
executive. If the departed CEO did not get any new position within 2 years from the
turnover, I categorize the turnover as forced. If the departed CEO obtained a top
position in another company, I categorize the turnover as voluntary. Table 6c reports
the results for the two sub-samples. The estimated marginal effects and statistical
significance support that overall connectedness has a bigger effect for voluntary
turnovers and pairwise connections have a bigger effect for forced turnovers.
5.2 Departed CEO’s new position
The results in the previous subsection indicate that CEO overall connectedness and
CEO-board pairwise connectedness have distinct effects on CEO turnover. The
explanation lies in the their different impacts on the career outlook of departed
CEOs. I highlight the difference by examining the determinants of departed CEOs’
new positions.
I estimate multinomial logit models with the dependent variable taking value
0, 1, and 2, representing “no new position,” “outside top business positions,” and
“other positions,” respectively. The explanatory variables include CEO centrality,
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a dummy indicating the CEO-board connection, CEO age, MBA education, and
the size and industry-adjusted stock return of the company the CEO previously
managed. Each specification uses one of the four centrality measures. I also control
for industry and year fixed effects. The right panel of Table 3b reports the summary
statistics for the data used in these regressions. Comparing with the summary
statistics for the full sample, the departed CEOs have higher centrality values, are
older, and are from larger and poorly performing companies. This confirms the
findings from the regression results in the previous section.
Table 7a presents the estimated results from the multinomial logit regression.
Since the dependent variable takes three values, one could make comparisons be-
tween three pairs of outcomes. To focus on the impact of the internal connection
on getting any new position and the impact of overall connectedness on getting a
high-level position in another company, the reference outcome in Table 7 is set to be
“other positions.” For ease of interpretation, Table 7 reports the exponential coeffi-
cient instead of the raw coefficient for each explanatory variable. It represents the
factor change in odds for unit increase in the explanatory variable. If the estimated
factor change is less than 1, the impact is negative, and vice versa. To compare
the magnitudes of impacts of variables, which are in different units of measurement,
I also report the factor change in odds for one standard deviation increase in the
explanatory variable.
The results show that the relative risk of having “no new position” over getting
“other positions” significantly decreases with the departed CEO’s age and the per-
formance of the company he previously managed. The effects of these two variables
are significant at the 1% level. For one standard deviation increase in the departed
CEO’s age and the industry-adjusted stock return, the relative risk of having no
new position is reduced by a factor of 0.67 and 0.77, respectively. MBA education
and company size do not have strong effects on the relative risk ratio. Controlling
for these factors, the existence of a connection between the departed CEO and the
board is associated with significantly lower odds of having “no new position” over
getting “other positions.” The relative risk for the linked ex-CEO is lowered by a
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factor of 0.69. In contrast, the centrality measures do not have much impact on the
ratio of probabilities of these two outcomes. The results here support the hypothesis
that CEO-board connectedness has an entrenchment effect. Even if the connected
CEO steps down from the position, he has a better chance to stay employed by the
company.
The second part of Table 7a compares the probability of getting “outside
top business positions” versus getting “other positions.” The odds of becoming an
executive or director in another company are significantly higher for a departed CEO
with younger age, an MBA degree, and previous management of a larger company.
The statistical significance levels for these three variables are 1%. A one standard
deviation increase in the departed CEO’s age reduces the odds of getting a high-
level position at another company by a factor of 0.61. An MBA education and
one standard deviation bigger firm size increases the chance of getting “outside top
business positions” by a factor of 1.66 and 1.23, respectively. The effect of prior
performance is positive, but not significantly so. For the comparison of this pair
of outcomes, whether the departed CEO had additional connections to the board
members does not have a significant effect. However, the centrality measure, which
captures the departed CEO’s overall connectedness, is significant at the 1% level. Its
z-statistic is 7.46, and the factor change in odds for one standard deviation increase
in the closeness measure is 1.63. The results provide direct evidence that CEOs with
better overall connectedness have better outside opportunities after departure.
Table 7b shows that these results remain unchanged using alternative central-
ity measures.
In sum, the connections to the board of directors help the departed CEO to
remain employed as opposed to having no new position. Typically, the linked ex-
CEO continued to be employed by the company, with a new role as a director or
an executive. Nevertheless, unlike overall connectedness, such internal connections
do not enhance the departed CEO’s chance of getting a top position at another
company. In line with the finding in the previous section, the overall connectedness
expands outside employment opportunities for the CEO.
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6 Networks and new CEO appointments
Following a CEO’s departure, the board of directors has to take the important
action of appointing a new CEO. Empirical studies such as Parrino (1997) provides
evidence on factors that affect a company’s decision to hire from inside or outside
the firm. However, there is little attention given to which particular candidate
would eventually be selected. Here, I explore the factors that are likely to affect the
CEO hiring decisions, with a focus on the role played by the connectedness of CEO
candidates.
Direct connections between a CEO candidate and the hiring board are ex-
pected to improve the candidate’s chance of getting the position. After a field study
on the CEO search process, Khurana (2000) reports that directors, candidates, and
executive search firms agree that CEO hiring relies on board member references.
Many of the board members are former CEOs or top executives themselves and
know potential CEO candidates from overlapping experience.
However, the anticipated effect of overall connectedness is not as straight-
forward. On the positive side, a company could be more interested in hiring a
well-connected candidate because his networks are potentially valuable to the firm
in facilitating activities like finding business partners or raising capital. On the flip
side, board members may have concerns about the limited time and energy such a
CEO could commit to the firm. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) show that busy outside
directors are not effective monitors. Similarly, busy, networking CEOs could be
less effective in managing the core operations of the firm. Also, there is evidence
in Section 5 indicating that the probabilities of turnover are higher for CEOs with
higher centrality measures. Firms concerned about retention and about reducing
future search costs might be reluctant to hire such candidates. The net effect of
connectedness on CEO selection remains an empirical question.
I examine the outside CEO recruiting and inside CEO hiring decisions sepa-
rately because the importance of networks could be different in these two types of
successions. I categorize hiring events into outside appointments and inside promo-
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tions based on the following rules:
1. If individual i was selected as the new CEO by company j in year t and this
was his first year of employment with this company, observation ijt is marked
as an outside appointment;
2. If individual i was selected as the new CEO by company j in year t and his
first year of employment with this company was earlier than t−1, observation
ijt is marked as an inside promotion.
6.1 Networks and outside CEO appointments
Networks are likely to be more important for outside hiring than for inside hiring.
Information asymmetry is more severe when hiring from outside the company be-
cause board directors have to rely more on their social connections to the candidates
in order to observe and evaluate their abilities as a CEO. Furthermore, the decision
to hire from outside reflects the fact that the company is in need of a new leader with
broader connections as opposed to someone with more firm-specific skills. Overall
connectedness is expected to be more valuable to such companies.
To test the hypotheses on candidate connectedness and outside CEO appoint-
ment, I first identify the outside candidate pools and then estimate regression models
to assess the importance of two types of connectedness.
6.1.1 Outside candidate pools
For each company j that was hiring from outside in year t, I compile a list of outside
candidates that were potentially qualified for the job. Basically, I get all or some
of the disclosed earners and executive directors working for companies similar to
company j in year t − 1 in terms of industry and size. I first sort all companies
in the COMPUSTAT database into various size and industry groups for each year,
and then I follow the procedure described below:
1. Identify companies with the same 4-digit SIC code and in the same 1/20 size
group as company j in year t− 1. The number of executives working for these
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companies is n1. If n1 ≤ 20, all of them are included in the candidate pool.
If n1 > 20, I randomly select 20 of them. If n1 < 5, move to the next step.
2. Identify companies with the same 3-digit SIC code and in the same size decile
as company j in year t − 1. The number of executives working for these
companies is n2. If n1 + n2 ≤ 5, all of them are added to the candidate pool.
If n1 + n2 > 5, I randomly select 5− n1 of them. If n1 + n2 < 5, move to the
next step.
3. Identify companies with the same 2-digit SIC code and in the same size quintile
as company j in year t − 1. The number of executives working for these
companies is n3. If n1 + n2 + n3 ≤ 5, all of them are added to the candidate
pool. If n1+n2+n3 > 5, I randomly select 5−n1−n2 of them. If n1+n2+n3 <
5, move to the next step.
4. Identify companies with the same 2-digit SIC code as company j in year t−1.
The number of executives working for these companies is n4. If n1+n2+n3+
n4 ≤ 5, all of them are added to the candidate pool. If n1+n2+n3+n4 > 5,
I randomly select 5 − n1 − n2 − n3 of them.
The average number of outside candidates identified this way is 8.72 per succes-
sion. Excluding financial companies and utilities, the final sample consists of 23,894
position-candidate observations. It involves 2,741 outside CEO hiring events that
occurred in 2,336 companies during the 17-year period from 1991 to 2007.
6.1.2 Outside appointment results
I estimate logit models to examine the impact of a candidate’s networks on the like-
lihood of getting the CEO position at a company that is hiring from outside. The
dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value one when the candidate is
selected and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables include the candidate’s cen-
trality measure, a dummy variable indicating the existence of a connection between
the candidate and the hiring board, candidate age, a dummy variable indicating
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MBA education, a dummy variable indicating that the candidate was a CEO for a
company in the past, and the number of years since the candidate first served as
a CEO for a company. Each specification has one of the four centrality measures
as the proxy for the candidate’s overall connectedness. I also control for firm fixed
effects. Table 3c presents the summary statistics of the data used in this section.
Table 8a presents the estimated marginal effects of the regression. The marginal
effects of candidate age, the MBA indicator, and the past CEO indicator are sig-
nificant at the 1% level. A candidate who is younger, who holds an MBA degree,
and who used to be a CEO is more likely to be selected. A one standard deviation
increase in age is related to a 2.0% lower probability of getting the CEO position.
As expected, an MBA education and past experience as a CEO enhances the chance
by 4.2% and 5.5%, respectively. The marginal effects of the number of years as a
CEO is negative. This is not surprising because, although a candidate with a long
CEO tenure is potentially more experienced, his human capital and other assets had
been heavily invested in another company, preventing him from job change.
The results show that the pairwise connection measure is positively related to
the hiring probability, over and above the set of control variables. The marginal
effect of the candidate-board connection dummy is significant at the 1% level. Hav-
ing a direct link to the hiring board boosts the probability of getting the CEO job
by 92%, which is substantially greater than the effects of all the other explanatory
variables. The evidence suggests that the overlapping experience between the CEO
candidate and the board members is crucial for outside hiring.
I also examine the impact of the outside candidate’s overall connectedness
on the probability of being hired as a CEO. The marginal effect of the centrality
measures is negative, significant at the 1% level. A one standard deviation increase in
overall connectedness reduces the probability of hiring by 8.7%, with the z-statistic
equal to 4.47.
Table 8b reports the results for alternative centrality measures. Like the close-
ness measure, the marginal effects of the degree and eigenvector measures are neg-
ative. The negative effect is significant at the 1% level for the degree measure, but
31
not significant for the eigenvector centrality. The marginal effect of the between-
ness centrality has a positive sign with the z-statistic equal to 1.61, which is not
significant at the convention level.
Controlling for the direct connections between the candidates and the hiring
boards as well as other factors, the evidence suggests that companies generally con-
sider the costs of hiring a well-connected CEO as outweighing the potential benefits
derived from the CEO’s network. The opposite signs of centrality measures reflect
the different aspects of connectedness captured by them. As discussed in Section 3,
the degree and closeness centrality measures count the total number of direct or in-
direct contacts. It takes time and energy to develop and maintain such connections,
so the negative effects of these two measures are significant. The eigenvalue is a
weighted version of degree that takes the quality of links into consideration, not just
the quantity. Therefore, the negative effect is better balanced by the positive effect.
Finally, a high betweenness measure does not necessarily indicate many outside jobs
or social interactions. It could be the case that the candidate has only a few outside
connections and yet these connections are very influential because they enable him
to join people from different parts of the network together. This situation benefits
the firm by bringing more business opportunities without costing too much of the
CEO’s time and energy.
6.2 Networks and inside CEO appointments
It is interesting to examine how networks affect inside CEO selection. Although, by
definition, an inside candidate is professionally connected to all the board members,
additional ties established from other common experience could still help to improve
the chance of hiring, maybe because of more effective communication between the
candidate and the directors, or simply due to homophily–i.e., the tendency to bond
with someone with similar characteristics. The attractiveness of a candidate’s overall
connectedness is likely to be smaller. The company’s decision to hire from inside
reveals its preference to firm-specific expertise over broad business connections.
To test the hypotheses on candidate connectedness and inside CEO appoint-
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ment, I first identify the inside candidate pools and then estimate regression models
to assess the importance of the two types of connectedness.
6.2.1 Inside candidate pools
For each company j that was hiring from within the firm in year t, I compile a list
of inside candidates who were potentially qualified for the job. Basically, I get all or
some of the top executives and directors working for company j in year t− 1. The
detailed procedure is described below:
1. Identify all disclosed earners and executive directors working for company j in
year t−1, except for the CEO. The total number of them is n1. Since n1 does
not exceed 16, all of the executives identified are included in the candidate
pool. If n1 < 5, move to the next step.
2. Consider all supervisor directors working for company j in year t − 1. The
total number of them is n2. If n1 + n2 ≤ 5, all of them are added to the
candidate pool. If n1 + n2 > 5, I randomly select 5 − n1 of them.
The average number of inside candidates identified this way is 4.72 per succes-
sion. Excluding financial companies and utilities, the final sample consists of 20,422
position-candidate observations and involves 4,328 inside CEO hiring events that
occurred in 3,439 companies during the 17-year period from 1991 to 2007.
6.2.2 Inside appointment results
A set of logit models is estimated to assess the effect of an inside candidate’s networks
on the likelihood of being promoted to the CEO position. The dependent variable
is a binary variable that takes value one when the candidate is selected and zero
otherwise. The explanatory variables include the candidate’s centrality measure,
a dummy variable indicating the existence of additional connections between the
candidate and the board of directors, candidate age, a dummy variable indicating
MBA education, a dummy variable indicating whether the candidate was a CEO
for a company in the past, the number of years since the candidate first served as a
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CEO, and the number of years since the candidate joined the company in question.
Each specification uses one of the four centrality measures as the proxy for the
candidate’s overall connectedness. I also control for firm fixed effects.
Table 9a presents the estimated marginal effects of the main regressions. The
pseudo-R2s in this table are markedly smaller than those in Table 8, suggesting
that when a company searches for a new CEO from inside the firm, non-publicly
observed characteristics of the candidates play more important roles, which cannot
be controlled for in my models. The model for the outside hiring explains 78% of
the variation in CEO selection, and the inside hiring model, only 21%. Removing
firm fixed effects, the pseudo R2statistics of the outside and inside hiring models
become 64% and 8%, respectively. The marginal effects of all the control variables
are still statistically significant in the inside hiring models. The directions of their
impacts are similar to what I find in the outside hiring regression, but the economic
magnitudes are generally smaller. For instance, a one standard deviation increase
in candidate age and the number of years since he first served as a CEO is related
to a 0.3% and 0.1% lower probability of getting the CEO position, respectively. An
MBA education and past experience as a CEO enhances the chance by 0.04% and
0.2%, respectively. In addition, a one standard deviation increase in the number of
years since the candidate joined the company increases the chance by 0.2%. The
statistical significance level of the MBA dummy is lower compared with that in the
outside hiring model. These findings suggest that companies hiring from inside place
more importance on firm-specific expertise than on general managerial skills.
The results indicate that networks matter for CEO selection, and much more
so for outside hiring than for inside hiring. It is not surprising given that the direc-
tors have plenty of chances to observe and appraise an insider’s abilities for the CEO
position. The marginal effect of additional connections between the inside candi-
date and the board bears a positive sign. However, both the statistical significance
and economic magnitude are much smaller than in the outside hiring models. The
z-statistic is 3.99. The existence of an extra link to the board slightly increases the
probability of being selected by 0.1%, but the inside candidate’s overall connected-
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ness is associated with lower probabilities of being promoted to the CEO position.
The marginal effects of the centrality measure is significant at the 1% level, with z-
statistic equal to -7.34. A one standard deviation increase in the centrality measure
reduces the probability of hiring by 0.4%. This magnitude of impact is comparable
to that of the control variables. Table 9b shows that these results are robust to
alternative centrality measures.
7 Networks and CEO compensation
The level of CEO compensation and its components have drawn much attention from
both the public and academia. The CEO’s networks can increase CEO compensation
in several ways. One the one hand, board members with social connections to the
CEO tend to be generous when deciding CEO pay because of their attachments to
the CEO. On the other hand, as I find in Section 5, connected CEOs have more
outside opportunities of getting top positions in other companies, which increases the
value of their human capital. In particular, due to their safety net in the job market,
they are better shielded from idiosyncratic firm risk. According to contract theories,
I expect them to have higher levels of stock-based incentives in their compensation
packages.
I start with all CEO compensation observations in EXECUCOMP. Financial
companies and utilities are excluded because CEO compensation in those companies
are likely to be regulated. Moreover, the CEO must have been in office for at least
one year to enter the final sample, which ensures that the CEO was responsible for
the company performance prior to the event year. The resulting sample consists
of 13,006 CEO-firm-year observations for the 16-year period from 1992 to 2007. It
involves 1,839 companies and 2,841 CEOs. The sample size is considerably smaller
than the turnover or selection sample, because EXECUCOMP only covers the S&P
1500 starting from 1992.
I estimate OLS models to examine the impact of networks on CEO compensa-
tion. To draw inferences on both the level and mix of CEO compensation packages,
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in addition to the total compensation, I also look at two compensation compo-
nents separately: stock-based compensation and salary. Due to the skewness of the
compensation variables, all three dependent variables are log-transformed. The key
explanatory variables are the CEO’s centrality measures and the CEO-board con-
nection dummy. I control for three CEO characteristics including age, tenure, and
MBA education, and three company characteristics–company age, risk, and perfor-
mance. I also control for year and industry fixed effects. The standard errors are
robust and clustered in year. Table 3d presents the summary statistics for the data
used in this section. Because the core data come from the EXECUCOMP data set
instead of the BoardEx data set, the sample size here is smaller than in the CEO
turnover and selection regressions. The companies in this sample belong to the S&P
1500 index and thus are larger in size.
Table 10a reports the estimated results, with Specification (1) for total com-
pensation, Specifications (2) for stock-based compensation, and Specifications (3)
for salary. Because the dependent variables are log-transformed, the exponentiated
coefficients are reported for ease of interpretation. This represents the factor change
in compensation for unit increase in the explanatory variable. If the estimated fac-
tor change is less than 1, the impact is negative, and vice versa. To compare the
magnitudes of impacts of variables, which are in different units of measurement, I
also report the factor change for one standard deviation increase in the explanatory
variable.
The results show that additional links between the CEO and the board of
directors have limited impact on CEO total compensation. The estimated coefficient
of the CEO-board connection dummy is positive and statistically insignificant at the
conventional level: a 0.8% increase with the t-statistic equal to 0.54. Its impacts
on the two compensation components are opposite. The coefficient of the CEO-
board connection dummy is positive in the stock-based compensation regression
and is statistically significant at the 5% level. In contrast, it bears a negative sign
in the salary regression, statistically significant at the 1% level. The economic
magnitude of increase in the stock-based compensation dominates the decrease in
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salary. The existence of extra CEO-board links is related to a 6% increase in stock-
based compensation, which is about $121,560 on average. The CEO-board link
dummy is related to a 1.4% decrease in salary, which is about $8,840 on average.
There is some evidence that the CEOs who are closely linked to the board members
receive higher compensation, but only in the form of stock-based compensation.
One interpretation is that if indeed the boards are awarding higher pay to linked
CEOs without justification, they would prefer a less transparent way to do so. The
valuation and disclosure on stock-based compensation is much more complicated
than on salaries. If anything, their salaries are slightly lower as compared with
other CEOs. This could be explained as a trade-off of enhanced job security.
There is strong and consistent evidence that the overall connectedness of a
CEO is associated with higher compensation, in both the stock-based and salary
components. The coefficients of the centrality measure are positive in all specifica-
tions, with the t-statistics ranging from 3.61 to 7.82. An increase of one standard
deviation in the overall connectedness increases total compensation, stock-based
compensation, and salary by 7.2%, 16.8%, and 8.8%, respectively. For a CEO who
is compensated at the average level, these changes imply a difference of $279,541
in annual total compensation, $340,373 in stock-based compensation, and $55,569
in salary. The results reveal substantial monetary benefits that CEOs can derive
from their overall connectedness on the professional networks. The benefits are es-
pecially pronounced in terms of stock options and restricted stock awards, which is
expected because connected CEOs, with better job market insurance, can tolerate
higher firm-specific risks.
The impacts of the control variables on CEO compensation packages are also
interesting. The effects of firm size, firm risk, and prior performance on CEO com-
pensation are significantly positive, consistent with previous findings (e.g., Rosen
(1982)), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), and Jensen and Murphy (1990)). CEO age,
CEO tenure, and firm age have opposite impact on the salary component versus the
incentive component. MBA education also increases CEO compensation, especially
for the stock-based compensation.
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Altogether, the control variables and connectedness variables explain a sub-
stantial part of CEO compensation, with regression R2 ranging from 33% to 53%.
The evidence presented here suggests that the general connectedness of a CEO in the
employment network has significant and distinct economic effects beyond those of
the connections between the CEO and the board in the current firm. It adds to the
empirical results reported in Hwang and Kim (2009b) that only consider pairwise
CEO-board affinity. Omitting overall connectedness would incorrectly attribute the
higher compensation received by well-connected CEOs to bad corporate governance.
As shown in Table 10b, these results are robust to the use of alternative centrality
measures as proxies for the overall connectedness.
8 Conclusions
Networking has natural influences in the CEO labor market. Motivated by the the-
ories of social capital and agency, this paper adopts an exploratory approach, which
assumes that the structure or pattern of social ties between corporate executives
and directors are consequential to key corporate decisions on CEO turnover, CEO
hiring, and CEO compensation. Using a comprehensive data set, I characterize
different aspects of CEO networks and empirically test their economic impacts. I
distinguish between the pairwise specific CEO-board connectedness and the strength
and structure of the CEO’s overall connectedness.
I construct annual networks consisting of board directors and disclosed earners
of U.S. companies during the period 1990-2007, and I look at the professional con-
nections between board members and the CEO they are supposed to monitor. I also
use four measures to reflect a person’s position on the overall professional networks.
Each measure offers a different perspective of connectedness. I analyze whether,
how, and in what direction these variables affect the likelihood of CEO turnover,
the departed CEOs’ career opportunities, the selection of new CEOs from both in-
side and outside the company, and the level and mixture of CEO compensation
packages.
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This paper provides a rich set of empirical results. Consistent with the theories
of agency, CEOs that are linked to the boards of directors are more entrenched
in the company. They are less likely to depart from the CEO positions. And
when turnovers happen, such CEOs have more chances of obtaining other positions
within the company. The turnover-performance sensitivity appears to be weaker
for the linked CEOs, and they also enjoy significantly higher pay in stock-based
compensation. Consistent with the theories of social capital, connections between a
CEO candidate and the directors of the hiring board are important in the selection
process. The ties are influential for inside candidates and are absolutely critical for
outside candidates.
The overall connectedness on the professional networks has quite different im-
pacts from the pairwise connections. I find that externally better-connected CEOs
are more likely to depart from their positions, and that the turnover-performance
sensitivity is stronger for them. Their connectedness enhances the chances of getting
high-level positions in other companies after their departure. CEO connectedness
is also valuable in that connected CEOs typically receive higher levels of total com-
pensation, in terms of both the salary and stock-based components. In the choice
of a new CEO, the results indicate that companies generally consider the costs of
hiring a well-connected CEO to outweigh the potential benefits derived from the
CEO’s network. This is especially true for companies that are hiring an insider.
Furthermore, some aspects of connectedness are more valuable than others.
Given the evidence developed in this paper, networks add to traditional turnover
and compensation variables in economically significant ways. They also play an
important role in the CEO selection process. In line with previous studies, the so-
cial connections between the CEO and the board could be signs of bad corporate
governance. By contrast, the overall connectedness works in ways that could be
interpreted as a type of valuable social capital. This paper also provides interesting
comparisons on the impacts of different aspects of connectedness. These are new
empirical results revealed by data and pose challenges for theory development in the
future.
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9 Figures and Tables
40
Figure 1: Network with three components.
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Figure 2: Network with a kite structure.
Table 1: Centrality Measures Corresponding to Figure 2
This table shows the values of four centrality measures (normalized) for each node in Figure 2.
Node Degree Closeness Betweenness Eigenvector
Andy 0.444 0.529 0.023 0.732
Brad 0.444 0.5294 0.023 0.732
Carol 0.333 0.500 0.000 0.594
Diane 0.667 0.600 0.102 1.000
Ed 0.333 0.500 0.000 0.594
Frank 0.556 0.643 0.231 0.827
Gary 0.556 0.643 0.231 0.827
Heather 0.333 0.600 0.389 0.407
Ian 0.222 0.429 0.222 0.100
Jane 0.111 0.310 0.000 0.023
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Table 2: Structure of Executive and Director Networks
This table shows the structure of network for each year t during the period 1990 to 2007, consisting
of corporate executives and directors from year t− 5 to year t. All is the number of all individuals
on the network. Largest is the size of the largest component. Second is the size of the second
largest component. Components is the number of components with size greater than or equal to
30. CEOs is the number of CEOs in public firms.
Year All Largest Second Components CEOs
1990 20,151 6,586 33 2 2,359
1991 21,715 7,854 31 3 2,606
1992 23,386 9,679 30 2 2,867
1993 25,355 11,953 <30 1 3,192
1994 27,316 14,271 30 2 3,521
1995 29,421 16,813 31 2 3,863
1996 31,778 19,766 38 4 4,244
1997 34,362 23,240 38 2 4,649
1998 37,113 26,724 42 2 5,045
1999 40,300 30,778 <30 1 5,516
2000 43,964 35,136 <30 1 5,875
2001 47,052 38,973 <30 1 5,973
2002 49,640 42,177 <30 1 6,018
2003 52,209 45,379 <30 1 6,089
2004 54,945 48,953 35 2 6,158
2005 57,242 52,065 57 4 6,214
2006 58,928 54,209 50 4 6,115
2007 59,751 55,273 54 5 5,853
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics on all variables for different samples. The relative degree and betweenness measures are multiplied by 104.
The closeness and eigenvector measures are multiplied by 102.
(a) Summary Statistics on Centrality Measures for All Nodes
Measures Mean Median Max SD Skewness
Non-CEO Abs. Degree 13.64 10.00 289.00 15.35 3.42
(n=628,471) Rel. Degree 2.89 2.27 50.49 3.01 3.18
Closeness 12.27 15.11 27.54 8.16 -0.49
Betweenness 0.50 0.00 84.01 1.89 9.07
Eigenvector 1.29 0.07 100.00 4.22 7.69
CEO Abs. Degree 14.93 9.00 244.00 17.56 2.90
(n=86,157) Rel. Degree 3.33 2.11 40.94 3.62 2.65
Closeness 12.90 15.11 26.90 7.48 -0.61
Betweenness 0.79 0.00 53.38 2.20 5.95
Eigenvector 1.66 0.08 100.00 5.56 7.26
Total Abs. Degree 13.80 10.00 289.00 15.64 3.35
(n=714,628) Rel. Degree 2.95 2.23 50.49 3.09 3.11
Closeness 12.34 15.11 27.54 8.08 -0.50
Betweenness 0.54 0.00 84.01 1.93 8.54
Eigenvector 1.33 0.07 100.00 4.40 7.72
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Table 3
(b) Summary Statistics for the Turnover Sample
All Company-CEO-Years Turnover=1
Mean Median SD Min Max Mean Median SD Min Max
Degree 3.58 2.27 3.76 0.00 40.94 4.25 2.72 4.39 0.00 40.90
Closeness 13.48 15.21 6.76 0.00 26.39 15.01 16.60 6.08 0.00 26.26
Betweenness 0.88 0.00 2.33 0.00 39.52 1.21 0.01 2.76 0.00 38.59
Eigenvector 1.88 0.12 5.99 0.00 100.00 2.51 0.23 7.23 0.00 100.00
Linked 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00
CEO Age 53.25 53.00 8.39 25.00 90.00 55.23 56.00 8.89 28.00 90.00
CEO Tenure 7.45 5.00 7.78 0.00 55.00 . . . . .
MBA . . . . . 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00
ARET 0.12 -0.02 0.93 -1.75 31.21 0.01 -0.10 0.87 -1.50 15.71
Sales (MM$) 2,083.70 258.54 9,036.21 0.001 335,086.00 2,574.30 347.58 9,591.59 0.001 263,989.00
Table 3
(c) Summary Statistics for the Succession Sample
Outside Hires Inside Hires
Mean Median SD Min Max Mean Median SD Min Max
Degree 3.21 2.34 3.18 0.00 37.86 4.16 2.87 4.36 0.00 41.76
Closeness 15.14 16.87 6.24 0.00 27.29 13.27 15.29 7.21 0.00 27.30
Betweenness 0.60 0.00 2.02 0.00 39.52 1.42 0.00 3.94 0.00 71.12
Eigenvector 1.60 0.14 5.24 0.00 100.00 2.27 0.20 6.39 0.00 100.00
Linked 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00
Candidate Age 51.09 51.00 8.65 22.00 93.00 53.90 54.00 9.89 22.00 95.00
MBA 0.23 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00
Past CEO 0.51 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00
Experience as CEO 4.82 1.00 7.11 0.00 53.00 3.35 0.00 6.95 0.00 58.00
Years in Firm . . . . . 8.52 5.00 8.80 0.00 69.00
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Table 3
(d) Summary Statistics for the Compensation Sample
Mean Median SD Min Max
Total Compensation (M$) 3,882.52 2,302.08 4,059.88 439.98 16,060.64
Stock-based Compensation (M$) 2,026.03 866.96 2,786.99 0.00 10,346.17
Salary (M$) 631.47 591.67 273.94 233.65 1,200.00
Degree 5.30 3.66 4.56 0.00 40.94
Closeness 15.16 16.15 5.59 0.00 26.01
Betweenness 1.49 0.18 3.05 0.00 39.52
Eigenvector 3.68 0.65 8.45 0.00 100.00
Linked 0.41 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
CEO Age 53.97 54.00 7.64 27.00 89.00
CEO Tenure 7.20 5.00 7.67 0.00 54.00
MBA 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00
ARET 0.11 0.02 0.70 -1.69 16.96
Sales (MM$) 4,556.98 1,194.35 12,304.16 0.04 328,213.00
Firm Age 22.50 16.26 19.15 0.84 80.14
Firm Risk 0.45 0.39 0.23 0.12 4.21
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Table 4: Most Connected CEOs
(a) CEOs with the Highest Degree Centrality
Year Abs. Degree CEO Name Company Industry
1990 57 Louis Gerstner Jr RJR NABISCO HOLDINGS CORP Food
1991 54 Louis Gerstner Jr RJR NABISCO HOLDINGS CORP Food
1992 58 Andrew Lewis Jr UNION PACIFIC CORP Transport
1993 96 Louis Gerstner Jr IBM Software & Computer Services
1994 103 Louis Gerstner Jr IBM Software & Computer Services
1995 91 Andrew Lewis Jr UNION PACIFIC CORP Transport
1996 103 Andrew Lewis Jr UNION PACIFIC CORP Transport
1997 108 George Fisher EASTMAN KODAK CO Electronic & Electrical Equipment
1998 134 John Snow CSX CORP Transport
1999 152 John Snow CSX CORP Transport
2000 180 John Snow CSX CORP Transport
2001 181 John Snow CSX CORP Transport
2002 203 John Snow CSX CORP Transport
2003 202 John Snow CSX CORP Transport
2004 182 William Owens NORTEL NETWORKS CORP Information Technology Hardware
2005 196 William Owens NORTEL NETWORKS CORP Information Technology Hardware
2006 196 Mary Wilderotter FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS CORP Telecommunication Services
2007 244 Mary Wilderotter FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS CORP Telecommunication Services
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Table 4
(b) CEOs with the Highest Closeness Centrality
Year Closeness CEO Name Company Industry
1990 7.48 Andrew Lewis Jr UNION PACIFIC CORP Transport
1991 8.48 Andrew Lewis Jr UNION PACIFIC CORP Transport
1992 9.91 Andrew Lewis Jr UNION PACIFIC CORP Transport
1993 11.50 Louis Gerstner Jr IBM Software & Computer Services
1994 13.07 Louis Gerstner Jr IBM Software & Computer Services
1995 14.53 Andrew Lewis Jr UNION PACIFIC CORP Transport
1996 16.17 Andrew Lewis Jr UNION PACIFIC CORP Transport
1997 17.45 Doctor George Fisher EASTMAN KODAK CO Electronic & Electrical Equipment
1998 19.44 John Snow CSX CORP Transport
1999 20.98 John Snow CSX CORP Transport
2000 22.59 John Snow CSX CORP Transport
2001 23.74 John Snow CSX CORP Transport
2002 24.68 John Snow CSX CORP Transport
2003 25.48 John Snow CSX CORP Transport
2004 25.77 Richard Notebaert QWEST COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL INC Telecommunication Services
2005 26.57 David Dorman AT&T CORP Telecommunication Services
2006 26.61 Steve Miller Jr DELPHI CORP Automobiles & Parts
2007 26.90 Paula Reynolds SAFECO CORP Insurance
48
Table 4
(c) CEOs with the Highest Betweenness Centrality
Year Betweenness CEO Name Company Industry
1990 29.45 Andrew Lewis Jr UNION PACIFIC CORP Transport
1991 24.81 James Williams SUNTRUST BANKS INC Banks
1992 35.10 Andrew Lewis Jr UNION PACIFIC CORP Transport
1993 35.23 Louis Gerstner Jr IBM Software & Computer Services
1994 36.70 Louis Gerstner Jr IBM Software & Computer Services
1995 38.31 Andrew Lewis Jr UNION PACIFIC CORP Transport
1996 37.27 Andrew Lewis Jr UNION PACIFIC CORP Transport
1997 31.40 William Stiritz RALSTON-RALSTON PURINA CO
1998 53.38 Rodney Dammeyer ANIXTER INTERNATIONAL INC Information Technology Hardware
1999 34.95 Roger Penske Sr PENSKE AUTOMOTIVE Automobiles & Parts
2000 31.57 John Snow CSX CORP Transport
2001 31.54 Henry Schacht LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC
2002 33.97 Joseph Wright Jr PANAMSAT CORP Telecommunication Services
2003 39.52 James Hackett ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORP Oil & Gas
2004 38.59 Admiral William Owens NORTEL NETWORKS CORP Information Technology Hardware
2005 41.59 Admiral William Owens NORTEL NETWORKS CORP Information Technology Hardware
2006 33.14 James Hackett ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORP Oil & Gas
2007 48.25 Mary Wilderotter FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS CORP Telecommunication Services
49
Table 4
(d) CEOs with the Highest Eigenvector Centrality
Year Eigenvector CEO Name Company Industry
1990 100 James Robinson III AMERICAN EXPRESS CO Speciality & Other Finance
1991 100 James Robinson III AMERICAN EXPRESS CO Speciality & Other Finance
1992 100 James Robinson III AMERICAN EXPRESS CO Speciality & Other Finance
1993 100 Louis Gerstner Jr IBM Software & Computer Services
1994 100 Louis Gerstner Jr IBM Software & Computer Services
1995 100 Louis Gerstner Jr IBM Software & Computer Services
1996 100 Andrew Lewis Jr UNION PACIFIC CORP Transport
1997 100 George Fisher EASTMAN KODAK CO Electronic & Electrical Equipment
1998 100 George Fisher EASTMAN KODAK CO Electronic & Electrical Equipment
1999 100 Charles Knight EMERSON ELECTRIC CO Electronic & Electrical Equipment
2000 100 Henry Schacht LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC Telecommunication Services
2001 100 George Conrades AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES INC Telecommunication Services
2002 91.92 George Conrades AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES INC Telecommunication Services
2003 89.64 George Conrades AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES INC Telecommunication Services
2004 100 George Conrades AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES INC Telecommunication Services
2005 96.70 George Conrades AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES INC Telecommunication Services
2006 67.40 Peter Brabeck-Letmathe NESTLE SA&Personal Care Household Products
2007 65.36 Paula Reynolds SAFECO CORP Insurance
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix
This table presents correlation matrix for four centrality measures, CEO age, and firm size.
Degree Closeness Betweenness Eigenvector CEO Age Firm Size
Degree 1.00
Closeness 0.41 1.00
Betweenness 0.77 0.19 1.00
Eigenvector 0.63 0.23 0.47 1.00
CEO Age 0.19 0.07 0.14 0.11 1.00
Firm Size 0.31 0.16 0.15 0.39 0.07 1.00
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Table 6: Networks and CEO Turnover
This table presents estimated marginal effects of logit CEO turnover models. Standardized
marginal effects are in square brackets; z statistics are in parentheses; Superscripts a, b, and
c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Panel (a) reports
the main results using closeness centrality as proxy for overall connectedness. Panel (b) reports
robustness results using other centrality measures as proxies for overall connectedness. Panel (c)
presents the results using forced and voluntary turnover subsamples.
(a) CEO Turnover Main Results
Centrality 0.004a [0.024] (8.24)
Centrality×ARET -0.001b [-0.012] (-2.50)
Linked CEO -0.014a [-0.007] (-4.58)
Linked×ARET 0.003 [0.002] (0.73)
ARET -0.007 [-0.006] (-1.22)
Company Size 0.002b [0.004] (2.34)
CEO Age 0.004a [0.032] (19.82)





(b) CEO Turnover Robustness Results
(1) (2) (3)
Degree Betweenness Eigenvector
Centrality 0.002a 0.003a 0.000b
[0.009] [0.007] [0.003]
(5.70) (5.52) (2.03)
Centrality×ARET -0.002b -0.003b -0.001
[-0.006] [-0.003] [-0.003]
(-2.33) (-2.03) (-1.52)
Linked CEO -0.015a -0.012a -0.011a
[-0.007] [-0.006] [-0.005]
(-4.58) (-4.00) (-3.46)
Linked×ARET 0.005 0.003 0.003
[0.003] [0.002] [0.001]
(0.98) (0.70) (0.54)
ARET -0.014a -0.018a -0.018a
[-0.013] [-0.016] [-0.017]
(-4.50) (-6.39) (-6.64)
Company Size 0.003a 0.004a 0.005a
[0.006] [0.009] [0.010]
(3.25) (5.28) (5.59)
CEO Age 0.004a 0.004a 0.004a
[0.032] [0.032] [0.033]
(19.08) (19.25) (19.92)
CEO Tenure -0.002a -0.002a -0.002a
[-0.016] [-0.016] [-0.016]
(-9.42) (-9.64) (-9.94)
Observations 40,208 40,208 40,208
Pseudo R2 0.032 0.032 0.031
Table 6
(c) CEO Turnover Results: Forced Vs. Voluntary
(1) (2)
Forced Voluntary
Centrality 0.000c [0.002] (1.76) 0.001a [0.006] (3.33)
Centrality×ARET -0.000 [-0.002] (-0.95) -0.000c [-0.005] (-1.88)
Linked CEO -0.003b [-0.001] (-2.24) -0.003 [-0.001] (-1.19)
Linked×ARET 0.002 [0.001] (0.84) -0.003 [-0.001] (-0.76)
ARET -0.006b [-0.005] (-2.17) -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.15)
Company Size -0.001b [-0.001] (-2.19) -0.001 [-0.002] (-1.41)
CEO Age 0.000a [0.003] (6.19) 0.002a [0.019] (18.97)
CEO Tenure -0.001a [-0.005] (-7.22) 0.000 [0.001] (0.64)
Observations 36,246 37,563
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.048
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Table 7: Departed CEO’s New Position
This table presents estimated factor changes in odds of multinomial logit models for new positions
after turnover. Standardized factor changes in odds are in square brackets; z statistics are in
parentheses; the base outcome is “other positions”; superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Panel (a) reports the main results using
closeness centrality as proxy for overall connectedness. Panel (b) reports robustness results using
other centrality measures as proxies for overall connectedness.
(a) New Position Main Results
Outcome = No New Position
Centrality 1.023c [1.148] (1.86)
Linked CEO 0.687a [0.836] (-3.45)
CEO Age 0.957a [0.678] (-7.53)
MBA 1.187 [1.078] (1.50)
Company Size 0.995 [0.989] (-0.18)
ARET 0.743a [0.773] (-3.65)
Outcome = Outside Top Position
Centrality 1.084a [1.633] (7.46)
Linked CEO 1.038 [1.018] (0.48)
CEO Age 0.946a [0.611] (-12.28)
MBA 1.659a [1.249] (6.07)
Company Size 1.095a [1.231] (4.53)





(b) New Position Robustness Results
(1) (2) (3)
Degree Betweenness Eigenvector
Outcome = No New Position
Centrality 1.013 1.036 1.001
[1.060] [1.103] [1.007]
(0.86) -1.4 (0.10)
Linked CEO 0.690a 0.690a 0.709a
[0.838] [0.837] [0.848]
(-3.34) (-3.41) (-3.18)
CEO Age 0.957a 0.956a 0.957a
[0.674] [0.671] [0.676]
(-7.57) (-7.64) (-7.56)
MBA 1.184 1.183 1.197
[1.077] [1.076] [1.082]
(1.47) -1.47 (1.57)
Company Size 1.002 1.005 1.013
[1.005] [1.011] [1.029]
(0.09) -0.19 (0.48)
ARET 0.743a 0.744a 0.743a
[0.772] [0.773] [0.773]
(-3.67) (-3.65) (-3.66)
Outcome = Outside Top Position
Centrality 1.067a 1.096a 1.005
[1.329] [1.288] [1.037]
(6.20) -5.67 (0.91)
Linked CEO 0.998 1.053 1.133
[0.999] [1.025] [1.061]
(-0.02) -0.66 (1.61)
CEO Age 0.944a 0.945a 0.948a
[0.599] [0.604] [0.621]
(-12.73) (-12.60) (-12.05)
MBA 1.633a 1.660a 1.704a
[1.240] [1.249] [1.264]
(5.88) -6.08 (6.42)
Company Size 1.096a 1.131a 1.153a
[1.236] [1.327] [1.386]
(4.50) -6.49 (7.26)
ARET 1.026 1.027 1.020
[1.023] [1.023] [1.018]
(0.67) -0.68 (0.52)
Observations 4,423 4,423 4,423
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.101 0.096
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Table 8: Networks and Outside CEO Hiring
This table presents estimated marginal effects of logit outside CEO hiring models. Standardized
marginal effects are in square brackets; z statistics are in parentheses; superscripts a, b, and
c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Panel (a) reports
the main results using closeness centrality as proxy for overall connectedness. Panel (b) reports
robustness results using other centrality measures as proxies for overall connectedness.
(a) Outside Hiring Main Results
Centrality -0.014a [-0.087] (-4.47)
Linked 0.920a [0.307] (81.41)
Age -0.002a [-0.020] (-8.50)
MBA 0.042a [0.018] (2.58)
Past CEO 0.055a [0.027] (2.91)




(b) Outside Hiring Robustness Results
(1) (2) (3)
Degree Betweenness Eigenvector
Centrality -0.015a 0.006 -0.002
[-0.047] [0.013] [-0.011]
(-3.94) (1.61) (-1.04)
Linked 0.739a 0.751a 0.740a
[0.246] [0.250] [0.247]
(13.96) (14.69) (14.06)
Age -0.005a -0.006a -0.006a
[-0.046] [-0.054] [-0.052]
(-4.38) (-5.83) (-5.20)
MBA 0.076a 0.063a 0.067a
[0.032] [0.027] [0.028]
(3.15) (2.61) (2.81)
Past CEO 0.106a 0.090a 0.095a
[0.053] [0.045] [0.048]
(3.79) (3.23) (3.44)
Years as CEO -0.003 -0.004c -0.004c
[-0.025] [-0.029] [-0.027]
(-1.61) (-1.85) (-1.75)
Observations 23,894 23,894 23,894
Pseudo R2 0.764 0.763 0.763
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Table 9: Networks and Inside CEO Hiring
This table presents estimated marginal effects of logit inside CEO hiring models. Standardized
marginal effects are in square brackets; z statistics are in parentheses; superscripts a, b, and
c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Panel (a) reports
the main results using closeness centrality as proxy for overall connectedness. Panel (b) reports
robustness results using other centrality measures as proxies for overall connectedness.
(a) Inside Hiring Main Results
Centrality -0.001a [-0.004] (-7.34)
Linked 0.001a [0.001] (3.99)
Age -0.000a [-0.003] (-8.36)
MBA 0.000b [0.000] (2.24)
Past CEO 0.002a [0.001] (4.32)
Years as CEO -0.000a [-0.001] (-3.20)





(b) Inside Hiring Robustness Results
(1) (2) (3)
Degree Betweenness Eigenvector
Centrality -0.002a -0.002a -0.000a
[-0.009] [-0.007] [-0.003]
(-7.26) (-5.98) (-4.35)
Linked 0.004a 0.002c 0.001
[0.002] [0.001] [0.000]
(3.82) (1.87) (1.27)
Age -0.001a -0.001a -0.001a
[-0.011] [-0.013] [-0.012]
(-10.01) (-10.13) (-9.97)
MBA 0.002a 0.002b 0.001c
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
(2.95) (2.56) (1.92)
Past CEO 0.007a 0.008a 0.006a
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
(4.71) (4.38) (3.98)
Years as CEO -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a
[-0.002] [-0.002] [-0.002]
(-2.99) (-3.29) (-3.37)
Years in Company 0.001a 0.001a 0.001a
[0.008] [0.009] [0.008]
(7.72) (7.87) (7.87)
Observations 20,422 20,422 20,422
Pseudo R2 0.171 0.156 0.148
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Table 10: Networks and CEO Compensation
This table presents exponentiated coefficients estimated in OLS CEO compensation models. Standardized factor changes are in square brackets; t
statistics are in parentheses; superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Panel (a) reports the
main results using closeness centrality as proxy for overall connectedness. Panel (b) reports robustness results using other centrality measures as
proxies for overall connectedness.
(a) CEO Compensation Main Results
(1) (2) (3)
Total Compensation Stock-based Compensation Salary
Centrality 1.033a [1.197] (7.26) 1.030a [1.168] (3.61) 1.015a [1.088] (7.82)
Linked 1.008 [1.004] (0.54) 1.059b [1.029] (2.67) 0.986a [0.993] (-3.52)
CEO Age 0.998b [0.986] (-2.65) 0.988a [0.917] (-10.37) 1.006a [1.045] (13.68)
CEO Tenure 0.997b [0.980] (-2.44) 1.002 [1.012] (1.17) 1.001 [1.004] (0.71)
MBA 1.048a [1.022] (3.26) 1.039c [1.018] (1.89) 1.003 [1.001] (0.56)
Firm Age 1.000 [0.995] (-0.86) 0.996a [0.922] (-7.05) 1.002a [1.043] (23.60)
Firm Size 1.457a [1.825] (40.33) 1.592a [2.117] (26.33) 1.187a [1.316] (35.06)
Firm Risk 1.308a [1.064] (3.37) 2.113a [1.181] (4.07) 1.006 [1.001] (0.35)
ARET 1.097a [1.067] (8.70) 1.202a [1.135] (7.61) 0.986b [0.991] (-2.86)
Observations 12,886 9,684 13,006
R2 0.423 0.323 0.533
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Table 10
(b) CEO Compensation Robustness Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CD CB CE CD CB CE CD CB CE
Total Compensation Stock-based Compensation Salary
Centrality 1.027a 1.023a 1.005a 1.029a 1.029a 1.008a 1.008a 1.007a 1.001b
[1.127] [1.072] [1.047] [1.141] [1.095] [1.074] [1.038] [1.020] [1.007]
(12.50) (8.68) (5.30) (8.66) (5.67) (7.01) (14.88) (9.97) (2.96)
Linked 0.988 1.022 1.031 1.027 1.062b 1.070a 0.985a 0.996 1.000
[0.994] [1.011] [1.015] [1.013] [1.030] [1.034] [0.993] [0.998] [1.000]
(-0.73) (1.21) (1.73) (1.12) (2.73) (3.25) (-3.42) (-0.79) (-0.03)
CEO Age 0.997a 0.998a 0.999 0.987a 0.987a 0.989a 1.006a 1.006a 1.006a
[0.978] [0.984] [0.992] [0.907] [0.912] [0.922] [1.044] [1.046] [1.049]
(-4.14) (-3.00) (-1.41) (-11.44) (-11.79) (-11.71) (12.15) (12.90) (13.89)
CEO Tenure 0.996a 0.996a 0.995a 1.001 1.001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
[0.972] [0.968] [0.966] [1.004] [1.004] [1.002] [0.999] [0.998] [0.997]
(-3.28) (-3.50) (-3.61) (0.40) (0.34) (0.20) (-0.07) (-0.26) (-0.36)
MBA 1.042b 1.053a 1.058a 1.030 1.039c 1.044b 1.003 1.006 1.008c
[1.019] [1.024] [1.026] [1.014] [1.018] [1.020] [1.001] [1.003] [1.004]
(2.90) (3.67) (3.93) (1.43) (1.97) (2.34) (0.63) (1.37) (1.79)
Firm Age 0.999c 1.000 1.000 0.995a 0.996a 0.996a 1.002a 1.002a 1.002a
[0.988] [0.998] [0.997] [0.913] [0.924] [0.920] [1.042] [1.045] [1.046]
(-2.05) (-0.28) (-0.40) (-9.27) (-7.74) (-8.42) (25.94) (27.58) (26.38)
Firm Size 1.450a 1.479a 1.477a 1.575a 1.604a 1.599a 1.190a 1.198a 1.199a
[1.811] [1.870] [1.867] [2.081] [2.145] [2.133] [1.321] [1.335] [1.337]
(48.16) (51.25) (49.71) (30.87) (31.60) (32.71) (44.25) (52.84) (57.16)
Firm Risk 1.320a 1.323a 1.343a 2.106a 2.091a 2.141a 1.013 1.014 1.019
[1.066] [1.066] [1.070] [1.180] [1.178] [1.184] [1.003] [1.003] [1.004]
(3.58) (3.82) (3.99) (4.07) (4.18) (4.35) (0.85) (0.93) (1.24)
ARET 1.098a 1.096a 1.095a 1.204a 1.202a 1.201a 0.986b 0.986a 0.985a
[1.068] [1.066] [1.066] [1.136] [1.135] [1.134] [0.990] [0.990] [0.990]
(8.57) (8.07) (7.93) (7.75) (7.59) (7.54) (-2.85) (-2.98) (-3.02)
Observations 12,886 12,886 12,886 9,684 9,684 9,684 13,006 13,006 13,006
R2 0.425 0.419 0.417 0.327 0.325 0.323 0.530 0.527 0.525
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Essay 2:
On Independence of Independent Directors
61
Abstract
We study the decisions to appoint and replace independent directors using a broad
vector of CEO attributes, director attributes, and CEO-Director connections. The
connections are further classified by whether the connections have professional ori-
gins established through common employment history or through shared educational
experiences or other forms of service outside the employment context. We find that
board changes are especially common in the first year after a new CEO is appointed,
with both a higher probability of replacing existing directors and new outside direc-
tor appointments. Director attributes matter in the replacement decision: outside
directors of similar age as the CEO and with connections established through a
shared employment history are less likely to be replaced. The decision to replace a
director who is not connected to the CEO is accompanied by appointment of indi-
viduals who are connected to the CEO. These results suggest that CEOs shape the
board to their own image and do so in the first year of their tenure. These results
hold even after controlling for CEO involvement in the director selection process and
even in subsamples where rules require CEOs to recuse themselves from the director
nomination process, suggesting that the appointment of connected directors is not
a back-door mechanism to retain CEO influence in the nomination process.
We also study CEO turnover and find that with a higher proportion of profes-
sionally related outside directors on the board, the CEO is less likely to experience
turnover. The cross-sectional relation between director turnover and professional
employment connections and the insignificance of non-professional connections also
holds in bivariate PROBIT models in which the CEO continuation is modeled in
conjunction with director replacement or appointment decisions. We discuss the
implications of our findings for corporate governance research and practice.
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1 Introduction
In the modern corporation, the board of directors represents a key institutional
mechanism by which shareholders exert influence over managers of a corporation.
Board members have a fiduciary responsibility to watch out for shareholders’ best
interests. A key element of this function is to monitor and discipline firm man-
agement, as articulated in Fama and Jensen (1983, p. 303). The monitoring and
disciplining functions involve hiring top management, establishing compensation
plans, and where necessary, shaking up and replacing top management.
The disciplining and monitoring role of boards suggests that there should be
some degree of separation between board members and top management. Indepen-
dent directors plausibly have fewer incentives to engage in activities that benefit
CEOs at the expense of shareholders. However, academic studies and practitioners
often question whether boards have been truly independent. Much of this work
stresses the CEO involvement in director selection. Early work by Mace (1971), or
Lorsch and MacIver (1989) finds that CEOs play a key role in director selection,
and Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find that CEO involvement lessens the odds of
appointing outside directors.
Concerns over board independence became especially elevated after high pro-
file fraud cases such as Enron and WorldCom. For instance, the New York Stock
Exchange now requires that more than 50% of the directors on a board should be
independent. The upshot has been a dramatic shift in board structure with a surge
in board members that meet the technical definition of independence. For instance,
the median percentage of outside directors is 82%, up from 45% reported by Shiv-
dasani and Yermack (1999)3. The dominance of independent directors – who are
perhaps more aptly called “outsiders” – raises interesting empirical questions about
these individuals. Are these individuals essentially drawn from symmetric distribu-
3We use “outside” and “independent” interchangeably in this paper. We acknowledge that the
conventional definition of independent directors per Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) is outside but
not gray. However, our main sample period is after 2003. After the 2003 Sarbanes Oxley Act and
other changes in corporate governance regulations, gray directors are essentially gone due to legal
requirement and public scrutiny.
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tions, so they are functionally identical individuals with differences attributable to
random chance? Or are there systematic differences in director attributes, and in
particular, their relation to a firm’s CEO? For instance, two directors may be nom-
inally independent of the CEO yet one may be connected to the CEO through ties
with the CEO separate from their role as director or CEO of the firm in question.
Such ties can arise, for example, from having common educational backgrounds, a
shared interest and participation in clubs and charities, or having served together
with the same employer at sometime in their careers. How do such CEO-Director
relationships affect the appointment and replacement decisions of an individual di-
rector?
In this paper, we investigate the characteristics of CEOs and the independent
directors appointed by CEOs and assess the existence of any prior relationship using
a broader vector of characteristics than used in prior work. Our basic tests examine
whether CEOs pick individuals who share similar antecedents that generate CEO-
Director connectedness or directors who have similar attributes. Our analysis is
dynamic. We start with the time a new CEO assumes office. In the years subsequent
to the hiring of the CEO, we examine all inside and outside directorial replacement
and appointments made until the CEO’s tenure ends. For each replacement and
appointment of a director, we assemble a vector of characteristics that comprises
the observable traits of the CEO and that of the director and the affiliations between
the CEO and the director.
Our source of data for developing a detailed picture of ties between the CEO
and the director to construct our connection variables is the BoardEx database.
BoardEx has detailed biographical data for senior executives of US public firms and
provides the raw data we use to develop CEO and director traits. We separately
examine two samples of firms that reflect the evolution of the BoardEx data. First
we examine firms over the period from 2004 to 2007 (the 2003 sample). BoardEx has
complete coverage for a large number of both small and large firms for this sample
period. Second we examine a sample of primarily large firms over the period from
2001 to 2007 (the 2000 sample). The two samples allow us to analyze both a large
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number of firms of different sizes and a smaller set of large firms for a longer time
period, especially a period that straddles the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (henceforth “SOX”).
The biographical data available on BoardEx is extensive, so it permits us
to develop educational, social and employment connections between the CEO and
directors. The first source of connections between the CEO and the director we
explore are the ties formed based on their common educational background. We
document educational connectedness on the lines of Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy
(2008, 2009), who argue that shared experiences and common culture arise from
attending a common educational institution, especially because such links are of-
ten formed long before the CEO’s current position. Thus, educational connections
can serve as effective conduits for information flows between individuals with the
same alma mater. Additionally, individuals may also interpret and form different
judgments about actions of those from a similar educational institutions. Finally,
education at the same institution may be more likely to lead to social relationships.
While such relationships could help when the connected individuals work together
in teams, they could be far less benign when the task is to monitor the CEO.
The second source of connections we analyze are connections formed through
common service on not-for-profit organizations such as universities or memberships
of charitable organizations, golf clubs, etc. These types of connections have gained
considerable notoriety in the popular press. For instance, donations of hundreds of
millions of dollars were made by Enron to the M.D. Andersen cancer center, whose
president John Mendelsohn sat on Enron’s board as an ostensibly independent di-
rector. Such anecdotal evidence suggests that directors with these other connections
to the CEOs may be compromised in their monitoring of the CEO. CEO-Director
connections that arise from ties based on common educational background and ser-
vice at non-for-profit institutions represent ties from social settings other than their
professional careers. We refer to these ties as non-professional connections.
The third category of CEO-Director ties we analyze are those that arise out
of shared professional experience at the same employer in their careers. These con-
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nections represent shared work experience and business relationships that engender
mutual respect as professional colleagues. We refer to these as professional connec-
tions.
We define an education connection when the CEO and director attended the
same undergraduate institution as in Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008, 2009). We
use data on an individuals service at not-for-profit organizations and their member-
ships in charities, golf clubs etc., to develop the service connections. We define a
service connection if the CEO and director have served or are members in the same
not-for-profit organizations. For employment connections, we examine the employ-
ment history of the CEO and director. We define an employment connection when
the CEO and director have overlapped and previously worked in another firm.
We find strong evidence in support of a homophily hypothesis. CEOs tend
to retain directors who are similar to them. Outside directors of similar age as the
CEO and professionally related to the CEO are less likely to be replaced. Further,
replacements of directors that are not connected to the CEO are accompanied by
appointments of directors that have connections to the CEO. In examining the
tendency of CEOs to shape the board, we also incorporate the decision by the board
to replace or retain the CEO. The CEO’s decision to replace an existing director or
to add new directors is conditional on the firm choosing to retain the CEO. We use
a bivariate PROBIT model to incorporate the probability of the firm replacing the
CEO into the director replacement and appointment decisions. We find that with a
higher proportion of professionally related outside directors on the board, the CEO
is more likely to stay.
We note that prior literature has examined the role of the CEO in the selection
of nominees to serve as directors. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), for example,
point out that when no nominating committee exists or when the CEO is on the
nominating committee, fewer independent directors and more grey directors with
outside conflicts of interest get appointed to boards. We examine whether the CEO-
Director connections essentially serve as a backdoor mechanism to assert the CEO’s
influence over the nomination process. Board changes, including those related to
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the appointment of connected directors, occur early in a CEO’s tenure. This result
suggests that boards are altered to complement the CEO who assumes office; these
appointments do not appear to be driven by increasing power as CEOs increase their
tenure in the corner office. Moreover, CEO involvement in the nomination process
has decreased over our sample period, and at least in a legal sense, is entirely
absent in the post-2003 sample period. Nevertheless, the fraction of directors on
the nominating committee who are connected to the CEO remains constant. We
conclude that it is unlikely that the CEO-Director connections is evidence of a
backdoor mechanism by which CEOs influence the nomination process.
Our evidence is more suggestive of an advisory role played by boards. One
function of boards is to monitor and discipline managers, a view stressed Fama
and Jensen (1983). The other function is to provide advice and counsel to top
management. Under this view, board members work together with top management
to review and influence key elements of the strategy and business direction of the
firm. This role for boards is discussed, for instance, in the book by Lorsch and
MacIver (1989) or the survey by Demb and Neubauer (1992). Our evidence suggests
that the presence of CEO-Director connections improves the ability of the CEO to
seek advice and the board to provide it. Shared experiences make it more likely
that CEOs will see the advice of the board. At the same time, the independent
nature of the board makes it likely that the board continues to serve a monitoring
role. In addition to our basic results, we also explore the role of the passage of the
SOX, firm size, and forced CEO turnovers. We find support for homophily in the
sample of both small and large firms. We also find that the role of CEO-Director
connections has decreased after the passage of SOX, but the role of professional
connections between the CEO and the director remain significant.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section, Section
2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 discusses the data and method. Section
4 and 5 present the empirical results. Section 6 expands on our basic tests and
discusses the effects of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the differences across large
and small firms, and the role of forced CEO turnovers on director replacements and
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appointments. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
In this section, we review the related literature on the role of the board of directors,
the replacement and appointment of directors, and CEO-Director social networks.
The independence of directors comprising the board has been a focus of much
of shareholder and regulatory activity. The Board is seen as fulfilling the dual roles
of monitoring and advising firm management as articulated in Fama and Jensen
(1983) and Adams (2005). Literature has found that the level of independence of
the board has been deemed crucial for the board to execute their fiduciary obliga-
tions. Weisbach (1988) finds that independent boards are more likely than other
boards to replace poorly performing management. Byrd and Hickman (1992), Shiv-
dasani (1993), Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997), and McWilliams and Sen
(1997) demonstrate that independent boards increase the chances of value increas-
ing merger bids for the shareholders. Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Lapides
(2000), Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), Klein (2002), and Uzun, Szewczyk, and
Varma (2004) have also found that as the number of independent outside directors
on a board increases, the incidence of corporate fraud decreases.
Of particular importance in understanding director independence is the pro-
cess by which individuals are selected to serve on the Board of Directors. Especially
important is the role of the CEO in the nomination process. Early work by Mace
(1971), or Lorsch and MacIver (1989) finds that CEOs play a key role in direc-
tor selection. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find that CEO involvement lessens
the odds of appointing outside directors. Recent trends in enforcing independence
requirements on the board of directors discourage the appointment of insider direc-
tors, nevertheless the CEOs involvement in the nomination process could severely
compromise the independence of the board.
Another aspect of director selection relates to the role of pre-existing connec-
tions, i.e. social networks, between the CEO and the director. There is a burgeoning
68
literature on CEO-Director social networks. Behavioral research shows that personal
ties foster collaboration and counseling by creating a sense of social security and en-
hanced mutual trust that reduces the perceived risks of seeking advice. (see, e.g.,
Anderson and Williams (1996), Fischer (1982), and Rosen (1983)). Cohen, Frazz-
ini, and Malloy (2008) were among the first to examine and document the role of
education connections in facilitating information transfer between the board of di-
rectors and mutual fund managers. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2009) document
that analyst’s forecasts are more accurate when they have an education connection
with the executives of the firm.
Several papers have expanded the scope of CEO-Director connections over and
above educational ties (see e.g. Mizruchi (1982), Mizruchi (1992), Useem (1984))
and develop an aggregate measure that includes ties arising from a shared employ-
ment history with a former employer and shared service in non-profit organizations.
Hwang and Kim (2009a) examine the impact of such aggregate CEO-Director con-
nections in Fortune 100 firms and find that the presence of connected CEOs is
associated with greater CEO compensation. Fracassi and Tate (2009) document the
effect of aggregate CEO networks on a variety of corporate policies like acquisitions
and accounting restatements. Fracassi and Tate (2009) examine the announce-
ment of accounting restatements and focus on the discovery of fraud. They find
that connected CEOs are associated with fewer internally initiated restatements.
Schmidt (2009) and Cai and Sevilir (2009) find higher bidder returns in acquisitions
in the presence of connected CEOs. This role of connections is also emphasized in
the “collaborative board” perspective of Westphal (1999), who argues that besides
monitoring, boards also play a role in providing expert advice and counsel to CEOs.
Our work complements the literature in that we separately examine each
component of the CEO-Director connections based on how they arise, i.e. non-
professional connections based on shared educational background and service on
not-for-profit companies Vs. professional connections based on prior employment
ties. Sociology literature documents that the source of ties and connections be-
tween people can have differential impact. Sanit-Charles and Mongeau (2009) and
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Krackhardt and Brass (1994) had also proposed different use of different networks
depending on the situation. For example, specialists networks are used for consul-
tation on work related matters and a network of friends are used to seek advice on
difficult decision that involve ambiguity and a lack of information. Engelberg, Gao,
and Parsons (2009) also separate the different connections but find no difference in
how these individual ties impact CEO compensation. While all sources of connec-
tions may have a similar effect on compensation of the CEO, it is plausible that
the different connection sources impact differently on the director replacement and
appointment decision as the the source of connections may have a differential impact
on the monitoring and counseling functions of the board. As Westphal (1999) shows
using survey data, that though CEO ties with directors hinder board monitoring
they have a positive effect on the counseling role of directors.
Our work also complements the literature that has examined the characteris-
tics and attributes of the board in determining their efficacy and ability to execute
their fiduciary obligation. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) study the role of busy direc-
tors and find that that busy boards are associated with weak corporate governance
and operating profits. However, Fich and Shivdasani (2007) find that shareholder
lawsuits impose costs on directors suggesting that the potential of losses from their
multiple board positions may actually give incentives to such busy directors to mon-
itor management and reduce the probability of a lawsuit. We therefore incorporate
the number of directorships held in determining the director replacement and ap-
pointment decisions. Our work also builds on the work of Coles, Daniel, and Naveen
(2008) who study coopted boards, or the members of a board brought on board by
a new CEO. We characterize more precisely what kinds of individual directors are
coopted on corporate boards.
Our empirical model incorporates the decision by the board to replace or
retain the CEO. The CEO’s decision to replace an existing director or to add new
directors is condition on the firm choosing to retain the CEO. In part of their
survey, John and Senbet (1998) examine both empirical and theoretical literature
on monitoring function of corporate board and discuss findings of CEO turnover as a
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particular measure of board monitoring effectiveness. Our model builds on the work
by Weisbach (1988), Parrino (1997), Jenter and Kanaan (2008), etc. and includes
the role of CEO-Director connections on the probability that the CEO is replaced.
3 Data and Methodology
Our analysis focuses on the replacement and appointment decisions of directors and
we develop probability models for the replacement and appointment of directors.
Our focus is on understanding the evolution of the board, especially the replacement
and appointment of independent directors, from the time a new CEO is appointed.
Our main data source is the BoardEx database provided by Management Di-
agnostic Limited. Additionally, we obtain stock return and accounting data from
CRSP and COMPUSTAT, respectively. BoardEx collects biographical information
of corporate directors and senior managers from a wide variety of public domain
sources. BoardEx initiated coverage of director and executive data for fewer than
100 U.S. companies in 1999 and has increased its coverage over time. The first main
expansion of the database in 2000 added more than 1,500 large U.S. companies.
The second expansion in 2003 added more than 2,000 smaller companies. For each
director and executive, BoardEx collects his or her biographical details and provides
data on each individual’s employment history, educational background, and other
activities such as club membership. The personal information provided in BoardEx
dates back to as early as 1926. We sort and code the data at the individual executive
and director level and then aggregate data at the firm level for each fiscal year. We
filter the data in several ways to screen out errors and inconsistencies.
3.1 Sample construction
We construct a sample of publicly traded firms for which we can identify the CEO
and the list of members on the Board of Directors. We require that coverage of
the firms by BoardEx is complete, i.e., the list of directors is not a partial list.
The distinction on complete versus partial coverage is especially important for the
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years prior to 2003. When coverage is complete, we match CUSIP, tickers symbols,
and company names give on BoardEx with corresponding data on COMPUSTAT to
identify the GVKEY of the firm. When matches between BoardEx and COMPUS-
TAT are only based on the name of the company, we manually verify such matches
by checking company locations and histories from company Web sites and other
sources. Companies for which there are no matches on COMPUSTAT are either
private, short listed, or not traded in North America.
BoardEx provides the position of each individual in the firm, their dates of
service, and classifies each individual as being an executive, an Executive Director,
or a Supervisory Director. For each firm, we identify the list of CEOs using the
position title and the starting and ending dates of CEO tenure. For each firm, we
identify an annual snapshot of the CEO and the Board of Directors in place at the
beginning and the end of the fiscal year using the starting and ending dates for each
director and fiscal year data from COMPUSTAT. We also determine CEO tenure
as of the end of the fiscal year. For each fiscal year, we use the integer tenure years
to determine the number of years the CEO has been in office and label the year as
the Event Year. The year in which the CEO is appointed is a turnover year, which
we refer to as Event Year 0. We examine director appointment and replacement
decisions for the first six years following the appointment of the CEO, that is up to
Event Year 6.
Comparing the snapshot of board of directors at the end of fiscal year t and that
at the end of fiscal year t−1, we determine director appointments and replacements
occurred during fiscal year t. A director is considered to be newly appointed if the
director serves on the board at the end of fiscal year t, but not t − 1. A director
is considered to be replaced if the director serves on the board at the end of fiscal
year t− 1, but not t.
Given the nature of BoardEx’s partial coverage of firms up to 2003, we con-
struct two samples for our analysis. Our first sample consists of all firm-fiscal year
combinations from after 2003, the year in which BoardEx’s initiated coverage of
small firms in addition to the large firms it was already covering and the number
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of firms covered was substantially increased. We label this sample the 2003 sample.
The sample covers a total of over 52,905 director-CEO-firm-year observations. As
shown in Table 11a, the sample consists of 7,399 firm-year over the 4-year period
from 2004 to 2007. There are 2,824 unique firms and 19,119 unique directors in this
sample. There are 804 CEO turnovers in the sample. A total of 4,956 directors were
replaced and total of 4,678 directors were newly appointed in the 4-year period from
2004-2007.
Table 11b shows that number of director appointments and replacements by
Event Year. As the table shows, 1,126 directors are replaced and 1,143 directors
are appointed in the first year after the new CEO is appointed. The number of
director replacements and appointments declines in each subsequent event year and
the number of replacements and appointments in year 6 are 593 and 610 respectively.
Table 11b also reports that the percentage of firms that make any outside director
appointment is 49.33% in year 1 but goes down to 42.08% in year 6. In terms of the
proportion of outside directors replaced on the board, it goes down from 18.57% in
year 1 to 15.49% in year 6. Similar patterns exist for director appointments. The
data thus indicate that director replacements and appointments are highest in the
years following a CEO turnover.
Our second sample focuses on the companies that entered into BoardEx cov-
erage in 2000-2003 and we gather data on these firms for the 2001-2007 period. We
refer to this sample as the 2000 sample. Note that the 2000 sample ignores all firms
that were first covered in BoardEx in 2003 and consequently there are fewer firms
in the sample and the firms in this sample are large firms. This sample consists
of 48,699 director-CEO-firm-year over 5,858 firm years in the 2000 sample. The
sample involves 1,914 unique firms and 11,302 unique directors. As shown in Table
11c, there are 610 CEO turnovers in the 2000 sample; a total of 4,607 directors were
replaced and total of 4,396 directors were newly appointed in the 7-year period from
2001-2007. The 2000 sample of firms serves as a robustness check for our results.
Table 11d shows the counts by event year. As in the 2000 sample, the number of
director replacements and appointments start from a high of 984 and 986, respec-
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tively. The number of replacements and appointments declines in each subsequent
event year, and the number of replacements and appointments in year 6 are 534 and
510, respectively.
The set of director replacements and appointments and their pattern by fiscal
and event year represents the raw data that we analyze further.
3.2 Methodology
We develop probability models for the replacement and appointment of directors.
Our focus is on understanding the evolution of the board for analyzing the role of
the CEO, director attributes and CEO-Director connections.
3.2.1 Director Replacement
Our dependent variable in understanding director replacement is a zero/one variable
that indicates whether a director on the board at the beginning of the fiscal year is
replaced in the fiscal year. The dependent variable is one if the director is replaced
and is zero if the director is retained in the fiscal year.
We estimate two models in examining the probability that a director is re-
placed by the firm. First we estimate the probability of director replacement using
a PROBIT model specified by the following equation,
Prob(DirRepl) = α+βFXF +βCXCEO +βDXDir +βConnecXConnec +βEY XEY +ε (6)
where XF are firm characteristic variables, XCEO are CEO attributes, XDir are
director attributes, XConnec are variables that represent the connections between
the CEO and the Board of Directors, and XEY are the event year indicators.
In our second model we incorporate the probability that the firm replaces/continues
with the current CEO in understanding the director replacement decision. The de-
cision to replace a current director or appoint a new director in a fiscal year is
conditional on retaining/replacing the current CEO in the same year. We therefore
estimate a bivariate PROBIT model where the first equation is a model for the
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CEO turnover decision and the second equation is to examine the replacement of a
director.
Prob(CEOTurn) = α + βFX1F + βCX1CEO + βConnecX1Connec + βEY XEY + ε (7)
Prob(DirRepl) = α + βFX2F + βCX2CEO + βDX2Dir + βConnecX2Connec + βEY XEY + ε(8)
where X1F and X2F are firm characteristic variables, X1CEO and X2CEO are CEO
attributes, X1Dir and X2Dir are director attributes, X1Connec and X2Connec are vari-
ables that represent the connections between the CEO and the Board of Directors,
and XEY are the event year indicators. We note that the set of variables differ in
the two equations. In general variables in Equation 7 are firm level variables and
variables in Equation 8 are either at the firm level or individual director level.
3.2.2 Director Appointment
Our dependent variable in understanding director appointments is a zero/one vari-
able that indicates whether a firm appoints a director in the fiscal year. The de-
pendent variable is one if the firm appoints a director in the fiscal year and is zero
otherwise. Since our unit of analysis is the firm’s decision to appoint a director, we
directly estimate a Bivariate PROBIT model that incorporates the firm’s decision to
retain/replace the CEO in understanding the firm’s decision to appoint a director.
The first equation is a model for the CEO turnover decision and the second equation
is an equation that examines the appointment of a director.
Prob(CEOTurn) = α + βFX1F + βCX1CEO + βConnecX1Connec + βEY XEY + ε(9)
Prob(DirApp) = α + βFX2F + βCX2CEO + βConnecX2Connec + βEY XEY + ε(10)
where X1F and X2F are firm characteristic variables, X1CEO and X2CEO are CEO
attributes, X1Dir and X2Dir are Director attributes, X1Connec and X2Connec are
variables that represent the connections between the CEO and the Board of Direc-
tors, and XEY are the event year indicators. We note that the set of variables differ
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in the two equations. In general variables in Equation 9 are firm level variables and
variables in Equation 10 include current and lagged replacement and appointment
decisions.
We next examine the variables used in our multivariate regressions.
3.2.3 CEO-Director Connections
The biographical data included in BoardEx covers educational qualifications, em-
ployment history, and details of the current employment such as the role within the
firm and committee memberships. The personal biographical information collected
by BoardEx dates back to as early as 1926. The dataset consists of two main files,
containing the employment records and education records respectively, downloaded
from BoardEx on Aug. 1, 2008. The key firm identification variable in BoardEx
is companyid, the key individual identification variable is directorid, and the key
variable to identify educational or certifying institutions attended by individual ex-
ecutives and directors is universityid. We use the biographical data for the CEO
and each director on the board to determine whether the CEO and the director have
educational, not-for-profit or employment overlaps.
Our first variable to capture connections between the CEO and director are
based on educational institution attended. For each director and executive, we
identify the educational institution attended and the degree or certificate received.
With respect to the names of educational institutions, the biographies contain a
variety of specifications. We manually match the names of educational institutions
taking care to identify multiple versions of the names (e.g. Harvard University and
Harvard). Specialized school names are matched back to institutions. Each satellite
campus are treated as a separate institution. If just a university name is given for a
university system that has satellite campuses, it is matched to the flagship campus.
If a single name could refer to multiple institutions, we drop the observation. For
each university, we assign a universityid to uniquely identify the institution. There
is a similar variation in the specification of the degrees earned by the executive and
director in the biographies. We manually sort through the degrees received and
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categorize them into the following six categories: Bachelors, Masters, MD, MBA,
JD, and PhD.
We classify the CEO and the outside or supervisory director as having an edu-
cational connection if they attended the same undergraduate institution. These edu-
cation connections encompass enhanced interactions or a sense of belonging through
alumni networks, college newsletters, donations, sports and culture. This falls in the
category of “weak” educational ties as in Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008). Many
papers that have studied educational connections have also examined these ties only
when the two individuals physically overlapped at the education institutions. This
overlap increases the likelihood that the CEO and the director are friends during
attendance at the education institution and since they graduated. Such a “strong”
definition of education ties is overly very restrictive. Our intent is to capture shared
beliefs, common culture and a sense of belonging, which is better captured by iden-
tifying cases where the CEO and the director went to the same institution. Cohen,
Frazzini and Malloy (2008) find significant impact of these “weak” education ties.
We find that about 7.7% of firm-years in our sample were classified as having
an educational connection between the CEO and an outside director. To capture the
influence of these education ties on the CEO, we normalize the number of education
ties by the total size of the board. This variable, referred to as the Frac Edu,
captures the fraction of the board that had education connections with the CEO
and consequently the influence of education connections on board functions.
We next examine the effect of CEO-Director Non-Profit or other social con-
nections. Consistent with the education connection variables, our measure of the
influence of these CEO-Director connections on board functioning is the fraction of
the board with Non-Profit ties to the CEO and is denoted as Frac Oth.
Our last variable to capture connections between the CEO and the outside
directors is based on employment connections. We classify a CEO as having an
employment connection with an outside director if they have a prior history of
being employed at the same time in another firm. Note that we have excluded their
shared employment history at the firm in the sample. Consistent with education
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connections we create Frac Prof, which is the fraction of the board that shares an
employment connection with the CEO to capture the influence of these connections
on board functioning. We find that about 41.3% of firm years in our sample were
classified as having an employment connection between the CEO and an outside
director.
3.2.4 CEO and Director Attributes
In addition to CEO-Director connections, the decisions to appoint or replace a
director are likely to be related to other CEO and director traits. Table 12 presents
the summary statistics of CEO and Director attributes we consider for the 2003
sample and Table 13 presents the summary statistics of the data for the 2000 sample.
The “homophily” argument in sociology suggests that the probability of in-
teractions increases with similarity (see, for example, McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and
Cook (2001)). We therefore use two mutual quality variables: the absolute age
difference between the independent director and the CEO and a dummy variable
indicating they are of the same gender. These mutual quality variables indicate the
potential connection between the CEO and the director, which complements the
actual connection captured by the overlap variables.
Personal traits of a CEO include age, gender, a dummy variable indicating
whether the individual had earned an MBA degree, and a dummy indicating whether
the individual had attended one of the “Ivy Plus” schools.4 We define a CEO as
“internal” if his or her first year of employment with this company preceded the year
of CEO appointment. Instead of using CEO tenure as one explanatory variable, our
regressions include 6 event year indicators with event year 6 as the omitted dummy.
Unlike a single CEO tenure variable, which only captures the linear relation between
the CEO’s years in office and the likelihood of director change, using indicator
variables allows us to compare the annual director change activities for each of the
first 6 years since a new CEO was appointed. In CEO replacement equations, we
4The “Ivy Plus” list obtained from Zawel (2005) includes Harvard, Yale, U Penn, Princeton,
Columbia, Brown, Dartmouth, Cornell, MIT, Stanford, and Chicago.
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also use a retirement dummy to indicate the CEO was 60 or older. Liu (2010) shows
that a good network position creates outside opportunities and therefore increases
the likelihood of CEO turnover. We use the betweenness centrality as defined by Liu
to measure a CEO’s connectedness on the overall executive and director employment
network. Our results are robust to the use of alternative centrality measures. We
elect to use the betweenness measure because it has the minimum correlation with
other variables such as age and board size. We winsorize the betweenness measure
at the top and bottom 2.5% level.
Similarly, personal traits of a director include age, gender, an MBA dummy, an
“Ivy Plus” dummy, and his or her overall connectedness on the executive and director
employment network. We also calculate the number of years since the director first
served on the board of a particular firm. Following Fich and Shivdasani (2006),
who suggest that busy outside directors are not effective monitors, we measure a
director’s “busyness” by counting the total number of directorships the person has
in a particular year.
3.2.5 Firm Characteristics
In our regressions, we control for standard firm and board characteristics including
firm size, board size, board independence, and firm performance.
Table 12 presents the summary statistics of the firm characteristics we use for
the 2003 sample and Table 13 presents the summary statistics for the 2000 sample.
We measure firm size as the natural logarithm of sales (COMPUSTAT data item
12). We winsorize firm size at the top and bottom 2.5% level.
We measure board size as the total number of directors served on the com-
pany’s board at the beginning of the fiscal year. In addition, we also calculate
Frac SD, the percentage of independent directors on the board. Frac SD is the
conventional board independence measure used in prior literature.
We use stock returns as the measure of firm performance. Following Jenter
and Kanaan (2008), we include both firm specific and industry stock returns in our
analysis. We calculate firm return as the buy-and-hold annual stock return of the
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firm. We calculate corresponding industry return as the value-weighted industry
buy-and-hold portfolio return in the same 12-month period. We winsorize firm
stock return at the top and bottom 2.5% level. Industry grouping is based on the
Fama-French 48-industry classification.5
4 Director replacement
In this section we present our empirical results for the director replacement decision.
We first present the results for a PROBIT model that examines the probability of
replacing the director replacement in a given year and present separate models
that examine the roles of the firm characteristics, CEO/director attributes, and the
connections between the CEO and the director. We next present the results for the
Bivariate PROBIT model that incorporates the decision of the firm to retain/replace
the CEO in determining whether a director is replaced.
4.1 PROBIT results for replacement
We estimate PROBIT models to examine the determinants of independent directors
replacements made by the CEO. Our unit of analysis is the director-firm-year obser-
vation. We identify a supervisory director replacement if a person was supervisory
director of a company at the beginning of the fiscal year but did not appear as a
board member at the end of the fiscal year. To make sure the director replacement
decision was made under the influence of the CEO, we further compare the end date
of the CEO and that of the director. Only when the director end date preceded the
CEO end date, we consider the director as replaced by the CEO.
The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes value 1 when an inde-
pendent director is replaced by the CEO and 0 otherwise. To highlight the effects
of the overlap variables, we start with a base model including only conventional
explanatory variables: firm size, firm return, industry return, board size, fraction
5Industry classification is obtained from the Ken French Web site:
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html.
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of supervisory directors, and event year dummies. The second model adds personal
traits of the CEO and the director: CEO age, CEO MBA, CEO Ivyplus, internal
CEO dummy, CEO connectedness, director’s number of years on board, director
busyness, director MBA, director Ivyplus, and director connectedness. The third
model introduces the mutual quality variables (same gender and age difference) and
the overlap variables (Prof Overlap and NonProf Overlap). All explanatory variables
are lagged as their values at the end of the prior fiscal year.
We fit maximum-likelihood PROBIT models allowing the standard errors to
be clustered at firm level. Table 14 reports the estimated results. Panel 14a reports
the estimated coefficients. Panel 14b reports the estimated marginal effects. The
marginal effects are partial derivatives of director replacement probabilities with
respect to the explanatory variables. To compare the magnitudes of impacts of
different explanatory variables, which are in different units of measurement, we also
calculate the standardized marginal effect by multiplying the raw marginal effect
with the standard deviation of each variable. The magnitudes of all marginal effects
appear to be small. But their economic significance should be assessed considering
that the average director turnover rate in this sample is only 8.77%.
The estimated results of the base model show that firm and board character-
istics significantly affect the likelihood of independent director replacements. Inde-
pendent directors are less likely to be replaced in larger firms. Board size and the
proportion of independent directors are negatively related to the probability of di-
rector replacements. Interestingly, firm specific stock returns do not have significant
impact on director turnover. But higher industry stock performance is related to
more director turnover. The coefficients of the event year dummies indicate that
CEOs typically replace independent directors in the first year after they took office.
The probability of director replacement in event year 1 is 2.5% higher than that
in event year 6. These effects remain statistically significant at the 1% level after
adding personal traits and overlap variables.
Model (2) includes CEO and director personal traits, which increases the over-
all explanatory power substantially, as evident by the Pseudo R2 statistics. Older
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CEOs and CEOs who were promoted from inside the firm are less likely to replace
independent directors. There is suggestive evidence that CEO’s overall connect-
edness is associated with higher probability of director replacement. Whether the
CEO had an MBA degree or attended an “Ivyplus” school does not matter. Not
surprisingly, director personal characteristics matter more. The effects of director’s
number of years on board, busyness, overall connectedness, and whether the director
had attended an “Ivyplus” school are all significant at the 1% level. A one-standard-
deviation increase in the number of years on board, the number of total directorship,
and overall connectedness is associated with a 1.6%, -0.5% and 0.6% change in di-
rector turnover probability, respectively. A director with “Ivyplus” experience is
more likely to turnover than others by 0.8%.
Model (3) adds director-CEO mutual quality and overlap variables, which
again increases the overall explanatory power. Results show that the absolute age
difference between the independent director and the CEO has strong positive effect
on the probability of director replacement, with a 13.20 z-statistic. If the inde-
pendent director and the CEO are closer in age by one standard deviation, the
probability of director replacement is reduced by 1.9%. It is worth noticing that
CEO age becomes irrelevant controlling for age difference. This suggests that simi-
larity in age is more important than CEO age alone. The same gender indicator is
insignificant, probably due to the very small proportion of females in both the CEO
and the director sample-only 3% of the CEOs and 10% of the directors are female
in our sample.
The results indicate that an independent director is less likely to be replaced
by the CEO if they had been employed by an same outside company at a same point
in time. The existence of such professional overlap reduces the probability of direc-
tor replacement by 1.4%. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level, with
a 4.26 z-statistic. In contrast, the existence of non-professional overlap between the
CEO and the independent director increases the probability of director replacement
by 0.7%. This effect is statistically significant at the 5% level, with a 2.28 z-statistic.
The findings suggest that connections established through professional ties act dif-
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ferently from those established through common educational background and other
social activities. CEOs tend to retain the independent directors they know from
work, not their friends in the informal social settings.
4.2 Bivariate PROBIT model of director replacement
Notwithstanding the results from the PROBIT model, a concern with the regres-
sions presented in Table 14 is whether we appropriately consider the effect of CEO
turnover. The CEO’s influence in remaking of the board is relevant only if the CEO
stays. Therefore, we estimate the seemingly unrelated bivariate PROBIT model to
incorporate CEO turnover decisions into our analysis of director replacement. This
method fits a two-equation PROBIT system described in the methodology section,
Section 3.2. The first equation tests the determinants of CEO replacement. The
second equation tests the determinants of independent director replacement. The
decision to replace the CEO and the decision to replace the directors are interre-
lated. The equations are allowed to be correlated and the correlation is estimated
within the system.
The dependent variable in Equation 7 is a binary variable that takes value one
when there was a CEO turnover and zero otherwise. We start with a base model
including only firm and board characteristics as explanatory variables: firm size,
firm return, industry Return, board size, fraction of supervisory directors, average
number of directorship held by board members, and event year dummies. The
second model adds personal traits of the CEO: a dummy indicating the CEO was
60 or older, CEO gender, CEO MBA, CEO Ivyplus, internal CEO dummy, and CEO
connectedness. The third model introduces the proportion of independent directors
that had professional overlap with the CEO and the proportion of independent
directors that had educational or social overlap with the CEO. All explanatory
variables are lagged as their values at the end of the prior fiscal year.
The dependent variable in Equation 8 is a binary variable that takes value
one when the independent director was replaced by the CEO and zero otherwise.
Again, the base model includes only firm and board characteristics and event year
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dummies. The second model adds CEO and director personal traits. The third
model adds mutual quality variables and overlap variables.
Table 15a presents the estimated coefficients of the bivariate PROBIT mod-
els. Table 15c presents the estimated marginal effects. For the CEO replacement
equation, we report the marginal effects of independent variables on the probability
of CEO turnover. For the director replacement equation, we report the marginal ef-
fects of independent variables on the probability of independent director replacement
conditional on no CEO turnover. Wald test results suggest that the two equations
are correlated (p-values less than 10% in all models).
The results of the first equation show the effects of various determinants of
CEO turnover. In general, we find these variables to influence CEO turnover in a
manner consistent with that reported in previous research. For example, we find a
significant negative relation between prior stock return and the likelihood of CEO
turnover. CEOs with age 60 or older and better connected CEOs are more likely
to go. We also find that firm size is negatively related to the probability CEO
turnover, but board size increases the probability of CEO turnover. Interestingly,
the fraction of independent director is associated with lower CEO turnover. The
average number of directorship held by board members is positively related to CEO
turnover. These findings are at odds with the prediction that more independent and
more concentrated boards are more effective monitors of the management. Other
CEO personal traits such as gender, MBA, Ivyplus, and internal hire do not yield
significant coefficients. Controlling for these effects, we find that the fraction of inde-
pendent directors who had professional overlap with the CEO significantly reduces
the probability of CEO turnover. The marginal effect is statistically significant at
the 1% level. A one-standard-deviation increase of the fraction of professionally
related outside directors reduces the likelihood of CEO turnover by 1.3%, which
is economically significant given the CEO turnover rate in our sample is merely
10.79%. However, the fraction of outside directors that had prior educational or
social relation with the CEO does not matter.
Our bivariate PROBIT model results from support our earlier results from the
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PROBIT models of outside director replacement. Outside director replacement is
higher in the first year of the new CEO appointment. An CEO from the internal
ranks of the firm is less likely to replace existing directors. The results also lend
support to the homophilly hypothesis. CEOs tend to retain the outside directors who
are closer to their own ages and those who have a shared employment experience
with the CEO in their earlier careers, i.e. those with professional overlaps. Our
findings also indicate that the existence of prior professional relation between the
CEO and outside director also provides job security for both parties. A CEO is less
likely to be replaced by a board with higher proportion of outside directors that
are professionally related to the CEO. At the same time, an outside director is less
likely to be replaced by the CEO if they overlapped through common employment
experience.
5 Director appointment
In this section we present our empirical results on the director appointment decision.
Our analysis of the director appointment decision is at the firm level and we examine
the probability that a firm appoints an outside director and the probability that the
outside director appointed has professional or non-professional ties with the CEO.
We note that the decision on whether the firm appoints an outsider director is
directly affected by the decision to retain the CEO and we therefore estimate the
bivariate PROBIT model for the director appointment decision. As for the director
replacement decision, we examine the roles of firm characteristics, CEO/Director
attributes, and the connections between the CEO and the director in understanding
director appointments.
The dependent variable in the first equation, Equation 9, of the bivariate
PROBIT model is a binary variable indicating CEO replacement. Table 16 presents
the results for three separate models. Model 1 presents the results for the base model
including only firm and board characteristics as explanatory variables: firm size,
firm return, industry Return, board size, fraction of supervisory directors, average
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number of directorship held by board members, and event year dummies. The
second model adds personal traits of the CEO: a dummy indicating the CEO was
60 or older, CEO gender, CEO MBA, CEO Ivyplus, internal CEO dummy, and CEO
connectedness. The third model introduces the proportion of independent directors
that had professional overlap with the CEO and the proportion of independent
directors that had educational or social overlap with the CEO. All explanatory
variables are lagged as their values at the end of the prior fiscal year.
The dependent variable in the second equation, Equation 10, is a binary vari-
able for outside director appointment. Table 16a presents the estimated coefficients
of the BIPROBIT models. Table 16b presents the estimated marginal effects. For
the CEO replacement equation, we report the marginal effects of independent vari-
ables on the probability of CEO turnover. For the director replacement equation,
we report the marginal effects of independent variables on the probability of out-
side director appointment conditional on no CEO turnover. Each table presents the
results for three models. Model 1, the base model includes only firm and board
characteristics and event year dummies. Model 2 reports results for the base model
plus variables that control for CEO attributes. Model 3, is the full model that adds
contemporaneous outside director replacement, prior outside director replacement
and appointment, and proportions of professionally or non-professionally related
outside directors on the board. Wald test results suggest that the two equations are
correlated (p-values less than 1% in all models).
The CEO turnover results are similar to those reported in Table 15. Control-
ling for the effects of firm, board, and CEO personal characteristics, we find that
the fraction of independent directors who had professional overlap with the CEO
significantly reduces the probability of CEO turnover. The marginal effect is statis-
tically significant at the 1% level. A one-standard-deviation increase of the fraction
of professionally related outside directors reduces the likelihood of CEO turnover by
1.0%. However, the fraction of outside directors that had prior educational or social
relation with the CEO does not matter.
With respect to director appointments, we find that larger and better per-
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forming firms are more likely to appoint new outside directors. This is consistent
with the notion that CEOs in more complex and better performing firms appoint-
ing independent directors for the counsel they provide. The probability of director
appointment is negatively related to board size but increases with the average busy-
ness of the board suggesting that the need for a new director decreases when there
are already a large number of directors but increases when the existing directors
have time constraints arising from service on multiple boards. The coefficients of
the event year dummies indicate that CEOs typically appoint outside directors in
the first year after they take office. The probability of director appointment in event
year 1 is 3.0% higher than that in event year 6.
As Model (2) reports, older CEOs and CEOs with MBA degrees are less likely
to appoint new outside directors but the significance of these effects disappears in
Model (3) when we add board change and overlap variables. Interestingly, a higher
quality CEO as proxied by an Ivy league background increases the probability of
the firm adding an additional outside director.
Results presented in Model (3) provide strong evidence that outside direc-
tor appointment is likely to occur with outside director replacement. Concurrent
replacement and previous year replacement are associated with 39.6% and 12.1%
higher probability of outside director appointment, respectively. These results indi-
cate that CEO typically appoints a new outside director to fill the seat vacant by a
replaced one. However, if the firm has appointed a director in the prior year, it is
less likely to appoint a director in the current fiscal year. Finally, the proportions of
both professionally overlapped and non-professionally overlapped outside directors
reduce the likelihood of new outside director appointment by 1.4%.
We next examine the probability that the outside director appointed has a
professional or a non-professional connections with the CEO.
5.1 Professionally overlapped outside director appointment
We estimate a bivariate PROBIT models to examine the decision to appoint a
new outside director who is professionally related to the CEO. The first equation
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is the same CEO replacement regression as specified the previous section. The
dependent variable in the second equation is a binary variable indicating at least
one professionally overlapped director was appointed. The explanatory variables
include firm and board characteristics, CEO personal traits, event year dummies,
a dummy variable indicating the replacement of an outside director who did not
overlap with the CEO (NonOverlap Rep), dummies indicating the replacements and
appointments occurred in the previous year (Lag Prof App, Lag NonProf App, Lag
NonOverlap Rep), and fractions of professionally or non-professionally overlapped
outside directors.
Table 17 presents the estimated results. The CEO turnover results are prac-
tically identical to those reported in Table 16. In the second equation, we find
that larger firm size is associated with higher probability of appointing new out-
side directors that are professionally related to the CEO. Better connected CEOs
are more likely to appoint a professionally related director. Other firm, board, and
CEO characteristics do not have a robust effect across all models. For example,
the average number of directorship help by board members has significant nega-
tive coefficients in Model (1) and (2), but the significance of the effect disappears
in Model (3). There is suggestive evidence that the appointment of professionally
related directors happen in the first year of a CEO’s tenure. The z-statistic for
event year 1 dummy range from 1.51 to 1.73. It is also interesting to notice that
neither firm stock return or industry stock return matter for the decision to appoint
a professionally related outside director.
The results show a clear pattern that CEOs consistently reshape the board
by adding and retaining outside directors who had prior professional relation with
them. The marginal effects of NonOverlap Rep and Lag Prof App are 4.6% (z-
statistic=6.22) and 3.0%(z-statistic=2.60), respectively. Also, one-standard-deviation
increase in the proportion of professionally overlapped outside directors leads to 3%
(z-statistic=12.53) higher probability of appointing another professionally related
director. However, the non-professional overlap variables do not have significant
effect.
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5.2 Non-professionally overlapped outside director appoint-
ment
We use seemingly unrelated bivariate PROBIT models to examine the decision to
appoint a new outside director who is related to the CEO through educational
or social overlaps. The first equation is the same CEO replacement regression as
specified the previous section. The dependent variable in the second equation is a
binary variable indicating at least one non-professionally overlapped director was
appointed. The explanatory variables include firm and board characteristics, CEO
personal traits, event year dummies, a dummy variable indicating the replacement of
an outside director who did not overlap with the CEO (NonOverlap Rep), dummies
indicating the replacements and appointments occurred in the previous year (Lag
Prof App, Lag NonProf App, Lag NonOverlap Rep), and fractions of professionally
or non-professionally overlapped outside directors.
Table 18 presents the estimated results. The CEO turnover results are prac-
tically identical to those reported in Table 16 and 17. In the second equation, we
find that larger board size is associated with lower probability of appointing new
outside directors that are non-professionally related to the CEO. CEOs who had
attended an “Ivyplus” school are more likely to appoint non-professionally related
outside directors. There is suggestive evidence that younger CEOs are less likely to
make such appointments. We also find that such appointments are more likely to
occur in the first year of the CEO’s tenure. The effect of event year 1 dummy is
positive at the 5% level in all models.
The results show a clear pattern that CEOs consistently reshape the board to
add and retain those outside directors who had prior non-professional connections
with them. The marginal effect of NonOverlap Rep is 12.26% (z-statistic=9.93).
Also, one-standard-deviation increase in the proportion of non-professionally over-
lapped outside directors leads to 7.6% (z-statistic=16.55) higher probability of ap-
pointing another non-professionally related director. However, board changes in the
prior year and the proportion of professionally overlaped outside directors do not
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have significant effect.
6 The role of SOX, Firm Size, and Forced CEO
turnovers
This section expands on our basic tests and discusses the effects of the 2002 Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, the differences across large and small firms, and the role of forced CEO
turnovers on director replacements and appointments.
6.1 Impact of 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The passage of the SOX has important implications on corporate governance prac-
tice. the 2000 sample allows us to analyze whether and how the decisions to ap-
point and replace directors change before and after SOX came in effect. We split
the sample into two sub-samples: the pre-SOX years from 2001 to 2003, and the
post-SOX years from 2004 to 2007. The pre-SOX sub-sample contains 22,182 firm-
CEO-Director-year observations and 1,859 firm-years. The post-SOX sub-sample
contains 26,805 firm-CEO-Director-year observations and 3,117 firm-years.
Using the two sub-samples, we estimate BIPROBIT models for CEO and
director replacement, as specified in Equation (1) and (2). Table 19 presents the
estimated coefficients and marginal effects. In the CEO replacement equation, prior
stock returns become more important in affecting the probability of CEO turnover
after SOX. In the post-SOX sub-sample, firm specific return is positive at the 1%
significance level and industry return is negative at the 5% level. In the pre-SOX
subsample, industry return is not significant and the marginal effect of firm return
is smaller. In the director replacement equation, we find support for homophilly in
both sub-samples. Directors that are of similar age with the CEOs are less likely
to be replaced. Absolute age difference is significantly positive at the 1% level in
both sub-samples. There is some evidence that professional connections between
the CEO and the director reduce the probability of director replacement. However,
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we find that the role of CEO-Director connections has decreased after the passage
of SOX.
Table 20-22 present the estimated results for the BIPROBIT director appoint-
ment models as specified in Equation (3) and (4) using the pre- and post-SOX
sub-samples. Comparing the coefficients on stock return variables in the CEO re-
placement equations, we confirm that the passage of SOX strengthens the CEO
turnover-performance sensitivity. In the director appointment equation of Table
20, the dependent variable is an indicator of appointing any new director. We find
that the coefficient on Lag App is negative at the 1% level in the post-SOX sub-
sample but only marginally significant in the pre-SOX sub-sample, indicating new
appointments are less likely to be made in two consecutive years after SOX.
In the director appointment equation of Table 21, the dependent variable is
an indicator of appointing a new director who is professionally connected to the
CEO. We find that in both periods, NonOverlap Rep and Frac Prof are signifi-
cantly positive, suggesting the appointment of professionally connected director is
accompanied by the replacement of non-overlapped directors and more likely to hap-
pen if the existing board has higher proportion of professionally connected directors.
Interestingly, the coefficient on Lag Prof App is positive at the 1% level in the post-
SOX sub-sample but insignificant in the pre-SOX sub-sample. So after SOX, the
appointment of connected directors are more likely to occur in consecutive years.
In the director appointment equation of Table 22, the dependent variable is
an indicator of appointing a new director who has non-professional connections to
the CEO. We find that in both periods, NonOverlap Rep and Frac NonProf are
significantly positive, suggesting the appointment of socially connected director is
also accompanied by the replacement of non-overlapped directors and more likely to
happen if the existing board has higher proportion of non-professionally connected
directors.
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6.2 Impact of firm size
The 2003 sample covers a wide range of companies and allows us to analyze the
effect of firm size. We split the sample based on whether the firm is first covered
by BoardEx before or after 2003. The firms enter into the BoardEx database be-
fore 2003 largely coincide with the EXECUCOMP companies and we label them
as “Large” and those enter later “Small”. The Large sub-sample contains 26,805
firm-CEO-Director-year observations and 3,118 firm-years. The Small sub-sample
contains 26,809 firm-CEO-Director-year observations and 2,990 firm-years.
Using the Large and Small sub-samples, Table 23-26 present the estimated
results for the BIPROBIT director replacement and appointment models as specified
in Equation (1)-(4). The CEO replacement results suggest that industry stock
return matters more for the large firms and the fraction of professionally connected
directors matters more for the small firms. For example, Table 23c shows that for
large firms, an one-standard-deviation increase in industry stock return increase the
probability of CEO turnover by 1.3%, and yet for small firms, industry stock return
seems irrelevant. Also, the coefficient of Frac Prof is significantly negative at the
1% level for small firms, but not significant for large firms.
In the director replacement equation of Table 23, we find directors that are
of similar age with the CEOs are less likely to be replaced in both the Large and
Small sub-samples. Absolute age difference is significantly positive at the 1% level
in both sub-samples. However, we find that the effects of CEO-Director connec-
tions concentrate in the Small sub-sample. For small firms, the existence of pro-
fessional connection between the CEO and the director reduces the probability of
director replacement by 1.8% with z-statistic equal to 3.90, and the existence of non-
professional connection increases the probability by 0.9% with a 2.02 z-statistic. But
for large firms, both types of connection are insignificant.
The results of the director appointment equations are generally the same for
the two size sub-samples, as shown in Table 24-26. The appointment of a director
with connections to the CEO is accompanied by the replacement of non-connected
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director. The proportion of connected directors on the existing board increases the
chance of making another connected appointment.
6.3 Impact of CEO turnover
The way a new CEO appoints or replaces directors may change as a function of why
the old CEO left. If the new CEO is the successor of a retired CEO, he or she might
not make the board composition as much as a new CEO who step in office after a
forced turnover.
For each CEO in the 2003 sample, we identify the prior CEO by finding out
who was in office during the year before the new CEO started his or her tenure.
And then we calculate the age of the departed CEO in the turnover year. We split
the 2003 sample into two sub-samples based on whether the prior CEO left at the
age greater than 62 or not. The “Retired” sub-sample contains the cases where the
prior CEO was older than 62 when departed. The “Forced” sub-sample contains
the cases where the prior CEO’s age was 62 or younger. There are 13,601 firm-
CEO-Director-year observations and 1,507 firm-years in the “Retired” sub-sample.
There are 25,845 firm-CEO-Director-year observations and 3,064 firm-years in the
“Forced” sub-sample.
Using the Retired and Forced sub-samples, Table 27-30 present the estimated
results for the BIPROBIT director replacement and appointment models as specified
in Equation (1)-(4). The CEO replacement results suggest that stock return matters
more for the Forced sub-sample. For example, Table 27c shows that if the current
CEO started tenure after a forced turnover, an one-standard-deviation decline in
firm stock return increases the probability of CEO turnover by 2.6% (significant
at 1% with z-statistic equal to 3.99). However, if the current CEO succeeded a
retired CEO, the standardized marginal effect of firm return is only 1.2% (marginally
significant with z-statistic equal to 1.81). We also find that in both sub-samples,
the proportion of professionally connected directors on the board is associated with
lower probability of CEO turnover.
In the director replacement equation of Table 27, we find the “Retired” and
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“Forced” sub-samples render similar results. Consistent with homophily, directors
that are of similar age with the CEOs are less likely to be replaced. Absolute age
difference is significantly positive at the 1% level in both sub-samples. The existence
of professional connection between the CEO and the director reduces the probability
of director replacement.
Table 24-26 presents the director appointment results. Our main results are
supported by both the “Retired” and “Forced” sub-samples. The appointment of a
director with connections to the CEO is accompanied by the replacement of non-
connected director. The proportion of connected directors on the existing board
increases the chance of making another connected appointment. In addition, we
find a positive relation between stock returns and the decision to appoint directors
that are connected to the CEO in the “Retired” sub-sample. Also, in the “Forced”
sample, the prior appointment of connected director is positively associated with the
probability of appointing another such director in the current year. The findings are
consistent with the notion that CEOs assumed office after a forced turnover have
more power in reshaping the board and performance is not critical to their ability
to do so.
6.4 Nomination Process
We examine the role of the CEO in the nomination process. Table 31 presents the
trends of nomination committee in both the 2000 and 2003 samples. We find that a
larger number of firms have a nominating committee and the nominating committee
is unlikely to have the CEO as a member over our sample period. We also find
that the number of independent directors connected to the CEO remains relatively
stable. Therefore, while CEO-Director connections play a role in the replacement
and appointment decisions, they do not represent a back-door mechanism for the
CEO to influence the nomination process.
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6.5 Robustness Test
Our analysis so far has been mainly on the 2003 sample of firms. For robustness,
we re-run all our tests separately on the 2000 sample of firms. Table 31-34 report
robustness tests. In these tables, Regression (1) uses Sample 1 and control for
industry fixed effects, Regression (2) uses Sample 2 without industry fixed effects,
and Regression (3) uses Sample 2 with industry fixed effects. Our main results are
robust to these alternative specifications and different sample.
7 Conclusions
The board of directors is a critical institution by which shareholders influence man-
agement. This institution has undergone significant transformation over the last
decade. Most board reforms are driven by activist institutions and others concerned
with the reform of corporate governance, and much of their efforts have focused on
establishing boards of directors who are independent in a technical sense. These
efforts have been successful. Board are largely composed of independent directors
with a dramatic decrease in the number of executives or individuals affiliated with
the board serving as directors.
We study the independence of independent directors. If independence is the
sole criterion by which directors are picked, boards at different companies should be
identical to each other subject to idiosyncratic noise. Alternatively, boards might
meet the technical definition of independence but might be affiliated to CEOs in
other dimensions. It is worth stressing that these connections need not be baleful,
and they may even be beneficial in facilitating advice seeking, advice giving, and
counseling CEOs in the matters of broad corporation strategy and direction. We
use detailed biographical data on the CEO and the directors of the firm obtained
from the BoardEx database to test these hypotheses.
We find that directors are less likely to be fired and more likely to be hired if
they are similar in age to the CEO and have an overlap in the professional careers of
the CEO and the director. Using a bivariate PROBIT specification, we show that
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professional connections reduce the probability that a board replaces a CEO and the
probability that a CEO replaces the connected director. Non-professional connec-
tions between the CEO and the director are not significant overall in the decision
to replace and appoint outside directors. While CEO influence over the director
selection process has all but disappeared since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we find that
the number of independent directors connected to the CEO remains relatively sta-
ble. Therefore, while CEO-Director connections play a role in the replacement and
appointment decisions, they do not represent a backdoor mechanism for the CEO
to influence the nomination process.
We conclude that the presence of professionally connected directors perhaps
increasing the ability of the board to provide advice and counsel to the CEO without




Table 11: Director Appointment and Replacement by Fiscal and Event
Year
This table reports the number of firms, CEO turnover, director appointments and replacements
by fiscal year and event year.
(a) The 2003 Sample by Fiscal Year
Fiscal #Firms #CEO #Director #Director
Year Turnover Appointments Replacements
2004 1,804 191 1,404 1,246
2005 1,868 200 1,189 1,165
2006 1,903 205 1,214 1,105
2007 1,824 208 1,149 1,162
Total 7,399 804 4,956 4,678
(b) The 2003 Sample by Event Year
Event Director Appointments Director Replacements
Year Total # % of Firms % of Boards Total # % of Firms % of Boards
1 1,143 49.33% 14.85% 1,126 48.06% 18.57%
2 926 45.12 12.89 831 41.14 16.22
3 817 42.63 12.70 747 39.91 16.37
4 792 43.57 12.29 726 40.94 16.12
5 665 40.12 11.24 655 39.68 15.79
6 610 42.08 11.33 593 42.67 15.49
Total 4,953 44.07 12.74 4,678 42.20 16.58
(c) The 2000 Sample by Fiscal Year
Fiscal #Firms #CEO #Director #Director
Year Turnover Appointments Replacements
2001 799 75 650 605
2002 987 95 630 724
2003 1011 84 887 753
2004 998 109 818 766
2005 862 100 617 601
2006 759 78 537 483
2007 642 69 468 464
Total 5,858 610 4,607 4,396
(d) The 2000 Sample by Event Year
Event Director Appointments Director Replacements
Year Total # % of Firms % of Boards Total # % of Firms % of Boards
1 984 54.18% 13.01% 966 54.09% 15.72
2 905 51.60 12.49 831 47.27 15.11
3 824 49.32 11.81 757 45.66 15.17
4 746 48.64 11.29 708 45.73 15.00
5 614 44.41 9.84 624 45.05 14.40
6 534 45.00 11.83 510 43.88 14.94
Total 4,907 11.82 49.20 4,396 47.18 15.11
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Table 12: Summary Statistics for the 2003 Sample
This table presents summary statistics on all variables for the 2003 sample. This sample contains
CEOs and board directors of the companies that existed in BoardEx after fiscal year 2003. The
sample period is 2004-2007.
Mean Median SD Min Max
Firm Characteristics (N=7,180)
Firm Size 4974.53 636.75 15046.47 14.86 104912.00
Board Size 8.73 8.00 2.61 3.00 29.00
Frac SD 0.82 0.86 0.10 0.27 1.00
Frac Prof 0.14 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00
Frac NonProf 0.22 0.17 0.21 0.00 1.00
Average Busyness 1.48 1.38 0.47 1.00 4.00
CEO Characteristics (N=7,448)
CEO Age 52.34 52.00 7.46 27.00 86.00
CEO Gender 0.97 1.00 0.17 0.00 1.00
CEO MBA 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00
CEO Ivyplus 0.23 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00
CEO Internal 0.46 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
CEO Connectedness 0.69 0.00 1.49 0.00 7.45
Director Characteristics (N=53,614)
Director Yrs on Brd 6.23 4.00 6.80 0.00 59.00
Director Busyness 1.51 1.00 0.89 1.00 9.00
Director Age 59.48 60.00 9.16 26.00 98.00
Director Gender 0.90 1.00 0.30 0.00 1.00
Director MBA 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00
Director Ivyplus 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00
Director Connectedness 1.98 0.44 3.33 0.00 15.59
Same Gender 0.87 1.00 0.33 0.00 1.00
Age Difference 10.39 9.00 7.69 0.00 58.00
Prof Overlap 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00
NonProf Overlap 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00
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Table 13: Summary Statistics for the 2000 Sample
This table presents summary statistics on all variables for the 2000 sample. This sample contains
CEOs and board directors of the companies that existed in BoardEx prior to fiscal year 2004. The
sample period is 2001-2007.
Mean Median SD Min Max
Firm Characteristics (N=5,901)
Firm Size 8726.71 1884.06 19774.44 14.86 104912.00
Board Size 9.67 9.00 2.83 4.00 31.00
Frac SD 0.82 0.86 0.10 0.20 1.00
Frac Prof 0.13 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.00
Frac NonProf 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.89
Average Busyness 1.59 1.50 0.51 1.00 4.40
CEO Characteristics (N=6,129)
CEO Age 52.43 53.00 7.03 30.00 83.00
CEO Gender 0.97 1.00 0.16 0.00 1.00
CEO MBA 0.34 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00
CEO Ivyplus 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00
CEO Internal 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
CEO Connectedness 1.09 0.11 1.87 0.00 7.45
Director Characteristics (N=48,987)
Director Yrs on Brd 6.45 4.00 6.87 0.00 59.00
Director Busyness 1.63 1.00 0.99 1.00 9.00
Director Age 59.74 60.00 8.73 27.00 98.00
Director Gender 0.88 1.00 0.33 0.00 1.00
Director MBA 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00
Director Ivyplus 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00
Director Connectedness 2.77 1.02 3.93 0.00 15.59
Same Gender 0.86 1.00 0.35 0.00 1.00
Age Difference 9.94 9.00 7.30 0.00 53.00
Prof Overlap 0.16 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00
NonProf Overlap 0.22 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00
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Table 14: PROBIT Director Replacement Models
This table presents the estimated results of PROBIT director replacement models, as specified
in Equation 6. The standard errors are allowed to be clustered at firm level. Panel (a) reports
estimated coefficients. Panel (b) reports estimated marginal effects. z statistics are in parentheses;
Standardized marginal effects are in square brackets; Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(a) PROBIT Director Replacement Models Coefficients
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size -0.035a (-5.66) -0.038a (-5.58) -0.035a (-5.07)
Firm Return -0.015 (-0.68) -0.018 (-0.80) -0.016 (-0.70)
Industry Return 0.262a (4.52) 0.267a (4.54) 0.264a (4.49)
Board Size 0.029a (5.95) 0.028a (5.34) 0.028a (5.31)
Frac SD 0.513a (3.87) 0.490a (3.58) 0.597a (4.33)
Event Year 1 0.149a (4.72) 0.147a (4.50) 0.136a (4.17)
Event Year 2 0.005 (0.16) 0.012 (0.36) 0.005 (0.16)
Event Year 3 -0.014 (-0.43) -0.008 (-0.23) -0.012 (-0.34)
Event Year 4 -0.014 (-0.42) -0.007 (-0.21) -0.008 (-0.25)
Event Year 5 -0.027 (-0.83) -0.025 (-0.74) -0.022 (-0.65)
CEO Age -0.006a (-4.30) 0.001 (0.40)
CEO MBA -0.026 (-1.19) -0.024 (-1.09)
CEO Ivyplus -0.004 (-0.18) -0.013 (-0.54)
CEO Internal -0.079a (-3.90) -0.091a (-4.36)
CEO Connectedness 0.010 (1.56) 0.013c (1.87)
Director Yrs on Brd 0.016a (13.80) 0.011a (9.07)
Director Busyness -0.036a (-2.83) -0.030b (-2.33)
Director MBA -0.031 (-1.58) -0.007 (-0.38)
Director Ivyplus 0.058a (3.11) 0.049a (2.63)
Director Connectedness 0.013a (4.05) 0.010a (3.19)
Same Gender 0.022 (0.88)
Age Difference 0.017a (12.74)
Prof Overlap -0.094a (-3.86)
NonProf Overlap 0.044b (2.28)
Observations 53,614 53,614 53,614
Pseudo R2 0.007 0.016 0.024
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(b) PROBIT Director Replacement Models Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size -0.006a [-0.012] (-5.61) -0.006a [-0.012] (-5.53) -0.005a [-0.011] (-5.03)
Firm Return -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.68) -0.003 [-0.001] (-0.80) -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.70)
Industry Return 0.041a [0.007] (4.52) 0.041a [0.007] (4.54) 0.040a [0.007] (4.49)
Board Size 0.005a [0.013] (5.89) 0.004a [0.012] (5.28) 0.004a [0.012] (5.24)
Frac SD 0.080a [0.007] (3.88) 0.076a [0.007] (3.60) 0.091a [0.008] (4.35)
Event Year 1 0.025a [0.010] (4.44) 0.024a [0.010] (4.23) 0.022a [0.009] (3.93)
Event Year 2 0.001 [0.000] (0.16) 0.002 [0.001] (0.36) 0.001 [0.000] (0.16)
Event Year 3 -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.43) -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.23) -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.34)
Event Year 4 -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.43) -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.21) -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.25)
Event Year 5 -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.84) -0.004 [-0.001] (-0.75) -0.003 [-0.001] (-0.66)
CEO Age -0.001a [-0.007] (-4.32) 0.000 [0.001] (0.40)
CEO MBA -0.004 [-0.002] (-1.20) -0.004 [-0.002] (-1.10)
CEO Ivyplus -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.18) -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.54)
CEO Internal -0.012a [-0.006] (-3.92) -0.014a [-0.007] (-4.38)
CEO Connectedness 0.002 [0.003] (1.56) 0.002c [0.003] (1.87)
Director Yrs on Brd 0.003a [0.017] (13.98) 0.002a [0.012] (9.12)
Director Busyness -0.006a [-0.005] (-2.83) -0.005b [-0.004] (-2.33)
Director MBA -0.005 [-0.002] (-1.60) -0.001 [-0.001] (-0.38)
Director Ivyplus 0.009a [0.004] (3.07) 0.008a [0.003] (2.60)
Director Connectedness 0.002a [0.007] (4.06) 0.002a [0.005] (3.19)
Same Gender 0.003 [0.001] (0.90)
Age Difference 0.003a [0.019] (12.92)
Prof Overlap -0.014a [-0.005] (-4.03)
NonProf Overlap 0.007b [0.003] (2.24)
Observations 53,614 53,614 53,614
Pseudo R2 0.007 0.016 0.024
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Table 15: BIPROBIT Director Replacement Models
This table presents the estimated results of BIPROBIT director replacement models, as specified
in Equation 7-8. The standard errors are allowed to be clustered at firm level. Panel (a) reports
estimated coefficients. Panel (b) reports estimated marginal effects. z statistics are in parentheses;
Standardized marginal effects are in square brackets; Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(a) BIPROBIT Director Replacement Models Coefficients
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size -0.063a (-4.37) -0.071a (-4.54) -0.066a (-4.23)
Firm Return -0.279a (-5.35) -0.290a (-5.44) -0.287a (-5.40)
Industry Return 0.214 (1.58) 0.226 (1.63) 0.226 (1.64)
Board Size 0.032a (2.60) 0.028b (2.12) 0.030b (2.31)
Frac SD -0.654a (-2.86) -0.547b (-2.32) -0.456c (-1.92)
Average Busyness 0.178a (3.94) 0.158a (3.29) 0.134a (2.72)
CEO 60 0.503a (9.53) 0.518a (9.80)
CEO Gender -0.023 (-0.20) -0.022 (-0.19)
CEO MBA 0.009 (0.19) 0.007 (0.15)
CEO Ivyplus -0.017 (-0.32) -0.026 (-0.48)
CEO Internal 0.008 (0.18) -0.021 (-0.46)
CEO Connectedness 0.034b (2.37) 0.032b (2.23)
Frac Prof -0.293a (-2.92)
Frac NonProf -0.060 (-0.57)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Continue on next page
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Table 15
Table 15(a) – continued from previous page
Y2 = Director Replacement
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size -0.035a (-5.54) -0.037a (-5.46) -0.033a (-4.83)
Firm Return -0.016 (-0.73) -0.018 (-0.81) -0.016 (-0.70)
Industry Return 0.267a (4.57) 0.271a (4.57) 0.271a (4.55)
Board Size 0.028a (5.71) 0.026a (5.05) 0.027a (5.07)
Frac SD 0.561a (4.51) 0.541a (4.18) 0.643a (4.92)
Event Year 1 0.151a (4.74) 0.150a (4.57) 0.138a (4.18)
Event Year 2 0.009 (0.28) 0.016 (0.48) 0.012 (0.37)
Event Year 3 -0.012 (-0.37) -0.006 (-0.17) -0.006 (-0.17)
Event Year 4 -0.012 (-0.36) -0.006 (-0.16) -0.006 (-0.18)
Event Year 5 -0.030 (-0.89) -0.027 (-0.83) -0.022 (-0.66)
CEO Age -0.006a (-4.06) 0.001 (0.67)
CEO MBA -0.026 (-1.18) -0.023 (-1.03)
CEO Ivyplus -0.005 (-0.21) -0.015 (-0.61)
CEO Internal -0.073a (-3.56) -0.087a (-4.14)
CEO Connectedness 0.010 (1.55) 0.012c (1.78)
Director Yrs on Brd 0.016a (13.78) 0.011a (9.16)
Director Busyness -0.034a (-2.65) -0.027b (-2.12)
Director MBA -0.030 (-1.54) -0.004 (-0.20)
Director Ivyplus 0.056a (2.98) 0.045b (2.39)
Director Connectedness 0.012a (3.68) 0.009a (2.84)
Same Gender 0.020 (0.80)
Age Difference 0.017a (12.73)
Prof Overlap -0.099a (-4.06)
NonProf Overlap 0.046b (2.35)
Observations 52,905 52,895 52,820
Log pseudolikelihood -33,394.33 -32,807.26 -32,560.34
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.013 0.099 0.099
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(c) BIPROBIT Director Replacement Models Marginal Effects
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size -0.011a [-0.024] (-4.35) -0.012a [-0.026] (-4.51) -0.012a [-0.024] (-4.20)
Firm Return -0.050a [-0.023] (-5.39) -0.051a [-0.023] (-5.47) -0.050a [-0.023] (-5.44)
Industry Return 0.039 [0.006] (1.58) 0.039 [0.006] (1.63) 0.039 [0.006] (1.64)
Board Size 0.006b [0.017] (2.57) 0.005b [0.014] (2.10) 0.005b [0.015] (2.28)
Frac SD -0.118a [-0.010] (-2.87) -0.096b [-0.008] (-2.33) -0.080c [-0.007] (-1.93)
Average Busyness 0.032a [0.015] (3.94) 0.028a [0.013] (3.28) 0.023a [0.011] (2.71)
CEO 60 0.109a [0.039] (8.04) 0.112a [0.041] (8.23)
CEO Gender -0.004 [-0.001] (-0.19) -0.004 [-0.001] (-0.19)
CEO MBA 0.002 [0.001] (0.19) 0.001 [0.001] (0.15)
CEO Ivyplus -0.003 [-0.001] (-0.32) -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.48)
CEO Internal 0.001 [0.001] (0.18) -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.46)
CEO Connectedness 0.006b [0.010] (2.39) 0.006b [0.009] (2.24)
Frac Prof -0.051a [-0.013] (-2.93)
Frac NonProf -0.010 [-0.002] (-0.57)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Continue on next page
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Table 15
Table 15(b) – continued from previous page
Y2 = Director Replacement
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size -0.006a [-0.012] (-5.62) -0.006a [-0.012] (-5.50) -0.005a [-0.011] (-4.87)
Firm Return -0.003 [-0.001] (-0.89) -0.003 [-0.002] (-0.93) -0.003 [-0.001] (-0.82)
Industry Return 0.043a [0.007] (4.62) 0.043a [0.007] (4.61) 0.042a [0.007] (4.59)
Board Size 0.004a [0.013] (5.72) 0.004a [0.012] (5.04) 0.004a [0.012] (5.07)
Frac SD 0.088a [0.008] (4.44) 0.084a [0.007] (4.15) 0.098a [0.008] (4.90)
Event Year 1 0.025a [0.010] (4.39) 0.025a [0.010] (4.26) 0.022a [0.009] (3.91)
Event Year 2 0.001 [0.001] (0.25) 0.003 [0.001] (0.48) 0.002 [0.001] (0.37)
Event Year 3 -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.42) -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.19) -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.20)
Event Year 4 -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.39) -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.18) -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.19)
Event Year 5 -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.88) -0.004 [-0.001] (-0.81) -0.003 [-0.001] (-0.64)
CEO Age -0.001a [-0.007] (-4.07) 0.000 [0.001] (0.67)
CEO MBA -0.004 [-0.002] (-1.18) -0.003 [-0.002] (-1.03)
CEO Ivyplus -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.22) -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.62)
CEO Internal -0.011a [-0.006] (-3.57) -0.013a [-0.007] (-4.17)
CEO Connectedness 0.002 [0.003] (1.59) 0.002c [0.003] (1.82)
Director Yrs on Brd 0.003a [0.017] (13.93) 0.002a [0.012] (9.20)
Director Busyness -0.005a [-0.005] (-2.64) -0.004b [-0.004] (-2.12)
Director MBA -0.005 [-0.002] (-1.55) -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.20)
Director Ivyplus 0.009a [0.004] (2.94) 0.007b [0.003] (2.37)
Director Connectedness 0.002a [0.006] (3.69) 0.001a [0.005] (2.85)
Same Gender 0.003 [0.001] (0.81)
Age Difference 0.003a [0.020] (12.91)
Prof Overlap -0.015a [-0.006] (-4.23)
NonProf Overlap 0.007b [0.003] (2.32)
Observations 52,905 52,895 52,820
Log pseudolikelihood -33,394.33 -32,807.26 -32,560.34
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.013 0.099 0.099
106
Table 16: BIPROBIT Director Appointment Models
This table presents the estimated results of BIPROBIT director appointment models, as specified
in Equation 9-10. The standard errors are allowed to be clustered at firm level. Panel (a) reports
estimated coefficients. Panel (b) reports estimated marginal effects. z statistics are in parentheses;
Standardized marginal effects are in square brackets; Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(a) BIPROBIT Director Appointment Models Coefficients
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size -0.064a (-4.88) -0.070a (-5.01) -0.079a (-4.42)
Firm Return -0.271a (-5.64) -0.279a (-5.67) -0.313a (-4.51)
Industry Return 0.187 (1.50) 0.198 (1.55) 0.323c (1.81)
Board Size 0.027a (2.66) 0.022b (2.07) 0.024c (1.92)
Frac SD -0.324 (-1.55) -0.231 (-1.07) -0.322 (-1.19)
Average Busyness 0.151a (3.54) 0.132a (2.92) 0.079 (1.41)
CEO 60 0.436a (8.63) 0.416a (6.49)
CEO Gender -0.068 (-0.60) -0.073 (-0.52)
CEO MBA 0.016 (0.34) 0.013 (0.22)
CEO Ivyplus -0.030 (-0.60) -0.034 (-0.54)
CEO Internal 0.015 (0.36) 0.021 (0.39)
CEO Connectedness 0.041a (3.04) 0.035b (2.03)
Frac Prof -0.341a (-2.62)
Frac NonProf -0.014 (-0.12)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Y2 = Director Appointment
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size 0.089a (8.66) 0.087a (8.32) 0.115a (9.17)
Firm Return 0.101a (3.11) 0.096a (2.95) 0.091b (2.18)
Industry Return 0.201b (2.10) 0.201b (2.09) 0.008 (0.07)
Board Size -0.032a (-4.17) -0.030a (-3.94) -0.076a (-7.81)
Frac SD 0.142 (0.85) 0.132 (0.78) -0.502b (-2.49)
Average Busyness 0.087b (2.55) 0.082b (2.39) 0.066c (1.67)
Event Year 1 0.198a (3.73) 0.188a (3.52) 0.169a (2.72)
Event Year 2 0.075 (1.42) 0.067 (1.27) 0.095 (1.55)
Event Year 3 0.005 (0.10) -0.003 (-0.05) 0.019 (0.30)
Event Year 4 0.031 (0.57) 0.026 (0.48) 0.025 (0.39)
Event Year 5 -0.057 (-1.03) -0.062 (-1.10) -0.079 (-1.20)
CEO Age -0.006a (-3.11) -0.003 (-1.07)
CEO Gender -0.020 (-0.24) 0.011 (0.12)
CEO MBA -0.076b (-2.22) -0.045 (-1.15)
CEO Ivyplus 0.051 (1.40) 0.074c (1.75)
CEO Internal -0.033 (-1.05) -0.009 (-0.25)
CEO Connectedness 0.016 (1.54) 0.013 (1.11)
Replacement 1.040a (27.73)
Lag App -0.208a (-5.51)
Lag Rep 0.307a (8.06)
Frac Prof -0.145c (-1.78)
Frac NonProf -0.167c (-1.95)
Observations 7,355 7,353 6,008
Log pseudolikelihood -7,429.04 -7,370.81 -5,051.32
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.000 0.000 0.008
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(b) BIPROBIT Director Appointment Models Marginal Effects
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size -0.012a [-0.024] (-4.85) -0.013a [-0.026] (-4.98) -0.010a [-0.020] (-4.39)
Firm Return -0.049a [-0.025] (-5.69) -0.049a [-0.025] (-5.72) -0.039a [-0.018] (-4.58)
Industry Return 0.034 [0.006] (1.50) 0.035 [0.006] (1.55) 0.041c [0.006] (1.82)
Board Size 0.005a [0.013] (2.66) 0.004b [0.010] (2.07) 0.003c [0.008] (1.92)
Frac SD -0.059 [-0.006] (-1.55) -0.041 [-0.004] (-1.07) -0.040 [-0.004] (-1.19)
Average Busyness 0.028a [0.013] (3.54) 0.023a [0.011] (2.91) 0.010 [0.005] (1.42)
CEO 60 0.093a [0.034] (7.45) 0.065a [0.023] (5.38)
CEO Gender -0.013 [-0.002] (-0.58) -0.010 [-0.002] (-0.50)
CEO MBA 0.003 [0.001] (0.34) 0.002 [0.001] (0.22)
CEO Ivyplus -0.005 [-0.002] (-0.61) -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.55)
CEO Internal 0.003 [0.001] (0.36) 0.003 [0.001] (0.39)
CEO Connectedness 0.007a [0.011] (3.05) 0.004b [0.007] (2.04)
Frac Prof -0.043a [-0.010] (-2.63)
Frac NonProf -0.002 [-0.000] (-0.12)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Continue on next page
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Table 16
Table 16(b) – continued from previous page
Y2 = Director Appointment
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size 0.034a [0.070] (8.33) 0.033a [0.069] (8.00) 0.045a [0.091] (9.05)
Firm Return 0.035a [0.017] (2.71) 0.033b [0.017] (2.57) 0.034b [0.015] (2.03)
Industry Return 0.084b [0.014] (2.20) 0.083b [0.014] (2.19) 0.006 [0.001] (0.12)
Board Size -0.012a [-0.032] (-3.99) -0.012a [-0.030] (-3.80) -0.030a [-0.078] (-7.76)
Frac SD 0.050 [0.005] (0.75) 0.048 [0.005] (0.72) -0.201b [-0.019] (-2.53)
Average Busyness 0.038a [0.018] (2.76) 0.035b [0.016] (2.55) 0.027c [0.013] (1.71)
Event Year 1 0.077a [0.030] (3.65) 0.074a [0.029] (3.48) 0.066a [0.026] (2.68)
Event Year 2 0.030 [0.012] (1.43) 0.028 [0.011] (1.31) 0.038 [0.015] (1.56)
Event Year 3 0.001 [0.000] (0.05) -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.07) 0.006 [0.002] (0.25)
Event Year 4 0.012 [0.004] (0.54) 0.010 [0.004] (0.47) 0.009 [0.004] (0.38)
Event Year 5 -0.021 [-0.008] (-0.96) -0.023 [-0.008] (-1.02) -0.030 [-0.011] (-1.17)
CEO Age -0.003a [-0.019] (-3.11) -0.001 [-0.008] (-1.07)
CEO Gender -0.009 [-0.002] (-0.27) 0.004 [0.001] (0.10)
CEO MBA -0.030b [-0.014] (-2.21) -0.018 [-0.008] (-1.15)
CEO Ivyplus 0.020 [0.008] (1.36) 0.029c [0.012] (1.74)
CEO Internal -0.013 [-0.006] (-1.03) -0.003 [-0.002] (-0.23)
CEO Connectedness 0.007c [0.011] (1.73) 0.006 [0.008] (1.17)
Replacement 0.396a [0.197] (30.26)
Lag App -0.082a [-0.041] (-5.53)
Lag Rep 0.121a [0.060] (8.09)
Frac Prof -0.060c [-0.014] (-1.86)
Frac NonProf -0.066c [-0.014] (-1.95)
Observations 7,355 7,353 6,008
Log pseudolikelihood -7,429.04 -7,370.81 -5,051.32
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.000 0.000 0.008
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Table 17: BIPROBIT Prof Overlap Director Appointment Models
This table presents the estimated results of BIPROBIT Prof Overlap director appointment
models, as specified in Equation 9-10. The standard errors are allowed to be clustered at firm
level. Panel (a) reports estimated coefficients. Panel (b) reports estimated marginal effects. z
statistics are in parentheses; Standardized marginal effects are in square brackets; Superscripts a,
b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(a) BIPROBIT Prof Overlap Director Appointment Models Coefficients
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size -0.064a (-4.89) -0.070a (-5.02) -0.079a (-4.42)
Firm Return -0.271a (-5.64) -0.278a (-5.67) -0.313a (-4.49)
Industry Return 0.193 (1.54) 0.200 (1.58) 0.324c (1.82)
Board Size 0.027a (2.67) 0.022b (2.06) 0.024c (1.93)
Frac SD -0.311 (-1.49) -0.216 (-1.00) -0.311 (-1.15)
Average Busyness 0.155a (3.59) 0.136a (2.98) 0.079 (1.43)
CEO 60 0.443a (8.77) 0.418a (6.53)
CEO Gender -0.068 (-0.60) -0.074 (-0.53)
CEO MBA 0.017 (0.36) 0.012 (0.22)
CEO Ivyplus -0.032 (-0.64) -0.035 (-0.55)
CEO Internal 0.016 (0.37) 0.021 (0.39)
CEO Connectedness 0.041a (3.08) 0.035b (2.05)
Frac Prof -0.349a (-2.66)
Frac NonProf -0.016 (-0.13)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Y2 = Prof Overlap Director Appointment
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size 0.095a (5.34) 0.093a (5.09) 0.051b (2.47)
Firm Return 0.005 (0.10) -0.001 (-0.02) 0.054 (0.76)
Industry Return 0.128 (0.88) 0.116 (0.79) -0.036 (-0.18)
Board Size -0.001 (-0.06) 0.001 (0.07) -0.029c (-1.94)
Frac SD 0.061 (0.19) 0.072 (0.22) -0.873b (-2.41)
Average Busyness -0.219a (-2.82) -0.230a (-2.95) -0.024 (-0.36)
Event Year 1 0.138 (1.63) 0.147c (1.70) 0.189c (1.92)
Event Year 2 0.030 (0.35) 0.026 (0.29) -0.001 (-0.01)
Event Year 3 -0.055 (-0.61) -0.056 (-0.61) -0.108 (-1.02)
Event Year 4 -0.048 (-0.53) -0.054 (-0.59) -0.107 (-0.99)
Event Year 5 -0.058 (-0.68) -0.063 (-0.73) -0.125 (-1.16)
CEO Age -0.003 (-0.85) -0.006 (-1.52)
CEO Gender 0.266 (1.56) 0.207 (1.01)
CEO MBA -0.049 (-0.76) -0.035 (-0.52)
CEO Ivyplus -0.076 (-1.07) 0.018 (0.25)
CEO Internal -0.193a (-3.32) 0.033 (0.49)
CEO Connectedness 0.042b (2.56) 0.067a (4.01)
NonOverlap Rep 0.490a (7.18)
Lag Prof App 0.305a (3.24)
Lag NonProf App 0.041 (0.45)
Lag NonOverlap Rep -0.003 (-0.04)
Frac Prof 1.693a (12.97)
Frac NonProf -0.008 (-0.05)
Observations 7,355 7,353 6,008
Log pseudolikelihood -3,970.73 -3,905.05 -2,534.30
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.100 0.080 0.936
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(b) BIPROBIT Prof Overlap Director Appointment Models Marginal Effects
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size -0.012a [-0.024] (-4.86) -0.013a [-0.026] (-4.99) -0.010a [-0.020] (-4.40)
Firm Return -0.049a [-0.025] (-5.69) -0.049a [-0.025] (-5.71) -0.039a [-0.018] (-4.56)
Industry Return 0.035 [0.006] (1.54) 0.036 [0.006] (1.58) 0.041c [0.006] (1.82)
Board Size 0.005a [0.013] (2.67) 0.004b [0.010] (2.06) 0.003c [0.008] (1.93)
Frac SD -0.057 [-0.006] (-1.49) -0.038 [-0.004] (-1.00) -0.039 [-0.004] (-1.15)
Average Busyness 0.028a [0.013] (3.59) 0.024a [0.011] (2.97) 0.010 [0.005] (1.43)
CEO 60 0.095a [0.034] (7.56) 0.065a [0.023] (5.41)
CEO Gender -0.013 [-0.002] (-0.58) -0.010 [-0.002] (-0.51)
CEO MBA 0.003 [0.001] (0.36) 0.002 [0.001] (0.22)
CEO Ivyplus -0.006 [-0.002] (-0.64) -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.56)
CEO Internal 0.003 [0.001] (0.37) 0.003 [0.001] (0.38)
CEO Connectedness 0.007a [0.011] (3.09) 0.004b [0.007] (2.06)
Frac Prof -0.044a [-0.010] (-2.68)
Frac NonProf -0.002 [-0.000] (-0.13)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Continue on next page
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Table 17(b) – continued from previous page
Y2 = Prof Overlap Director Appointment
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size 0.010a [0.020] (5.31) 0.009a [0.019] (5.01) 0.004b [0.008] (2.46)
Firm Return -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.00) -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.13) 0.004 [0.002] (0.77)
Industry Return 0.014 [0.002] (0.91) 0.012 [0.002] (0.82) -0.003 [-0.000] (-0.18)
Board Size -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.02) 0.000 [0.000] (0.11) -0.002c [-0.006] (-1.92)
Frac SD 0.006 [0.001] (0.17) 0.007 [0.001] (0.21) -0.067b [-0.006] (-2.45)
Average Busyness -0.022a [-0.011] (-2.80) -0.023a [-0.011] (-2.93) -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.36)
Event Year 1 0.015 [0.006] (1.51) 0.016 [0.006] (1.57) 0.016c [0.006] (1.73)
Event Year 2 0.003 [0.001] (0.34) 0.003 [0.001] (0.30) -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.01)
Event Year 3 -0.006 [-0.002] (-0.64) -0.006 [-0.002] (-0.64) -0.008 [-0.003] (-1.09)
Event Year 4 -0.005 [-0.002] (-0.56) -0.005 [-0.002] (-0.61) -0.008 [-0.003] (-1.06)
Event Year 5 -0.006 [-0.002] (-0.68) -0.006 [-0.002] (-0.73) -0.009 [-0.003] (-1.27)
CEO Age -0.000 [-0.003] (-0.85) -0.000 [-0.004] (-1.51)
CEO Gender 0.022c [0.004] (1.95) 0.013 [0.002] (1.23)
CEO MBA -0.005 [-0.002] (-0.77) -0.003 [-0.001] (-0.53)
CEO Ivyplus -0.008 [-0.003] (-1.12) 0.001 [0.001] (0.24)
CEO Internal -0.019a [-0.010] (-3.34) 0.003 [0.001] (0.49)
CEO Connectedness 0.004a [0.007] (2.61) 0.005a [0.008] (3.97)
NonOverlap Rep 0.046a [0.021] (6.22)
Lag Prof App 0.030a [0.007] (2.60)
Lag NonProf App 0.003 [0.001] (0.44)
Lag NonOverlap Rep -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.04)
Frac Prof 0.130a [0.030] (12.53)
Frac NonProf -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.05)
Observations 7,355 7,353 6,008
Log pseudolikelihood -3,970.73 -3,905.05 -2,534.30
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.100 0.080 0.936
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Table 18: BIPROBIT NonProf Overlap Director Appointment Models
This table presents the estimated results of BIPROBIT NonProf Overlap director appointment
models, as specified in Equation 9-10. The standard errors are allowed to be clustered at firm
level. Panel (a) reports estimated coefficients. Panel (b) reports estimated marginal effects. z
statistics are in parentheses; Standardized marginal effects are in square brackets; Superscripts a,
b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(a) BIPROBIT NonProf Overlap Director Appointment Models Coefficients
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size -0.065a (-4.91) -0.071a (-5.04) -0.079a (-4.44)
Firm Return -0.272a (-5.65) -0.279a (-5.68) -0.313a (-4.50)
Industry Return 0.195 (1.56) 0.204 (1.60) 0.324c (1.82)
Board Size 0.027a (2.70) 0.022b (2.10) 0.024c (1.94)
Frac SD -0.320 (-1.53) -0.225 (-1.04) -0.314 (-1.16)
Average Busyness 0.154a (3.58) 0.134a (2.95) 0.080 (1.43)
CEO 60 0.442a (8.76) 0.419a (6.54)
CEO Gender -0.069 (-0.61) -0.073 (-0.52)
CEO MBA 0.016 (0.34) 0.012 (0.22)
CEO Ivyplus -0.033 (-0.65) -0.035 (-0.56)
CEO Internal 0.016 (0.37) 0.020 (0.38)
CEO Connectedness 0.041a (3.07) 0.035b (2.04)
Frac Prof -0.349a (-2.67)
Frac NonProf -0.014 (-0.12)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Y2 = NonProf Overlap Director Appointment
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size 0.006 (0.46) 0.002 (0.12) 0.032b (2.15)
Firm Return 0.040 (1.05) 0.035 (0.91) 0.055 (1.15)
Industry Return 0.212c (1.84) 0.205c (1.78) -0.088 (-0.59)
Board Size -0.021b (-2.05) -0.017c (-1.67) -0.024b (-2.00)
Frac SD -0.056 (-0.27) -0.094 (-0.44) -0.782a (-3.02)
Average Busyness -0.058 (-1.34) -0.077c (-1.72) 0.033 (0.66)
Event Year 1 0.168a (2.61) 0.154b (2.38) 0.170b (2.29)
Event Year 2 0.101 (1.56) 0.094 (1.44) 0.105 (1.39)
Event Year 3 0.066 (0.99) 0.062 (0.92) 0.088 (1.15)
Event Year 4 -0.011 (-0.16) -0.017 (-0.24) 0.017 (0.22)
Event Year 5 -0.012 (-0.18) -0.018 (-0.26) -0.084 (-1.03)
CEO Age -0.008a (-3.06) -0.005 (-1.54)
CEO Gender 0.152 (1.36) 0.130 (1.03)
CEO MBA -0.007 (-0.17) 0.047 (1.01)
CEO Ivyplus 0.164a (3.65) 0.150a (3.06)
CEO Internal 0.012 (0.31) 0.046 (1.01)
CEO Connectedness 0.006 (0.42) 0.010 (0.67)
NonOverlap Rep 0.532a (10.74)
Lag Prof App 0.093 (1.04)
Lag NonProf App -0.035 (-0.56)
Lag NonOverlap Rep 0.074 (1.49)
Frac Prof 0.063 (0.56)
Frac NonProf 1.798a (16.45)
Observations 7,355 7,353 6,008
Log pseudolikelihood -5,488.43 -5,423.55 -3,707.46
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.003 0.012 0.173
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(b) BIPROBIT NonProf Overlap Director Appointment Models Marginal Effects
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size -0.012a [-0.024] (-4.88) -0.013a [-0.026] (-5.01) -0.010a [-0.020] (-4.42)
Firm Return -0.050a [-0.025] (-5.70) -0.050a [-0.025] (-5.72) -0.039a [-0.018] (-4.57)
Industry Return 0.036 [0.006] (1.56) 0.036 [0.006] (1.60) 0.041c [0.006] (1.82)
Board Size 0.005a [0.013] (2.70) 0.004b [0.010] (2.10) 0.003c [0.008] (1.94)
Frac SD -0.058 [-0.006] (-1.53) -0.040 [-0.004] (-1.04) -0.039 [-0.004] (-1.16)
Average Busyness 0.028a [0.013] (3.57) 0.024a [0.011] (2.95) 0.010 [0.005] (1.44)
CEO 60 0.094a [0.034] (7.55) 0.065a [0.023] (5.42)
CEO Gender -0.013 [-0.002] (-0.58) -0.010 [-0.002] (-0.50)
CEO MBA 0.003 [0.001] (0.34) 0.002 [0.001] (0.22)
CEO Ivyplus -0.006 [-0.002] (-0.66) -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.57)
CEO Internal 0.003 [0.001] (0.37) 0.003 [0.001] (0.38)
CEO Connectedness 0.007a [0.011] (3.08) 0.004b [0.007] (2.05)
Frac Prof -0.044a [-0.010] (-2.69)
Frac NonProf -0.002 [-0.000] (-0.12)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Continue on next page
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Table 18(b) – continued from previous page
Y2 = NonProf Overlap Director Appointment
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size 0.001 [0.002] (0.33) -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.00) 0.006b [0.013] (2.09)
Firm Return 0.008 [0.004] (0.86) 0.007 [0.003] (0.75) 0.010 [0.005] (1.07)
Industry Return 0.050c [0.008] (1.89) 0.048c [0.008] (1.82) -0.017 [-0.003] (-0.56)
Board Size -0.005b [-0.012] (-1.98) -0.004 [-0.010] (-1.62) -0.005b [-0.012] (-1.98)
Frac SD -0.015 [-0.001] (-0.31) -0.022 [-0.002] (-0.47) -0.159a [-0.015] (-3.04)
Average Busyness -0.012 [-0.006] (-1.25) -0.017c [-0.008] (-1.65) 0.007 [0.003] (0.68)
Event Year 1 0.040b [0.016] (2.45) 0.036b [0.014] (2.25) 0.036b [0.014] (2.14)
Event Year 2 0.024 [0.009] (1.51) 0.022 [0.009] (1.41) 0.022 [0.009] (1.35)
Event Year 3 0.015 [0.006] (0.95) 0.014 [0.005] (0.90) 0.018 [0.007] (1.09)
Event Year 4 -0.003 [-0.001] (-0.18) -0.004 [-0.001] (-0.25) 0.003 [0.001] (0.22)
Event Year 5 -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.15) -0.004 [-0.001] (-0.23) -0.016 [-0.006] (-1.05)
CEO Age -0.002a [-0.014] (-3.06) -0.001 [-0.007] (-1.54)
CEO Gender 0.032 [0.005] (1.46) 0.024 [0.004] (1.10)
CEO MBA -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.16) 0.010 [0.005] (1.00)
CEO Ivyplus 0.039a [0.016] (3.50) 0.032a [0.014] (2.94)
CEO Internal 0.003 [0.001] (0.32) 0.009 [0.005] (1.02)
CEO Connectedness 0.002 [0.002] (0.49) 0.002 [0.003] (0.70)
NonOverlap Rep 0.122a [0.055] (9.93)
Lag Prof App 0.020 [0.005] (0.99)
Lag NonProf App -0.007 [-0.002] (-0.57)
Lag NonOverlap Rep 0.015 [0.007] (1.46)
Frac Prof 0.012 [0.003] (0.52)
Frac NonProf 0.363a [0.076] (16.55)
Observations 7,355 7,353 6,008
Log pseudolikelihood -5,488.43 -5,423.55 -3,707.46
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.003 0.012 0.173
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Table 19: BIPROBIT Director Replacement Models: SOX Sub-samples
This table presents the estimated results of BIPROBIT director replacement models, as specified
in Equation 7-8. The 2000 sample is split into two sub-samples based on the passage of SOX. The
standard errors are allowed to be clustered at firm level. Panel (a) reports estimated coefficients.
Panel (b) reports estimated marginal effects. z statistics are in parentheses; Standardized
marginal effects are in square brackets; Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(a) BIPROBIT Director Replacement Models Coeffi-
cients
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Post-SOX (2) Pre-SOX
Firm Size -0.039 (-1.47) 0.011 (0.37)
Firm Return -0.413a (-4.18) -0.347a (-3.33)
Industry Return 0.446b (2.18) -0.052 (-0.31)
Board Size 0.019 (1.06) -0.003 (-0.19)
Frac SD -1.046a (-2.71) -1.187a (-3.51)
Frac Prof -0.309 (-1.63) -0.051 (-0.28)
Frac NonProf -0.249 (-1.34) 0.144 (0.73)
Average Busyness 0.091 (1.30) 0.045 (0.50)
CEO 60 0.559a (7.10) 0.724a (7.98)
CEO Gender 0.004 (0.02) -0.172 (-0.72)
CEO MBA -0.030 (-0.43) -0.011 (-0.13)
CEO Ivyplus -0.037 (-0.50) -0.121 (-1.39)
CEO Internal -0.102 (-1.48) -0.199a (-2.62)
CEO Connectedness 0.023 (1.26) -0.008 (-0.35)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Continue on next page
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Table 19(a) – continued from previous page
Y2 = Director Replacement
(1) Post-SOX (2) Pre-SOX
Firm Size -0.004 (-0.36) -0.024b (-2.07)
Firm Return 0.005 (0.14) 0.008 (0.26)
Industry Return 0.198b (2.44) -0.111c (-1.73)
Board Size 0.030a (3.87) 0.019a (2.95)
Frac SD 0.569b (2.56) 0.394b (2.50)
CEO Age 0.006b (2.35) 0.000 (0.08)
CEO MBA -0.023 (-0.76) 0.010 (0.30)
CEO Ivyplus -0.017 (-0.56) 0.002 (0.05)
CEO Internal -0.089a (-3.08) -0.112a (-3.57)
CEO Connectedness 0.008 (1.06) 0.012c (1.67)
Director Yrs on Brd 0.010a (5.56) 0.007a (3.98)
Director Busyness -0.036b (-2.17) -0.045b (-2.36)
Director MBA -0.023 (-0.86) -0.068b (-2.22)
Director Ivyplus 0.010 (0.40) -0.031 (-1.06)
Director Connectedness 0.006 (1.37) 0.008c (1.79)
Same Gender 0.019 (0.61) 0.061 (1.56)
Age Difference 0.026a (12.47) 0.018a (8.54)
Prof Overlap -0.037 (-1.01) -0.058 (-1.48)
NonProf Overlap 0.019 (0.68) -0.022 (-0.69)
Event Year 1 0.123a (2.67) 0.127b (2.41)
Event Year 2 -0.033 (-0.72) 0.095c (1.76)
Event Year 3 -0.049 (-1.03) 0.064 (1.18)
Event Year 4 -0.023 (-0.50) 0.054 (0.94)
Event Year 5 -0.043 (-0.93) 0.078 (1.39)
Observations 26,805 22,182
Log pseudolikelihood -16,218.91 -12,837.80
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.013 0.002
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(c) BIPROBIT Director Replacement Models Marginal Effects
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Post-SOX (2) Pre-SOX
Firm Size -0.007 [-0.011] (-1.47) 0.002 [0.003] (0.37)
Firm Return -0.070a [-0.028] (-4.19) -0.049a [-0.022] (-3.40)
Industry Return 0.076b [0.013] (2.18) -0.007 [-0.002] (-0.31)
Board Size 0.003 [0.009] (1.05) -0.000 [-0.001] (-0.19)
Frac SD -0.177a [-0.014] (-2.72) -0.166a [-0.016] (-3.57)
Frac Prof -0.052 [-0.011] (-1.63) -0.007 [-0.002] (-0.28)
Frac NonProf -0.042 [-0.008] (-1.34) 0.020 [0.004] (0.73)
Average Busyness 0.015 [0.007] (1.30) 0.006 [0.003] (0.49)
CEO 60 0.120a [0.044] (5.86) 0.143a [0.051] (6.24)
CEO Gender 0.001 [0.000] (0.02) -0.027 [-0.004] (-0.64)
CEO MBA -0.005 [-0.002] (-0.43) -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.13)
CEO Ivyplus -0.006 [-0.003] (-0.50) -0.016 [-0.008] (-1.44)
CEO Internal -0.017 [-0.009] (-1.47) -0.028a [-0.014] (-2.64)
CEO Connectedness 0.004 [0.007] (1.27) -0.001 [-0.002] (-0.35)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Y2 = Director Replacement
(1) Post-SOX (2) Pre-SOX
Firm Size -0.001 [-0.001] (-0.43) -0.004b [-0.007] (-2.04)
Firm Return -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.06) 0.000 [0.000] (0.05)
Industry Return 0.031b [0.005] (2.56) -0.018c [-0.004] (-1.75)
Board Size 0.005a [0.013] (3.90) 0.003a [0.011] (2.92)
Frac SD 0.083b [0.007] (2.50) 0.061b [0.006] (2.37)
CEO Age 0.001b [0.006] (2.35) 0.000 [0.000] (0.08)
CEO MBA -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.78) 0.002 [0.001] (0.30)
CEO Ivyplus -0.003 [-0.001] (-0.58) -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.02)
CEO Internal -0.014a [-0.007] (-3.13) -0.019a [-0.009] (-3.68)
CEO Connectedness 0.001 [0.002] (1.11) 0.002c [0.004] (1.65)
Director Yrs on Brd 0.002a [0.011] (5.57) 0.001a [0.008] (3.97)
Director Busyness -0.005b [-0.005] (-2.17) -0.007b [-0.007] (-2.36)
Director MBA -0.003 [-0.002] (-0.86) -0.011b [-0.005] (-2.26)
Director Ivyplus 0.002 [0.001] (0.40) -0.005 [-0.002] (-1.07)
Director Connectedness 0.001 [0.003] (1.37) 0.001c [0.005] (1.79)
Same Gender 0.003 [0.001] (0.62) 0.010 [0.003] (1.61)
Age Difference 0.004a [0.029] (12.79) 0.003a [0.022] (8.72)
Prof Overlap -0.006 [-0.002] (-1.03) -0.009 [-0.004] (-1.52)
NonProf Overlap 0.003 [0.001] (0.68) -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.70)
Event Year 1 0.019b [0.007] (2.42) 0.022b [0.009] (2.27)
Event Year 2 -0.006 [-0.002] (-0.82) 0.017c [0.007] (1.75)
Event Year 3 -0.008 [-0.003] (-1.15) 0.010 [0.004] (1.12)
Event Year 4 -0.004 [-0.001] (-0.55) 0.009 [0.003] (0.89)
Event Year 5 -0.006 [-0.002] (-0.93) 0.014 [0.005] (1.38)
Observations 26,805 22,182
Log pseudolikelihood -16,218.91 -12,837.80
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.013 0.002
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Table 20: BIPROBIT Director Appointment Models: SOX Sub-samples
This table presents the estimated results of BIPROBIT director appointment models, as specified
in Equation 9-10. The 2000 sample is split into two sub-samples based on the passage of SOX. The
standard errors are allowed to be clustered at firm level. Panel (a) reports estimated coefficients.
Panel (b) reports estimated marginal effects. z statistics are in parentheses; Standardized
marginal effects are in square brackets; Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(a) BIPROBIT Director Appointment Models Coefficients
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Post-SOX (2) Pre-SOX
Firm Size -0.018 (-0.67) 0.049 (1.19)
Firm Return -0.403a (-3.51) -0.169 (-1.16)
Industry Return 0.376 (1.58) -0.380 (-1.24)
Board Size -0.007 (-0.38) -0.018 (-0.90)
Frac SD -0.352 (-0.82) -0.042 (-0.09)
Frac Prof -0.357 (-1.60) -0.019 (-0.07)
Frac NonProf -0.154 (-0.78) 0.313 (1.09)
Average Busyness 0.059 (0.77) -0.277a (-2.69)
CEO 60 0.394a (4.08) 0.685a (5.57)
CEO Gender 0.027 (0.13) -0.149 (-0.44)
CEO MBA -0.002 (-0.03) 0.049 (0.43)
CEO Ivyplus -0.149c (-1.75) -0.125 (-1.00)
CEO Internal -0.119 (-1.53) -0.091 (-0.80)
CEO Connectedness 0.013 (0.62) -0.008 (-0.27)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Y2 = Director Appointment
(1) Post-SOX (2) Pre-SOX
Replacement 0.956a (18.61) 0.907a (13.90)
Lag App -0.247a (-4.87) -0.119c (-1.78)
Lag Rep 0.294a (5.67) 0.207a (3.14)
Firm Size 0.133a (6.52) 0.089a (3.42)
Firm Return 0.091 (1.43) -0.025 (-0.33)
Industry Return 0.111 (0.73) -0.045 (-0.26)
Board Size -0.079a (-5.88) -0.070a (-5.29)
Frac SD -0.630b (-2.13) -0.611b (-2.04)
Frac Prof -0.113 (-0.85) -0.161 (-1.01)
Frac NonProf -0.151 (-1.12) -0.158 (-0.92)
Average Busyness 0.020 (0.39) 0.166b (2.47)
CEO Age 0.002 (0.51) -0.000 (-0.11)
CEO Gender -0.082 (-0.60) 0.027 (0.14)
CEO MBA -0.033 (-0.62) 0.015 (0.22)
CEO Ivyplus 0.021 (0.38) -0.053 (-0.73)
CEO Internal -0.021 (-0.41) -0.053 (-0.82)
CEO Connectedness -0.004 (-0.30) -0.018 (-1.04)
Event Year 1 0.172b (1.99) 0.195c (1.67)
Event Year 2 0.118 (1.40) 0.226b (2.01)
Event Year 3 0.050 (0.59) 0.173 (1.54)
Event Year 4 0.086 (1.03) 0.148 (1.28)
Event Year 5 -0.006 (-0.07) -0.057 (-0.46)
Observations 3,117 1,859
Log pseudolikelihood -2,644.66 -1,498.52
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.002 0.002
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(b) BIPROBIT Director Appointment Models Marginal Effects
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Post-SOX (2) Pre-SOX
Firm Size -0.002 [-0.004] (-0.67) 0.004 [0.008] (1.19)
Firm Return -0.048a [-0.021] (-3.57) -0.015 [-0.007] (-1.17)
Industry Return 0.045 [0.008] (1.58) -0.034 [-0.006] (-1.24)
Board Size -0.001 [-0.002] (-0.38) -0.002 [-0.005] (-0.89)
Frac SD -0.042 [-0.004] (-0.82) -0.004 [-0.000] (-0.09)
Frac Prof -0.043 [-0.009] (-1.62) -0.002 [-0.000] (-0.07)
Frac NonProf -0.018 [-0.003] (-0.78) 0.028 [0.005] (1.10)
Average Busyness 0.007 [0.003] (0.77) -0.025a [-0.013] (-2.65)
CEO 60 0.059a [0.020] (3.37) 0.093a [0.032] (4.09)
CEO Gender 0.003 [0.001] (0.13) -0.015 [-0.002] (-0.39)
CEO MBA -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.03) 0.004 [0.002] (0.42)
CEO Ivyplus -0.017c [-0.008] (-1.84) -0.011 [-0.005] (-1.05)
CEO Internal -0.014 [-0.007] (-1.52) -0.008 [-0.004] (-0.80)
CEO Connectedness 0.002 [0.003] (0.62) -0.001 [-0.001] (-0.27)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Y2 = Director Appointment
(1) Post-SOX (2) Pre-SOX
Replacement 0.368a [0.184] (20.15) 0.351a [0.175] (14.93)
Lag App -0.098a [-0.049] (-4.89) -0.047c [-0.024] (-1.78)
Lag Rep 0.117a [0.058] (5.71) 0.083a [0.041] (3.16)
Firm Size 0.053a [0.089] (6.49) 0.036a [0.062] (3.50)
Firm Return 0.031 [0.013] (1.24) -0.012 [-0.006] (-0.42)
Industry Return 0.049 [0.009] (0.82) -0.024 [-0.004] (-0.34)
Board Size -0.032a [-0.082] (-5.90) -0.028a [-0.086] (-5.36)
Frac SD -0.256b [-0.023] (-2.17) -0.245b [-0.026] (-2.05)
Frac Prof -0.050 [-0.010] (-0.93) -0.065 [-0.014] (-1.02)
Frac NonProf -0.062 [-0.012] (-1.16) -0.059 [-0.011] (-0.85)
Average Busyness 0.009 [0.004] (0.43) 0.062b [0.033] (2.33)
CEO Age 0.001 [0.005] (0.51) -0.000 [-0.001] (-0.11)
CEO Gender -0.032 [-0.006] (-0.60) 0.008 [0.001] (0.10)
CEO MBA -0.013 [-0.006] (-0.62) 0.007 [0.003] (0.25)
CEO Ivyplus 0.006 [0.003] (0.29) -0.023 [-0.011] (-0.79)
CEO Internal -0.010 [-0.005] (-0.49) -0.022 [-0.011] (-0.87)
CEO Connectedness -0.002 [-0.003] (-0.27) -0.007 [-0.014] (-1.06)
Event Year 1 0.065c [0.024] (1.90) 0.078c [0.030] (1.71)
Event Year 2 0.046 [0.018] (1.38) 0.096b [0.039] (2.20)
Event Year 3 0.018 [0.007] (0.52) 0.069 [0.027] (1.55)
Event Year 4 0.034 [0.013] (1.03) 0.062 [0.023] (1.36)
Event Year 5 -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.05) -0.019 [-0.007] (-0.39)
Observations 3,117 1,859
Log pseudolikelihood -2,644.66 -1,498.52
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.002 0.002
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Table 21: BIPROBIT Prof Overlap Director Appointment Models: SOX Sub-
sampless
This table presents the estimated results of BIPROBIT Prof Overlap director appointment
models, as specified in Equation 9-10. The 2000 sample is split into two sub-samples based on
the passage of SOX.The standard errors are allowed to be clustered at firm level. Panel (a)
reports estimated coefficients. Panel (b) reports estimated marginal effects. z statistics are in
parentheses; Standardized marginal effects are in square brackets; Superscripts a, b, and c denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(a) BIPROBIT Prof Overlap Director Appointment
Models Coefficients
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Post-SOX (2) Pre-SOX
Firm Size -0.019 (-0.70) 0.051 (1.20)
Firm Return -0.395a (-3.41) -0.161 (-1.11)
Industry Return 0.375 (1.56) -0.403 (-1.32)
Board Size -0.007 (-0.39) -0.019 (-0.93)
Frac SD -0.338 (-0.78) -0.093 (-0.19)
Frac Prof -0.358 (-1.62) -0.009 (-0.03)
Frac NonProf -0.162 (-0.82) 0.326 (1.14)
Average Busyness 0.059 (0.78) -0.271a (-2.64)
CEO 60 0.392a (4.07) 0.696a (5.65)
CEO Gender 0.033 (0.16) -0.118 (-0.34)
CEO MBA 0.000 (0.00) 0.051 (0.44)
CEO Ivyplus -0.151c (-1.77) -0.134 (-1.08)
CEO Internal -0.121 (-1.55) -0.088 (-0.77)
CEO Connectedness 0.014 (0.66) -0.008 (-0.28)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Continue on next page
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Table 21(a) – continued from previous page
Y2 = Prof Overlap Director Appointment
(1) Post-SOX (2) Pre-SOX
NonOverlap Rep 0.454a (4.91) 0.419a (3.56)
Lag Prof App 0.350a (2.68) 0.116 (0.64)
Lag NonProf App 0.091 (0.73) 0.061 (0.40)
Lag NonOverlap Rep -0.087 (-0.93) 0.148 (1.43)
Firm Size 0.063c (1.82) 0.050 (1.20)
Firm Return 0.183c (1.78) 0.086 (0.68)
Industry Return -0.163 (-0.64) -0.139 (-0.45)
Board Size -0.040c (-1.79) -0.039 (-1.39)
Frac SD -0.940 (-1.63) -0.777 (-1.44)
Frac Prof 1.850a (9.25) 2.132a (8.31)
Frac NonProf -0.124 (-0.51) -0.136 (-0.42)
Average Busyness 0.032 (0.38) 0.144 (1.28)
CEO Age -0.001 (-0.14) 0.009 (1.23)
CEO Gender 0.369 (1.13) -0.241 (-0.81)
CEO MBA -0.015 (-0.18) 0.159 (1.40)
CEO Ivyplus 0.061 (0.65) -0.129 (-1.04)
CEO Internal 0.061 (0.68) -0.259b (-2.14)
CEO Connectedness 0.060a (2.96) 0.007 (0.28)
Event Year 1 0.184 (1.29) 0.380c (1.88)
Event Year 2 0.098 (0.68) 0.217 (1.12)
Event Year 3 -0.005 (-0.04) 0.126 (0.65)
Event Year 4 -0.055 (-0.38) 0.158 (0.78)
Event Year 5 -0.094 (-0.64) 0.135 (0.65)
Observations 3,117 1,859
Log pseudolikelihood -1,286.21 -711.15
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.655 0.655
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Table 21
(c) BIPROBIT Prof Overlap Director Appointment Models Marginal Ef-
fects
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Post-SOX (2) Pre-SOX
Firm Size -0.002 [-0.004] (-0.70) 0.005 [0.008] (1.19)
Firm Return -0.047a [-0.020] (-3.48) -0.014 [-0.006] (-1.12)
Industry Return 0.045 [0.008] (1.57) -0.036 [-0.007] (-1.33)
Board Size -0.001 [-0.002] (-0.39) -0.002 [-0.005] (-0.93)
Frac SD -0.041 [-0.004] (-0.78) -0.008 [-0.001] (-0.19)
Frac Prof -0.043 [-0.009] (-1.63) -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.03)
Frac NonProf -0.019 [-0.004] (-0.82) 0.029 [0.005] (1.15)
Average Busyness 0.007 [0.003] (0.77) -0.024a [-0.013] (-2.60)
CEO 60 0.058a [0.020] (3.37) 0.095a [0.033] (4.14)
CEO Gender 0.004 [0.001] (0.17) -0.012 [-0.002] (-0.31)
CEO MBA 0.000 [0.000] (0.00) 0.005 [0.002] (0.43)
CEO Ivyplus -0.017c [-0.008] (-1.87) -0.012 [-0.005] (-1.13)
CEO Internal -0.015 [-0.007] (-1.54) -0.008 [-0.004] (-0.76)
CEO Connectedness 0.002 [0.003] (0.66) -0.001 [-0.001] (-0.28)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Y2 = Prof Overlap Director Appointment
(1) Post-SOX (2) Pre-SOX
NonOverlap Rep 0.041a [0.019] (4.42) 0.040a [0.019] (3.25)
Lag Prof App 0.036b [0.009] (2.10) 0.011 [0.003] (0.58)
Lag NonProf App 0.007 [0.003] (0.69) 0.005 [0.002] (0.39)
Lag NonOverlap Rep -0.007 [-0.003] (-0.96) 0.013 [0.006] (1.38)
Firm Size 0.005c [0.008] (1.82) 0.004 [0.007] (1.22)
Firm Return 0.014c [0.006] (1.73) 0.007 [0.003] (0.68)
Industry Return -0.012 [-0.002] (-0.63) -0.012 [-0.002] (-0.45)
Board Size -0.003c [-0.008] (-1.78) -0.003 [-0.010] (-1.44)
Frac SD -0.073 [-0.006] (-1.62) -0.066 [-0.007] (-1.49)
Frac Prof 0.144a [0.029] (8.56) 0.180a [0.039] (7.96)
Frac NonProf -0.010 [-0.002] (-0.51) -0.011 [-0.002] (-0.41)
Average Busyness 0.002 [0.001] (0.38) 0.012 [0.006] (1.28)
CEO Age -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.14) 0.001 [0.005] (1.23)
CEO Gender 0.021 [0.004] (1.64) -0.025 [-0.004] (-0.68)
CEO MBA -0.001 [-0.001] (-0.18) 0.014 [0.007] (1.35)
CEO Ivyplus 0.005 [0.002] (0.63) -0.011 [-0.005] (-1.10)
CEO Internal 0.005 [0.002] (0.68) -0.022b [-0.011] (-2.21)
CEO Connectedness 0.005a [0.008] (2.93) 0.001 [0.001] (0.28)
Event Year 1 0.016 [0.006] (1.14) 0.040 [0.015] (1.56)
Event Year 2 0.008 [0.003] (0.64) 0.021 [0.008] (1.01)
Event Year 3 -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.05) 0.011 [0.005] (0.61)
Event Year 4 -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.39) 0.015 [0.006] (0.72)
Event Year 5 -0.007 [-0.003] (-0.67) 0.013 [0.004] (0.61)
Observations 3,117 1,859
Log pseudolikelihood -1,286.21 -711.15
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.655 0.655
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Table 22: BIPROBIT NonProf Overlap Director Appointment Models: SOX Sub-
samples
This table presents the estimated results of BIPROBIT NonProf Overlap director appointment
models, as specified in Equation 9-10. The 2000 sample is split into two sub-samples based on
the passage of SOX. The standard errors are allowed to be clustered at firm level. Panel (a)
reports estimated coefficients. Panel (b) reports estimated marginal effects. z statistics are in
parentheses; Standardized marginal effects are in square brackets; Superscripts a, b, and c denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(a) BIPROBIT NonProf Overlap Director Appointment
Models Coefficients
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Post-SOX (2) Pre-SOX
Firm Size -0.020 (-0.72) 0.050 (1.18)
Firm Return -0.396a (-3.44) -0.168 (-1.16)
Industry Return 0.376 (1.57) -0.394 (-1.29)
Board Size -0.007 (-0.37) -0.019 (-0.92)
Frac SD -0.347 (-0.81) -0.074 (-0.15)
Frac Prof -0.355 (-1.60) -0.011 (-0.04)
Frac NonProf -0.157 (-0.80) 0.326 (1.14)
Average Busyness 0.060 (0.78) -0.275a (-2.67)
CEO 60 0.394a (4.09) 0.694a (5.64)
CEO Gender 0.032 (0.16) -0.123 (-0.36)
CEO MBA -0.001 (-0.01) 0.051 (0.44)
CEO Ivyplus -0.152c (-1.78) -0.136 (-1.09)
CEO Internal -0.121 (-1.55) -0.092 (-0.81)
CEO Connectedness 0.014 (0.65) -0.007 (-0.23)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Continue on next page
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Table 22
Table 22(a) – continued from previous page
Y2 = NonProf Overlap Director Appointment
(1) Post-SOX (2) Pre-SOX
NonOverlap Rep 0.429a (6.70) 0.449a (5.16)
Lag Prof App -0.018 (-0.15) -0.313c (-1.71)
Lag NonProf App 0.034 (0.38) 0.003 (0.02)
Lag NonOverlap Rep 0.058 (0.87) 0.191b (2.22)
Firm Size 0.047c (1.91) 0.060c (1.86)
Firm Return 0.093 (1.25) 0.128 (1.43)
Industry Return -0.097 (-0.53) -0.073 (-0.32)
Board Size -0.013 (-0.81) -0.012 (-0.71)
Frac SD -0.799b (-2.23) -0.873b (-2.12)
Frac Prof 0.207 (1.18) 0.228 (1.07)
Frac NonProf 1.802a (10.46) 2.234a (9.97)
Average Busyness -0.019 (-0.28) 0.049 (0.56)
CEO Age -0.004 (-0.84) 0.001 (0.23)
CEO Gender 0.151 (0.82) -0.045 (-0.18)
CEO MBA 0.098 (1.58) 0.089 (1.05)
CEO Ivyplus 0.069 (1.07) 0.053 (0.60)
CEO Internal 0.038 (0.59) -0.139c (-1.65)
CEO Connectedness 0.001 (0.06) 0.006 (0.28)
Event Year 1 0.148 (1.43) 0.173 (1.11)
Event Year 2 0.126 (1.22) 0.213 (1.42)
Event Year 3 -0.018 (-0.17) 0.216 (1.43)
Event Year 4 -0.019 (-0.19) 0.200 (1.25)
Event Year 5 -0.077 (-0.72) -0.036 (-0.22)
Observations 3,117 1,859
Log pseudolikelihood -1,900.33 -999.95
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.224 0.171
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(c) BIPROBIT NonProf Overlap Director Appointment Models Marginal
Effects
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Post-SOX (2) Pre-SOX
Firm Size -0.002 [-0.004] (-0.72) 0.004 [0.008] (1.18)
Firm Return -0.048a [-0.020] (-3.50) -0.015 [-0.007] (-1.17)
Industry Return 0.045 [0.008] (1.57) -0.035 [-0.007] (-1.30)
Board Size -0.001 [-0.002] (-0.37) -0.002 [-0.005] (-0.91)
Frac SD -0.042 [-0.004] (-0.81) -0.007 [-0.001] (-0.15)
Frac Prof -0.043 [-0.009] (-1.61) -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.04)
Frac NonProf -0.019 [-0.003] (-0.80) 0.029 [0.005] (1.14)
Average Busyness 0.007 [0.003] (0.78) -0.025a [-0.013] (-2.63)
CEO 60 0.059a [0.020] (3.38) 0.095a [0.033] (4.14)
CEO Gender 0.004 [0.001] (0.16) -0.012 [-0.002] (-0.33)
CEO MBA -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.01) 0.005 [0.002] (0.44)
CEO Ivyplus -0.017c [-0.008] (-1.88) -0.012 [-0.005] (-1.14)
CEO Internal -0.015 [-0.007] (-1.53) -0.008 [-0.004] (-0.81)
CEO Connectedness 0.002 [0.003] (0.65) -0.001 [-0.001] (-0.23)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Y2 = NonProf Overlap Director Appointment
(1) Post-SOX (2) Pre-SOX
NonOverlap Rep 0.094a [0.045] (6.41) 0.092a [0.044] (4.86)
Lag Prof App -0.004 [-0.001] (-0.15) -0.050b [-0.012] (-2.09)
Lag NonProf App 0.007 [0.002] (0.37) 0.000 [0.000] (0.02)
Lag NonOverlap Rep 0.012 [0.006] (0.86) 0.038b [0.018] (2.14)
Firm Size 0.010c [0.016] (1.91) 0.012c [0.020] (1.89)
Firm Return 0.018 [0.008] (1.17) 0.024 [0.011] (1.40)
Industry Return -0.019 [-0.003] (-0.50) -0.015 [-0.003] (-0.35)
Board Size -0.003 [-0.007] (-0.81) -0.002 [-0.007] (-0.73)
Frac SD -0.164b [-0.014] (-2.25) -0.166b [-0.018] (-2.13)
Frac Prof 0.041 [0.008] (1.15) 0.043 [0.009] (1.06)
Frac NonProf 0.367a [0.068] (10.50) 0.425a [0.078] (10.07)
Average Busyness -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.27) 0.008 [0.004] (0.50)
CEO Age -0.001 [-0.006] (-0.84) 0.000 [0.002] (0.23)
CEO Gender 0.028 [0.005] (0.91) -0.009 [-0.001] (-0.18)
CEO MBA 0.020 [0.010] (1.55) 0.017 [0.008] (1.04)
CEO Ivyplus 0.014 [0.006] (1.02) 0.010 [0.005] (0.56)
CEO Internal 0.007 [0.004] (0.57) -0.027c [-0.013] (-1.67)
CEO Connectedness 0.000 [0.000] (0.08) 0.001 [0.002] (0.27)
Event Year 1 0.031 [0.012] (1.32) 0.035 [0.014] (1.05)
Event Year 2 0.027 [0.010] (1.16) 0.046 [0.018] (1.37)
Event Year 3 -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.19) 0.044 [0.018] (1.33)
Event Year 4 -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.19) 0.042 [0.016] (1.18)
Event Year 5 -0.015 [-0.006] (-0.73) -0.006 [-0.002] (-0.19)
Observations 3,117 1,859
Log pseudolikelihood -1,900.33 -999.95
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.224 0.171
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Table 23: BIPROBIT Director Replacement Models: Size Sub-samples
This table presents the estimated results of BIPROBIT director replacement models, as specified
in Equation 7-8. The 2003 sample is split into two sub-samples based on firm size as proxied by
BoardEx initial coverage. The standard errors are allowed to be clustered at firm level. Panel
(a) reports estimated coefficients. Panel (b) reports estimated marginal effects. z statistics are in
parentheses; Standardized marginal effects are in square brackets; Superscripts a, b, and c denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(a) BIPROBIT Director Replacement Models Coeffi-
cients
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Large (2) Small
Firm Size -0.039 (-1.47) -0.102a (-4.76)
Firm Return -0.413a (-4.18) -0.229a (-3.70)
Industry Return 0.446b (2.18) 0.035 (0.20)
Board Size 0.019 (1.06) 0.041b (2.17)
Frac SD -1.046a (-2.71) -0.050 (-0.16)
Frac Prof -0.309 (-1.63) -0.338a (-2.73)
Frac NonProf -0.249 (-1.34) 0.100 (0.76)
Average Busyness 0.091 (1.30) 0.205a (2.90)
CEO 60 0.559a (7.10) 0.479a (6.62)
CEO Gender 0.004 (0.02) -0.054 (-0.35)
CEO MBA -0.030 (-0.43) 0.027 (0.41)
CEO Ivyplus -0.037 (-0.50) -0.005 (-0.07)
CEO Internal -0.102 (-1.48) 0.055 (0.91)
CEO Connectedness 0.023 (1.26) 0.054b (2.13)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Continue on next page
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Table 23
Table 23(a) – continued from previous page
Y2 = Director Replacement
(1) Large (2) Small
Firm Size -0.004 (-0.36) -0.058a (-5.89)
Firm Return 0.005 (0.14) -0.023 (-0.82)
Industry Return 0.198b (2.44) 0.309a (3.58)
Board Size 0.030a (3.87) 0.024a (2.96)
Frac SD 0.569b (2.56) 0.690a (3.92)
CEO Age 0.006b (2.35) -0.003 (-1.39)
CEO MBA -0.023 (-0.76) -0.030 (-0.94)
CEO Ivyplus -0.017 (-0.56) -0.018 (-0.49)
CEO Internal -0.089a (-3.08) -0.101a (-3.37)
CEO Connectedness 0.008 (1.06) 0.013 (1.00)
Director Yrs on Brd 0.010a (5.56) 0.012a (7.16)
Director Busyness -0.036b (-2.17) -0.019 (-0.99)
Director MBA -0.023 (-0.86) 0.012 (0.40)
Director Ivyplus 0.010 (0.40) 0.076a (2.81)
Director Connectedness 0.006 (1.37) 0.017a (3.44)
Same Gender 0.019 (0.61) -0.000 (-0.01)
Age Difference 0.026a (12.47) 0.010a (6.00)
Prof Overlap -0.037 (-1.01) -0.120a (-3.73)
NonProf Overlap 0.019 (0.68) 0.054b (2.06)
Event Year 1 0.123a (2.67) 0.168a (3.60)
Event Year 2 -0.033 (-0.72) 0.051 (1.08)
Event Year 3 -0.049 (-1.03) 0.024 (0.50)
Event Year 4 -0.023 (-0.50) 0.008 (0.17)
Event Year 5 -0.043 (-0.93) -0.002 (-0.03)
Observations 26,805 26,809
Log pseudolikelihood -16,218.91 -16,491.39
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.013 0.891
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(c) BIPROBIT Director Replacement Models Marginal Effects
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Large (2) Small
Firm Size -0.007 [-0.011] (-1.47) -0.017a [-0.032] (-4.71)
Firm Return -0.070a [-0.028] (-4.19) -0.039a [-0.020] (-3.73)
Industry Return 0.076b [0.013] (2.18) 0.006 [0.001] (0.20)
Board Size 0.003 [0.009] (1.05) 0.007b [0.019] (2.13)
Frac SD -0.177a [-0.014] (-2.72) -0.009 [-0.001] (-0.16)
Frac Prof -0.052 [-0.011] (-1.63) -0.058a [-0.016] (-2.76)
Frac NonProf -0.042 [-0.008] (-1.34) 0.017 [0.004] (0.76)
Average Busyness 0.015 [0.007] (1.30) 0.035a [0.014] (2.88)
CEO 60 0.120a [0.044] (5.86) 0.100a [0.037] (5.59)
CEO Gender 0.001 [0.000] (0.02) -0.010 [-0.002] (-0.34)
CEO MBA -0.005 [-0.002] (-0.43) 0.005 [0.002] (0.41)
CEO Ivyplus -0.006 [-0.003] (-0.50) -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.07)
CEO Internal -0.017 [-0.009] (-1.47) 0.010 [0.005] (0.90)
CEO Connectedness 0.004 [0.007] (1.27) 0.009b [0.011] (2.13)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Y2 = Director Replacement
(1) Large (2) Small
Firm Size -0.001 [-0.001] (-0.43) -0.009a [-0.016] (-5.78)
Firm Return -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.06) -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.83)
Industry Return 0.031b [0.005] (2.56) 0.048a [0.007] (3.58)
Board Size 0.005a [0.013] (3.90) 0.004a [0.010] (2.97)
Frac SD 0.083b [0.007] (2.50) 0.106a [0.010] (3.91)
CEO Age 0.001b [0.006] (2.35) -0.000 [-0.003] (-1.39)
CEO MBA -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.78) -0.005 [-0.002] (-0.95)
CEO Ivyplus -0.003 [-0.001] (-0.58) -0.003 [-0.001] (-0.50)
CEO Internal -0.014a [-0.007] (-3.13) -0.015a [-0.008] (-3.41)
CEO Connectedness 0.001 [0.002] (1.11) 0.002 [0.002] (1.01)
Director Yrs on Brd 0.002a [0.011] (5.57) 0.002a [0.013] (7.21)
Director Busyness -0.005b [-0.005] (-2.17) -0.003 [-0.002] (-0.99)
Director MBA -0.003 [-0.002] (-0.86) 0.002 [0.001] (0.40)
Director Ivyplus 0.002 [0.001] (0.40) 0.012a [0.005] (2.74)
Director Connectedness 0.001 [0.003] (1.37) 0.003a [0.007] (3.44)
Same Gender 0.003 [0.001] (0.62) -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.01)
Age Difference 0.004a [0.029] (12.79) 0.002a [0.012] (6.03)
Prof Overlap -0.006 [-0.002] (-1.03) -0.018a [-0.007] (-3.90)
NonProf Overlap 0.003 [0.001] (0.68) 0.009b [0.004] (2.02)
eventyr==1 0.019b [0.007] (2.42) 0.028a [0.011] (3.37)
eventyr==2 -0.006 [-0.002] (-0.82) 0.008 [0.003] (1.06)
eventyr==3 -0.008 [-0.003] (-1.15) 0.004 [0.001] (0.50)
eventyr==4 -0.004 [-0.001] (-0.55) 0.001 [0.000] (0.17)
eventyr==5 -0.006 [-0.002] (-0.93) -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.03)
Observations 26,805 26,809
Log pseudolikelihood -16,218.91 -16,491.39
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.013 0.891
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Table 24: BIPROBIT Director Appointment Models: Size Sub-samples
This table presents the estimated results of BIPROBIT director appointment models, as specified
in Equation 9-10. The 2003 sample is split into two sub-samples based on firm size as proxied by
BoardEx initial coverage. The standard errors are allowed to be clustered at firm level. Panel
(a) reports estimated coefficients. Panel (b) reports estimated marginal effects. z statistics are in
parentheses; Standardized marginal effects are in square brackets; Superscripts a, b, and c denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(a) BIPROBIT Director Appointment Models Coefficients
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Large (2) Small
Firm Size -0.053c (-1.86) -0.116a (-4.48)
Firm Return -0.296a (-2.88) -0.330a (-3.70)
Industry Return 0.283 (1.22) 0.111 (0.37)
Board Size 0.011 (0.64) 0.043b (2.36)
Frac SD -0.563 (-1.42) 0.022 (0.06)
Frac Prof -0.214 (-1.14) -0.524a (-2.89)
Frac NonProf -0.121 (-0.59) 0.118 (0.73)
Average Busyness 0.061 (0.80) 0.108 (1.26)
CEO 60 0.324a (3.55) 0.333a (3.69)
CEO Gender 0.165 (0.76) -0.246 (-1.26)
CEO MBA -0.049 (-0.60) -0.040 (-0.48)
CEO Ivyplus -0.135 (-1.54) 0.092 (1.00)
CEO Internal 0.017 (0.22) 0.076 (1.03)
CEO Connectedness 0.034c (1.71) 0.051 (1.63)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Y2 = Director Appointment
(1) Large (2) Small
Replacement 0.951a (18.43) 1.149a (21.33)
Lag App -0.216a (-4.28) -0.186a (-3.37)
Lag Rep 0.289a (5.61) 0.321a (5.63)
Firm Size 0.128a (6.29) 0.093a (5.26)
Firm Return 0.094 (1.50) 0.096c (1.75)
Industry Return 0.093 (0.60) -0.396c (-1.78)
Board Size -0.077a (-5.93) -0.072a (-5.04)
Frac SD -0.599b (-1.99) -0.550b (-1.98)
Frac Prof -0.109 (-0.83) -0.122 (-1.10)
Frac NonProf -0.171 (-1.29) -0.106 (-0.94)
Average Busyness 0.023 (0.44) 0.104c (1.70)
CEO Age 0.001 (0.18) -0.004 (-1.25)
CEO Gender -0.119 (-0.85) 0.035 (0.27)
CEO MBA -0.024 (-0.46) -0.050 (-0.84)
CEO Ivyplus 0.000 (0.01) 0.146b (2.19)
CEO Internal -0.026 (-0.51) -0.001 (-0.02)
CEO Connectedness -0.005 (-0.36) 0.039c (1.77)
Event Year 1 0.156c (1.81) 0.186b (2.07)
Event Year 2 0.113 (1.34) 0.085 (0.94)
Event Year 3 0.033 (0.38) 0.042 (0.45)
Event Year 4 0.112 (1.34) -0.028 (-0.30)
Event Year 5 -0.025 (-0.29) -0.075 (-0.75)
Observations 3,118 2,990
Log pseudolikelihood -2,660.41 -2,474.56
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.005 0.082
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(b) BIPROBIT Director Appointment Models Marginal Effects
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Large (2) Small
Firm Size -0.007c [-0.011] (-1.86) -0.015a [-0.027] (-4.45)
Firm Return -0.036a [-0.016] (-2.91) -0.043a [-0.020] (-3.77)
Industry Return 0.035 [0.006] (1.22) 0.014 [0.002] (0.37)
Board Size 0.001 [0.004] (0.64) 0.006b [0.013] (2.36)
Frac SD -0.069 [-0.006] (-1.42) 0.003 [0.000] (0.06)
Frac Prof -0.026 [-0.005] (-1.13) -0.068a [-0.018] (-2.96)
Frac NonProf -0.015 [-0.003] (-0.59) 0.015 [0.003] (0.73)
Average Busyness 0.008 [0.004] (0.80) 0.014 [0.006] (1.26)
CEO 60 0.048a [0.016] (3.04) 0.051a [0.019] (3.17)
CEO Gender 0.018 [0.003] (0.86) -0.038 [-0.006] (-1.08)
CEO MBA -0.006 [-0.003] (-0.61) -0.005 [-0.002] (-0.49)
CEO Ivyplus -0.016 [-0.007] (-1.61) 0.013 [0.005] (0.95)
CEO Internal 0.002 [0.001] (0.22) 0.010 [0.005] (1.01)
CEO Connectedness 0.004c [0.007] (1.73) 0.007 [0.007] (1.63)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Y2 = Director Appointment
(1) Large (2) Small
Replacement 0.366a [0.183] (19.93) 0.429a [0.209] (23.41)
Lag App -0.086a [-0.043] (-4.29) -0.071a [-0.035] (-3.40)
Lag Rep 0.115a [0.057] (5.65) 0.124a [0.060] (5.62)
Firm Size 0.051a [0.085] (6.19) 0.035a [0.061] (5.17)
Firm Return 0.034 [0.015] (1.37) 0.034 [0.016] (1.64)
Industry Return 0.040 [0.007] (0.66) -0.151c [-0.017] (-1.78)
Board Size -0.031a [-0.080] (-5.87) -0.027a [-0.063] (-5.00)
Frac SD -0.246b [-0.021] (-2.04) -0.210b [-0.021] (-1.98)
Frac Prof -0.046 [-0.009] (-0.87) -0.050 [-0.013] (-1.19)
Frac NonProf -0.070 [-0.013] (-1.31) -0.040 [-0.009] (-0.92)
Average Busyness 0.010 [0.005] (0.48) 0.040c [0.017] (1.73)
CEO Age 0.000 [0.002] (0.18) -0.002 [-0.012] (-1.25)
CEO Gender -0.046 [-0.008] (-0.82) 0.011 [0.002] (0.23)
CEO MBA -0.010 [-0.005] (-0.48) -0.019 [-0.009] (-0.86)
CEO Ivyplus -0.001 [-0.001] (-0.06) 0.057b [0.022] (2.20)
CEO Internal -0.010 [-0.005] (-0.50) 0.000 [0.000] (0.01)
CEO Connectedness -0.002 [-0.003] (-0.29) 0.015c [0.017] (1.82)
Event Year 1 0.059c [0.022] (1.74) 0.073b [0.030] (2.06)
Event Year 2 0.044 [0.017] (1.32) 0.034 [0.014] (0.99)
Event Year 3 0.012 [0.004] (0.35) 0.016 [0.006] (0.46)
Event Year 4 0.043 [0.016] (1.30) -0.011 [-0.004] (-0.30)
Event Year 5 -0.009 [-0.004] (-0.27) -0.028 [-0.010] (-0.74)
Observations 3,118 2,990
Log pseudolikelihood -2,660.41 -2,474.56
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.005 0.082
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Table 25: BIPROBIT Prof Overlap Director Appointment Models: Size Sub-samples
This table presents the estimated results of BIPROBIT Prof Overlap director appointment
models, as specified in Equation 9-10. The 2003 sample is split into two sub-samples based on firm
size as proxied by BoardEx initial coverage. The standard errors are allowed to be clustered at
firm level. Panel (a) reports estimated coefficients. Panel (b) reports estimated marginal effects.
z statistics are in parentheses; Standardized marginal effects are in square brackets; Superscripts
a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(a) BIPROBIT Prof Overlap Director Appointment
Models Coefficients
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Large (2) Small
Firm Size -0.053c (-1.86) -0.116a (-4.49)
Firm Return -0.292a (-2.83) -0.333a (-3.72)
Industry Return 0.282 (1.21) 0.119 (0.40)
Board Size 0.011 (0.60) 0.044b (2.43)
Frac SD -0.552 (-1.40) 0.026 (0.07)
Frac Prof -0.212 (-1.13) -0.536a (-2.93)
Frac NonProf -0.129 (-0.62) 0.115 (0.71)
Average Busyness 0.063 (0.83) 0.108 (1.27)
CEO 60 0.329a (3.59) 0.334a (3.70)
CEO Gender 0.176 (0.81) -0.247 (-1.26)
CEO MBA -0.045 (-0.56) -0.041 (-0.49)
CEO Ivyplus -0.135 (-1.55) 0.093 (1.00)
CEO Internal 0.016 (0.21) 0.074 (1.00)
CEO Connectedness 0.033c (1.71) 0.051 (1.62)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Continue on next page
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Table 25(a) – continued from previous page
Y2 = Prof Overlap Director Appointment
(1) Large (2) Small
NonOverlap Rep 0.450a (4.83) 0.592a (6.04)
Lag Prof App 0.334a (2.73) 0.397a (2.91)
Lag NonProf App 0.103 (0.84) -0.128 (-0.93)
Lag NonOverlap Rep -0.045 (-0.48) 0.072 (0.67)
Firm Size 0.059c (1.72) 0.033 (1.20)
Firm Return 0.171c (1.65) -0.071 (-0.71)
Industry Return -0.149 (-0.58) 0.062 (0.18)
Board Size -0.039c (-1.74) -0.012 (-0.65)
Frac SD -0.914 (-1.52) -1.147b (-2.36)
Frac Prof 1.860a (9.32) 1.601a (9.25)
Frac NonProf -0.073 (-0.30) 0.139 (0.65)
Average Busyness 0.026 (0.32) -0.014 (-0.14)
CEO Age -0.003 (-0.43) -0.008 (-1.53)
CEO Gender 0.363 (1.11) -0.098 (-0.39)
CEO MBA -0.022 (-0.25) -0.026 (-0.26)
CEO Ivyplus 0.021 (0.22) -0.068 (-0.56)
CEO Internal 0.059 (0.66) -0.013 (-0.13)
CEO Connectedness 0.064a (3.22) 0.063b (2.08)
Event Year 1 0.205 (1.42) 0.161 (1.19)
Event Year 2 0.127 (0.86) -0.093 (-0.63)
Event Year 3 -0.007 (-0.05) -0.136 (-0.89)
Event Year 4 -0.055 (-0.37) -0.095 (-0.60)
Event Year 5 -0.059 (-0.40) -0.157 (-1.00)
Observations 3,118 2,990
Log pseudolikelihood -1,288.32 -1,294.73
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.060 0.342
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(c) BIPROBIT Prof Overlap Director Appointment Models Marginal Effects
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Large (2) Small
Firm Size -0.006c [-0.011] (-1.85) -0.015a [-0.027] (-4.46)
Firm Return -0.036a [-0.015] (-2.86) -0.043a [-0.020] (-3.79)
Industry Return 0.035 [0.006] (1.21) 0.016 [0.002] (0.40)
Board Size 0.001 [0.003] (0.61) 0.006b [0.013] (2.43)
Frac SD -0.068 [-0.006] (-1.40) 0.003 [0.000] (0.07)
Frac Prof -0.026 [-0.005] (-1.13) -0.070a [-0.018] (-3.00)
Frac NonProf -0.016 [-0.003] (-0.63) 0.015 [0.003] (0.71)
Average Busyness 0.008 [0.004] (0.82) 0.014 [0.006] (1.27)
CEO 60 0.048a [0.017] (3.07) 0.051a [0.019] (3.18)
CEO Gender 0.019 [0.003] (0.93) -0.038 [-0.006] (-1.08)
CEO MBA -0.005 [-0.003] (-0.56) -0.005 [-0.002] (-0.50)
CEO Ivyplus -0.016 [-0.007] (-1.61) 0.013 [0.005] (0.96)
CEO Internal 0.002 [0.001] (0.21) 0.010 [0.005] (0.98)
CEO Connectedness 0.004c [0.007] (1.73) 0.007 [0.007] (1.62)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Y2 = Prof Overlap Director Appointment
(1) Large (2) Small
NonOverlap Rep 0.041a [0.019] (4.37) 0.058a [0.025] (4.75)
Lag Prof App 0.034b [0.008] (2.17) 0.040b [0.010] (2.19)
Lag NonProf App 0.009 [0.003] (0.79) -0.009 [-0.003] (-1.01)
Lag NonOverlap Rep -0.003 [-0.002] (-0.48) 0.005 [0.002] (0.65)
Firm Size 0.005c [0.008] (1.67) 0.003 [0.005] (1.28)
Firm Return 0.013 [0.005] (1.56) -0.005 [-0.002] (-0.65)
Industry Return -0.011 [-0.002] (-0.55) 0.004 [0.001] (0.17)
Board Size -0.003c [-0.008] (-1.71) -0.001 [-0.002] (-0.69)
Frac SD -0.073 [-0.006] (-1.54) -0.083b [-0.008] (-2.42)
Frac Prof 0.146a [0.029] (8.64) 0.117a [0.030] (9.03)
Frac NonProf -0.006 [-0.001] (-0.32) 0.010 [0.002] (0.64)
Average Busyness 0.002 [0.001] (0.34) -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.16)
CEO Age -0.000 [-0.001] (-0.43) -0.001 [-0.005] (-1.53)
CEO Gender 0.021 [0.004] (1.63) -0.007 [-0.001] (-0.35)
CEO MBA -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.27) -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.25)
CEO Ivyplus 0.001 [0.001] (0.18) -0.005 [-0.002] (-0.60)
CEO Internal 0.005 [0.002] (0.67) -0.001 [-0.001] (-0.14)
CEO Connectedness 0.005a [0.009] (3.23) 0.004b [0.005] (2.02)
Event Year 1 0.018 [0.007] (1.23) 0.013 [0.005] (1.08)
Event Year 2 0.011 [0.004] (0.79) -0.007 [-0.003] (-0.70)
Event Year 3 -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.07) -0.009 [-0.003] (-0.98)
Event Year 4 -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.41) -0.006 [-0.002] (-0.64)
Event Year 5 -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.40) -0.010 [-0.004] (-1.13)
Observations 3,118 2,990
Log pseudolikelihood -1,288.32 -1,294.73
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.060 0.342
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Table 26: BIPROBIT NonProf Overlap Director Appointment Models: Size Sub-
samples
This table presents the estimated results of BIPROBIT NonProf Overlap director appointment
models, as specified in Equation 9-10. The 2003 sample is split into two sub-samples based on firm
size as proxied by BoardEx initial coverage. The standard errors are allowed to be clustered at
firm level. Panel (a) reports estimated coefficients. Panel (b) reports estimated marginal effects.
z statistics are in parentheses; Standardized marginal effects are in square brackets; Superscripts
a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(a) BIPROBIT NonProf Overlap Director Appointment
Models Coefficients
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Large (2) Small
Firm Size -0.075a (-2.59) -0.096a (-3.59)
Firm Return -0.337a (-3.12) -0.318a (-3.54)
Industry Return 0.388c (1.72) 0.451 (1.51)
Board Size 0.026 (1.47) 0.026 (1.41)
Frac SD -0.444 (-1.10) 0.233 (0.61)
Frac Prof -0.409b (-2.04) -0.668a (-3.54)
Frac NonProf 0.065 (0.34) 0.020 (0.12)
Average Busyness 0.015 (0.18) 0.105 (1.25)
CEO 60 0.452a (4.97) 0.291a (3.06)
CEO Gender 0.100 (0.45) -0.128 (-0.61)
CEO MBA -0.023 (-0.28) 0.099 (1.23)
CEO Ivyplus -0.202b (-2.27) 0.059 (0.63)
CEO Internal -0.015 (-0.19) 0.074 (0.98)
CEO Connectedness 0.027 (1.27) 0.053 (1.62)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Continue on next page
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Y2 = NonProf Overlap Director Appointment
(1) Large (2) Small
NonOverlap Rep 0.442a (6.81) 0.635a (8.53)
olh empm 0.005 (0.04) 0.061 (0.45)
olh socm 0.057 (0.64) -0.126 (-1.40)
nolfm 0.093 (1.38) 0.091 (1.20)
Firm Size 0.054b (2.17) 0.010 (0.48)
Firm Return 0.089 (1.19) 0.053 (0.85)
Industry Return -0.068 (-0.36) -0.226 (-0.84)
Board Size -0.017 (-1.06) -0.035b (-2.16)
Frac SD -0.890b (-2.41) -0.726b (-2.02)
Frac Prof 0.185 (1.03) 0.098 (0.66)
Frac NonProf 1.812a (10.52) 1.827a (12.71)
Average Busyness -0.031 (-0.44) 0.048 (0.63)
CEO Age -0.005 (-1.08) -0.005 (-1.32)
CEO Gender 0.182 (0.96) 0.048 (0.28)
CEO MBA 0.089 (1.41) 0.013 (0.18)
CEO Ivyplus 0.045 (0.69) 0.205a (2.72)
CEO Internal 0.011 (0.18) 0.061 (0.94)
CEO Connectedness 0.002 (0.12) 0.029 (0.94)
Event Year 1 0.145 (1.39) 0.198c (1.84)
Event Year 2 0.136 (1.30) 0.083 (0.75)
Event Year 3 -0.024 (-0.23) 0.178 (1.61)
Event Year 4 -0.003 (-0.03) 0.015 (0.13)
Event Year 5 -0.110 (-1.01) -0.047 (-0.39)
Observations 3,104 2,973
Log pseudolikelihood -1,855.37 -1,821.09
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.012 0.605
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(c) BIPROBIT NonProf Overlap Director Appointment Models Marginal Ef-
fects
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Large (2) Small
Firm Size -0.009a [-0.015] (-2.59) -0.012a [-0.021] (-3.60)
Firm Return -0.039a [-0.017] (-3.15) -0.040a [-0.019] (-3.57)
Industry Return 0.045c [0.008] (1.72) 0.056 [0.006] (1.52)
Board Size 0.003 [0.008] (1.47) 0.003 [0.008] (1.41)
Frac SD -0.051 [-0.004] (-1.10) 0.029 [0.003] (0.61)
Frac Prof -0.047b [-0.009] (-2.04) -0.083a [-0.022] (-3.65)
Frac NonProf 0.007 [0.001] (0.34) 0.002 [0.001] (0.12)
Average Busyness 0.002 [0.001] (0.18) 0.013 [0.005] (1.25)
CEO 60 0.067a [0.023] (4.05) 0.042a [0.015] (2.67)
CEO Gender 0.011 [0.002] (0.49) -0.018 [-0.003] (-0.56)
CEO MBA -0.003 [-0.001] (-0.28) 0.013 [0.006] (1.19)
CEO Ivyplus -0.022b [-0.010] (-2.43) 0.008 [0.003] (0.61)
CEO Internal -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.19) 0.009 [0.005] (0.96)
CEO Connectedness 0.003 [0.006] (1.28) 0.007 [0.007] (1.62)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Y2 = NonProf Overlap Director Appointment
(1) Large (2) Small
NonOverlap Rep 0.097a [0.046] (6.51) 0.149a [0.064] (7.53)
olh empm 0.001 [0.000] (0.04) 0.012 [0.003] (0.43)
olh socm 0.012 [0.004] (0.62) -0.023 [-0.008] (-1.48)
nolfm 0.019 [0.009] (1.35) 0.018 [0.008] (1.17)
Firm Size 0.010b [0.018] (2.09) 0.002 [0.003] (0.45)
Firm Return 0.016 [0.007] (1.06) 0.010 [0.005] (0.81)
Industry Return -0.012 [-0.002] (-0.30) -0.043 [-0.005] (-0.83)
Board Size -0.003 [-0.009] (-1.02) -0.007b [-0.016] (-2.15)
Frac SD -0.184b [-0.016] (-2.46) -0.142b [-0.014] (-2.02)
Frac Prof 0.035 [0.007] (0.97) 0.018 [0.005] (0.63)
Frac NonProf 0.370a [0.068] (10.61) 0.357a [0.080] (12.71)
Average Busyness -0.006 [-0.003] (-0.43) 0.010 [0.004] (0.64)
CEO Age -0.001 [-0.007] (-1.08) -0.001 [-0.008] (-1.32)
CEO Gender 0.034 [0.006] (1.09) 0.009 [0.002] (0.28)
CEO MBA 0.018 [0.009] (1.38) 0.003 [0.001] (0.19)
CEO Ivyplus 0.008 [0.004] (0.60) 0.043b [0.017] (2.55)
CEO Internal 0.002 [0.001] (0.17) 0.012 [0.006] (0.94)
CEO Connectedness 0.001 [0.001] (0.16) 0.006 [0.006] (0.96)
Event Year 1 0.030 [0.011] (1.29) 0.041c [0.017] (1.72)
Event Year 2 0.029 [0.011] (1.23) 0.017 [0.007] (0.73)
Event Year 3 -0.006 [-0.002] (-0.26) 0.037 [0.014] (1.51)
Event Year 4 -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.00) 0.003 [0.001] (0.13)
Event Year 5 -0.022 [-0.008] (-1.06) -0.009 [-0.003] (-0.40)
Observations 3,104 2,973
Log pseudolikelihood -1,855.37 -1,821.09
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.012 0.605
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Table 27: BIPROBIT Director Replacement Models: Retired vs. Forced
This table presents the estimated results of BIPROBIT director replacement models, as specified
in Equation 7-8. The 2003 sample is split into two sub-samples based on whether the prior CEO
departed at the age older than 62. The standard errors are allowed to be clustered at firm level.
Panel (a) reports estimated coefficients. Panel (b) reports estimated marginal effects. z statistics
are in parentheses; Standardized marginal effects are in square brackets; Superscripts a, b, and c
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(a) BIPROBIT NonProf Overlap Director Appointment
Models Coefficients
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Retired (2) Forced
Firm Size -0.064c (-1.70) -0.039c (-1.79)
Firm Return -0.279c (-1.80) -0.290a (-3.96)
Industry Return 0.202 (0.58) 0.109 (0.56)
Board Size 0.050c (1.78) 0.014 (0.81)
Frac SD -0.833c (-1.80) -1.143a (-3.11)
Frac Prof -0.524c (-1.87) -0.324c (-1.83)
Frac NonProf -0.124 (-0.44) 0.001 (0.01)
Average Busyness 0.226c (1.81) -0.000 (-0.00)
CEO 60 0.765a (6.86) 0.456a (5.63)
CEO Gender 0.110 (0.39) 0.044 (0.28)
CEO MBA -0.141 (-1.25) 0.095 (1.45)
CEO Ivyplus -0.038 (-0.29) -0.086 (-1.22)
CEO Internal -0.261b (-2.46) 0.000 (0.00)
CEO Connectedness 0.044 (1.51) 0.027 (1.38)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Continue on next page
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Y2 = Director Replacement
(1) Retired (2) Forced
Firm Size 0.007 (0.54) -0.047a (-4.60)
Firm Return -0.031 (-0.59) -0.023 (-0.70)
Industry Return 0.020 (0.15) 0.185b (2.18)
Board Size 0.013 (1.37) 0.039a (4.48)
Frac SD 1.046a (4.11) 0.435b (2.01)
CEO Age 0.015a (3.96) -0.003 (-1.47)
CEO MBA 0.002 (0.06) -0.028 (-0.89)
CEO Ivyplus -0.074 (-1.50) 0.028 (0.87)
CEO Internal -0.102b (-2.47) -0.085a (-2.86)
CEO Connectedness 0.008 (0.62) 0.014 (1.50)
Director Yrs on Brd 0.008a (3.79) 0.013a (7.15)
Director Busyness -0.019 (-0.72) -0.031c (-1.76)
Director MBA 0.021 (0.49) -0.055b (-2.04)
Director Ivyplus 0.041 (1.07) 0.039 (1.51)
Director Connectedness 0.003 (0.41) 0.011b (2.47)
Same Gender -0.003 (-0.05) 0.033 (0.96)
Age Difference 0.031a (10.49) 0.010a (5.20)
Prof Overlap -0.104c (-1.96) -0.073b (-1.98)
NonProf Overlap 0.064c (1.68) 0.038 (1.39)
Event Year 1 0.177a (2.71) 0.163a (3.00)
Event Year 2 0.001 (0.01) 0.050 (0.91)
Event Year 3 -0.029 (-0.43) 0.015 (0.26)
Event Year 4 -0.089 (-1.35) 0.056 (0.95)
Event Year 5 -0.038 (-0.57) -0.024 (-0.39)
Observations 13,601 25,845
Log pseudolikelihood -7,072.15 -16,898.05
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.841 0.109
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(c) BIPROBIT Director Replacement Models Marginal Effects
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Retired (2) Forced
Firm Size -0.008c [-0.015] (-1.71) -0.007c [-0.015] (-1.79)
Firm Return -0.033c [-0.012] (-1.81) -0.055a [-0.026] (-3.99)
Industry Return 0.024 [0.004] (0.58) 0.021 [0.003] (0.56)
Board Size 0.006c [0.018] (1.76) 0.003 [0.007] (0.81)
Frac SD -0.098c [-0.009] (-1.81) -0.219a [-0.017] (-3.12)
Frac Prof -0.061c [-0.014] (-1.89) -0.062c [-0.013] (-1.84)
Frac NonProf -0.015 [-0.003] (-0.44) 0.000 [0.000] (0.01)
Average Busyness 0.026c [0.013] (1.82) -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.00)
CEO 60 0.137a [0.045] (5.12) 0.105a [0.036] (4.81)
CEO Gender 0.012 [0.002] (0.42) 0.008 [0.002] (0.29)
CEO MBA -0.016 [-0.007] (-1.31) 0.019 [0.009] (1.42)
CEO Ivyplus -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.30) -0.016 [-0.007] (-1.25)
CEO Internal -0.032b [-0.016] (-2.30) 0.000 [0.000] (0.00)
CEO Connectedness 0.005 [0.009] (1.51) 0.005 [0.009] (1.38)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Y2 = Director Replacement
(1) Retired (2) Forced
Firm Size 0.001 [0.002] (0.53) -0.008a [-0.016] (-4.60)
Firm Return -0.005 [-0.002] (-0.60) -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.82)
Industry Return 0.003 [0.000] (0.15) 0.030b [0.005] (2.20)
Board Size 0.002 [0.006] (1.38) 0.006a [0.017] (4.43)
Frac SD 0.153a [0.014] (4.18) 0.068c [0.005] (1.95)
CEO Age 0.002a [0.014] (4.05) -0.001 [-0.004] (-1.47)
CEO MBA 0.000 [0.000] (0.05) -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.85)
CEO Ivyplus -0.011 [-0.004] (-1.55) 0.004 [0.002] (0.83)
CEO Internal -0.015b [-0.007] (-2.44) -0.014a [-0.007] (-2.84)
CEO Connectedness 0.001 [0.002] (0.63) 0.002 [0.004] (1.54)
Director Yrs on Brd 0.001a [0.010] (3.77) 0.002a [0.013] (7.22)
Director Busyness -0.003 [-0.003] (-0.72) -0.005c [-0.005] (-1.76)
Director MBA 0.003 [0.001] (0.49) -0.009b [-0.004] (-2.07)
Director Ivyplus 0.006 [0.003] (1.06) 0.006 [0.003] (1.50)
Director Connectedness 0.000 [0.001] (0.41) 0.002b [0.006] (2.47)
Same Gender -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.05) 0.005 [0.002] (0.98)
Age Difference 0.004a [0.036] (10.96) 0.002a [0.012] (5.25)
Prof Overlap -0.014b [-0.005] (-2.08) -0.011b [-0.004] (-2.06)
NonProf Overlap 0.010c [0.004] (1.65) 0.006 [0.003] (1.37)
Event Year 1 0.028b [0.012] (2.53) 0.028a [0.012] (2.84)
Event Year 2 0.000 [0.000] (0.01) 0.009 [0.003] (0.92)
Event Year 3 -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.44) 0.002 [0.001] (0.26)
Event Year 4 -0.012 [-0.005] (-1.41) 0.009 [0.003] (0.95)
Event Year 5 -0.006 [-0.002] (-0.58) -0.003 [-0.001] (-0.32)
Observations 13,601 25,845
Log pseudolikelihood -7,072.15 -16,898.05
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.841 0.109
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Table 28: BIPROBIT Director Appointment Models: Retired vs. Forced
This table presents the estimated results of BIPROBIT director appointment models, as specified
in Equation 9-10. The 2003 sample is split into two sub-samples based on whether the prior CEO
departed at the age older than 62. The standard errors are allowed to be clustered at firm level.
Panel (a) reports estimated coefficients. Panel (b) reports estimated marginal effects. z statistics
are in parentheses; Standardized marginal effects are in square brackets; Superscripts a, b, and c
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(a) BIPROBIT Director Appointment Models Coefficients
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Retired (2) Forced
Firm Size -0.096b (-2.45) -0.018 (-0.75)
Firm Return -0.319c (-1.67) -0.335a (-3.78)
Industry Return 0.464 (1.06) 0.294 (1.25)
Board Size 0.027 (1.00) 0.008 (0.45)
Frac SD 0.273 (0.46) -0.813b (-2.01)
Frac Prof -0.611c (-1.65) -0.406c (-1.88)
Frac NonProf -0.343 (-1.10) 0.072 (0.45)
Average Busyness 0.117 (0.88) -0.020 (-0.25)
CEO 60 0.617a (4.39) 0.399a (4.36)
CEO Gender 0.293 (0.70) -0.150 (-0.87)
CEO MBA -0.070 (-0.53) 0.125c (1.70)
CEO Ivyplus -0.175 (-1.16) -0.121 (-1.46)
CEO Internal -0.082 (-0.65) -0.080 (-1.14)
CEO Connectedness 0.059c (1.71) 0.008 (0.38)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Y2 = Director Appointment
(1) Retired (2) Forced
Replacement 1.050a (14.12) 1.017a (19.61)
Lag App -0.223a (-2.94) -0.185a (-3.55)
Lag Rep 0.288a (3.58) 0.293a (5.52)
Firm Size 0.088a (3.72) 0.134a (7.43)
Firm Return -0.052 (-0.52) 0.097c (1.71)
Industry Return -0.122 (-0.49) 0.049 (0.28)
Board Size -0.064a (-4.10) -0.095a (-6.11)
Frac SD -0.118 (-0.32) -0.879a (-2.92)
Frac Prof -0.239 (-1.40) -0.010 (-0.08)
Frac NonProf -0.061 (-0.33) -0.163 (-1.39)
Average Busyness 0.089 (1.17) -0.011 (-0.19)
CEO Age 0.005 (0.89) -0.003 (-0.79)
CEO Gender 0.050 (0.29) -0.045 (-0.36)
CEO MBA 0.027 (0.36) -0.052 (-0.97)
CEO Ivyplus 0.117 (1.38) 0.085 (1.47)
CEO Internal -0.066 (-0.90) -0.014 (-0.27)
CEO Connectedness -0.012 (-0.50) 0.012 (0.72)
Event Year 1 0.171 (1.34) 0.187b (2.01)
Event Year 2 0.162 (1.28) 0.085 (0.89)
Event Year 3 0.088 (0.66) 0.075 (0.75)
Event Year 4 0.179 (1.27) 0.086 (0.86)
Event Year 5 0.241c (1.66) -0.159 (-1.46)
Observations 1,507 3,064
Log pseudolikelihood -1,180.20 -2,689.23
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.437 0.000
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(b) BIPROBIT Director Appointment Models Marginal Effects
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Retired (2) Forced
Firm Size -0.008b [-0.016] (-2.46) -0.003 [-0.005] (-0.75)
Firm Return -0.027c [-0.010] (-1.69) -0.049a [-0.023] (-3.83)
Industry Return 0.040 [0.006] (1.07) 0.043 [0.007] (1.25)
Board Size 0.002 [0.006] (0.99) 0.001 [0.003] (0.45)
Frac SD 0.023 [0.002] (0.46) -0.119b [-0.010] (-2.01)
Frac Prof -0.052c [-0.011] (-1.69) -0.059c [-0.012] (-1.90)
Frac NonProf -0.029 [-0.006] (-1.10) 0.010 [0.002] (0.45)
Average Busyness 0.010 [0.005] (0.89) -0.003 [-0.001] (-0.25)
CEO 60 0.079a [0.026] (3.25) 0.071a [0.024] (3.65)
CEO Gender 0.020 [0.003] (0.92) -0.024 [-0.005] (-0.79)
CEO MBA -0.006 [-0.003] (-0.54) 0.019c [0.009] (1.66)
CEO Ivyplus -0.014 [-0.006] (-1.25) -0.017 [-0.007] (-1.52)
CEO Internal -0.007 [-0.003] (-0.63) -0.012 [-0.006] (-1.14)
CEO Connectedness 0.005c [0.008] (1.71) 0.001 [0.002] (0.38)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Y2 = Director Appointment
(1) Retired (2) Forced
Replacement 0.400a [0.200] (15.49) 0.390a [0.194] (21.40)
Lag App -0.088a [-0.044] (-2.96) -0.074a [-0.037] (-3.56)
Lag Rep 0.114a [0.057] (3.61) 0.117a [0.058] (5.55)
Firm Size 0.035a [0.071] (3.75) 0.053a [0.108] (7.41)
Firm Return -0.020 [-0.008] (-0.49) 0.033 [0.016] (1.47)
Industry Return -0.050 [-0.008] (-0.51) 0.024 [0.004] (0.36)
Board Size -0.025a [-0.070] (-4.12) -0.038a [-0.094] (-6.11)
Frac SD -0.048 [-0.005] (-0.33) -0.364a [-0.031] (-3.04)
Frac Prof -0.093 [-0.019] (-1.37) -0.011 [-0.002] (-0.20)
Frac NonProf -0.023 [-0.004] (-0.32) -0.064 [-0.014] (-1.36)
Average Busyness 0.035 [0.017] (1.16) -0.005 [-0.002] (-0.21)
CEO Age 0.002 [0.012] (0.89) -0.001 [-0.008] (-0.79)
CEO Gender 0.019 [0.003] (0.27) -0.021 [-0.004] (-0.42)
CEO MBA 0.011 [0.005] (0.37) -0.019 [-0.009] (-0.87)
CEO Ivyplus 0.047 [0.020] (1.40) 0.032 [0.014] (1.39)
CEO Internal -0.026 [-0.012] (-0.89) -0.007 [-0.003] (-0.33)
CEO Connectedness -0.005 [-0.008] (-0.52) 0.005 [0.008] (0.75)
Event Year 1 0.069 [0.029] (1.36) 0.077b [0.034] (2.09)
Event Year 2 0.065 [0.026] (1.29) 0.039 [0.016] (1.02)
Event Year 3 0.036 [0.014] (0.67) 0.031 [0.012] (0.79)
Event Year 4 0.072 [0.026] (1.28) 0.040 [0.014] (0.99)
Event Year 5 0.096c [0.033] (1.67) -0.055 [-0.018] (-1.30)
Observations 1,507 3,064
Log pseudolikelihood -1,180.20 -2,689.23
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.437 0.000
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Table 29: BIPROBIT Prof Overlap Director Appointment Models: Retired vs.
Forceds
This table presents the estimated results of BIPROBIT Prof Overlap director appointment
models, as specified in Equation 9-10. The 2003 sample is split into two sub-samples based on
whether the prior CEO departed at the age older than 62. The standard errors are allowed to
be clustered at firm level. Panel (a) reports estimated coefficients. Panel (b) reports estimated
marginal effects. z statistics are in parentheses; Standardized marginal effects are in square
brackets; Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
(a) BIPROBIT Prof Overlap Director Appointment
Models Coefficients
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Retired (2) Forced
Firm Size -0.095b (-2.44) -0.018 (-0.75)
Firm Return -0.316c (-1.66) -0.340a (-3.81)
Industry Return 0.456 (1.04) 0.306 (1.29)
Board Size 0.028 (1.03) 0.007 (0.37)
Frac SD 0.259 (0.44) -0.806b (-2.00)
Frac Prof -0.625c (-1.68) -0.417c (-1.93)
Frac NonProf -0.337 (-1.08) 0.062 (0.38)
Average Busyness 0.118 (0.89) -0.017 (-0.22)
CEO 60 0.615a (4.39) 0.399a (4.36)
CEO Gender 0.291 (0.70) -0.156 (-0.90)
CEO MBA -0.074 (-0.56) 0.127c (1.73)
CEO Ivyplus -0.171 (-1.13) -0.121 (-1.47)
CEO Internal -0.082 (-0.65) -0.080 (-1.13)
CEO Connectedness 0.059c (1.69) 0.009 (0.41)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Continue on next page
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Table 29
Table 29(a) – continued from previous page
Y2 = Prof Overlap Director Appointment
(1) Retired (2) Forced
NonOverlap Rep 0.592a (4.03) 0.472a (4.98)
Lag Prof App 0.087 (0.47) 0.387a (2.77)
Lag NonProf App 0.211 (1.30) 0.068 (0.52)
Lag NonOverlap Rep 0.008 (0.06) -0.057 (-0.57)
Firm Size 0.054 (1.38) 0.069b (2.28)
Firm Return 0.343b (2.13) 0.006 (0.05)
Industry Return -0.472 (-1.18) -0.113 (-0.42)
Board Size -0.045c (-1.71) -0.030 (-1.33)
Frac SD -0.919 (-1.35) -1.117c (-1.93)
Frac Prof 2.143a (7.76) 1.585a (8.13)
Frac NonProf 0.175 (0.50) -0.190 (-0.80)
Average Busyness -0.112 (-0.86) -0.050 (-0.55)
CEO Age 0.002 (0.22) -0.000 (-0.04)
CEO Gender 0.462 (0.82) 0.410 (1.30)
CEO MBA -0.001 (-0.00) -0.068 (-0.70)
CEO Ivyplus 0.127 (0.95) 0.026 (0.25)
CEO Internal -0.052 (-0.41) -0.092 (-0.97)
CEO Connectedness 0.050 (1.53) 0.055b (2.43)
Event Year 1 0.040 (0.20) 0.258 (1.57)
Event Year 2 -0.005 (-0.02) 0.034 (0.20)
Event Year 3 -0.238 (-1.03) 0.155 (0.88)
Event Year 4 0.038 (0.17) 0.026 (0.14)
Event Year 5 -0.223 (-0.98) 0.073 (0.39)
Observations 1,507 3,064
Log pseudolikelihood -535.02 -1,371.73
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.213 0.561
144
Table 29
(c) BIPROBIT Prof Overlap Director Appointment Models Marginal Ef-
fects
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Retired (2) Forced
Firm Size -0.008b [-0.016] (-2.44) -0.003 [-0.005] (-0.75)
Firm Return -0.027c [-0.010] (-1.68) -0.049a [-0.023] (-3.86)
Industry Return 0.039 [0.006] (1.05) 0.045 [0.007] (1.29)
Board Size 0.002 [0.007] (1.02) 0.001 [0.002] (0.37)
Frac SD 0.022 [0.002] (0.44) -0.117b [-0.010] (-2.01)
Frac Prof -0.054c [-0.011] (-1.73) -0.061c [-0.012] (-1.94)
Frac NonProf -0.029 [-0.005] (-1.09) 0.009 [0.002] (0.38)
Average Busyness 0.010 [0.005] (0.90) -0.002 [-0.001] (-0.22)
CEO 60 0.079a [0.026] (3.26) 0.071a [0.024] (3.65)
CEO Gender 0.020 [0.003] (0.91) -0.025 [-0.005] (-0.82)
CEO MBA -0.006 [-0.003] (-0.58) 0.019c [0.009] (1.69)
CEO Ivyplus -0.014 [-0.006] (-1.21) -0.017 [-0.007] (-1.53)
CEO Internal -0.007 [-0.003] (-0.63) -0.012 [-0.006] (-1.13)
CEO Connectedness 0.005c [0.008] (1.69) 0.001 [0.002] (0.41)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Y2 = Prof Overlap Director Appointment
(1) Retired (2) Forced
NonOverlap Rep 0.051a [0.024] (3.59) 0.042a [0.019] (4.37)
Lag Prof App 0.007 [0.002] (0.44) 0.039b [0.009] (2.11)
Lag NonProf App 0.017 [0.006] (1.13) 0.005 [0.002] (0.50)
Lag NonOverlap Rep 0.001 [0.000] (0.06) -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.58)
Firm Size 0.004 [0.008] (1.44) 0.005b [0.010] (2.27)
Firm Return 0.025b [0.010] (2.21) 0.000 [0.000] (0.02)
Industry Return -0.034 [-0.005] (-1.22) -0.008 [-0.001] (-0.41)
Board Size -0.003c [-0.009] (-1.72) -0.002 [-0.005] (-1.32)
Frac SD -0.066 [-0.007] (-1.40) -0.083c [-0.007] (-1.95)
Frac Prof 0.153a [0.032] (7.08) 0.117a [0.023] (7.74)
Frac NonProf 0.013 [0.002] (0.53) -0.014 [-0.003] (-0.80)
Average Busyness -0.008 [-0.004] (-0.88) -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.54)
CEO Age 0.000 [0.001] (0.22) -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.04)
CEO Gender 0.022 [0.003] (1.37) 0.021b [0.004] (1.97)
CEO MBA 0.000 [0.000] (0.01) -0.005 [-0.002] (-0.70)
CEO Ivyplus 0.010 [0.004] (0.93) 0.002 [0.001] (0.23)
CEO Internal -0.004 [-0.002] (-0.39) -0.007 [-0.003] (-0.98)
CEO Connectedness 0.003 [0.006] (1.51) 0.004b [0.007] (2.37)
Event Year 1 0.003 [0.001] (0.22) 0.022 [0.009] (1.41)
Event Year 2 -0.000 [-0.000] (-0.01) 0.003 [0.001] (0.21)
Event Year 3 -0.014 [-0.005] (-1.15) 0.013 [0.005] (0.81)
Event Year 4 0.003 [0.001] (0.18) 0.002 [0.001] (0.15)
Event Year 5 -0.014 [-0.005] (-1.16) 0.006 [0.002] (0.40)
Observations 1,507 3,064
Log pseudolikelihood -535.02 -1,371.73
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.213 0.561
145
Table 30: BIPROBIT NonProf Overlap Director Appointment Models: Retired vs.
Forced
This table presents the estimated results of BIPROBIT NonProf Overlap director appointment
models, as specified in Equation 9-10. The 2003 sample is split into two sub-samples based on
whether the prior CEO departed at the age older than 62. The standard errors are allowed to
be clustered at firm level. Panel (a) reports estimated coefficients. Panel (b) reports estimated
marginal effects. z statistics are in parentheses; Standardized marginal effects are in square
brackets; Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
(a) BIPROBIT NonProf Overlap Director Appointment
Models Coefficients
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Retired (2) Forced
Firm Size -0.097b (-2.47) -0.018 (-0.77)
Firm Return -0.315c (-1.65) -0.339a (-3.80)
Industry Return 0.458 (1.05) 0.301 (1.27)
Board Size 0.027 (1.00) 0.007 (0.40)
Frac SD 0.274 (0.46) -0.812b (-2.01)
Frac Prof -0.619c (-1.67) -0.420c (-1.94)
Frac NonProf -0.348 (-1.10) 0.066 (0.41)
Average Busyness 0.122 (0.92) -0.018 (-0.23)
CEO 60 0.611a (4.35) 0.400a (4.37)
CEO Gender 0.295 (0.70) -0.153 (-0.88)
CEO MBA -0.068 (-0.52) 0.127c (1.72)
CEO Ivyplus -0.179 (-1.19) -0.122 (-1.47)
CEO Internal -0.083 (-0.65) -0.080 (-1.13)
CEO Connectedness 0.060c (1.73) 0.009 (0.41)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Continue on next page
146
Table 30
Table 30(a) – continued from previous page
Y2 = NonProf Overlap Director Appointment
(1) Retired (2) Forced
NonOverlap Rep 0.529a (5.37) 0.485a (7.45)
Lag Prof App 0.003 (0.01) 0.165 (1.33)
Lag NonProf App -0.112 (-0.81) -0.077 (-0.88)
Lag NonOverlap Rep 0.040 (0.41) 0.152b (2.28)
Firm Size 0.062b (2.15) 0.027 (1.24)
Firm Return -0.058 (-0.53) 0.082 (1.31)
Industry Return -0.077 (-0.28) -0.213 (-1.02)
Board Size -0.056a (-2.71) -0.033c (-1.77)
Frac SD -0.575 (-1.19) -0.613 (-1.63)
Frac Prof 0.203 (0.79) 0.083 (0.46)
Frac NonProf 2.214a (8.71) 1.580a (10.49)
Average Busyness 0.080 (0.83) -0.004 (-0.06)
CEO Age 0.001 (0.19) -0.007 (-1.46)
CEO Gender 0.565c (1.66) -0.043 (-0.29)
CEO MBA 0.041 (0.45) 0.029 (0.43)
CEO Ivyplus -0.038 (-0.37) 0.232a (3.37)
CEO Internal -0.152c (-1.74) 0.100 (1.59)
CEO Connectedness 0.026 (0.98) 0.001 (0.07)
Event Year 1 0.382b (2.30) 0.167 (1.47)
Event Year 2 0.343b (2.04) 0.067 (0.57)
Event Year 3 0.459a (2.76) 0.060 (0.49)
Event Year 4 0.429b (2.56) -0.032 (-0.25)
Event Year 5 0.349c (1.92) -0.201 (-1.49)
Observations 1,507 3,064
Log pseudolikelihood -854.90 -2,014.37
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.264 0.165
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(c) BIPROBIT NonProf Overlap Director Appointment Models Marginal
Effects
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) Retired (2) Forced
Firm Size -0.008b [-0.017] (-2.48) -0.003 [-0.005] (-0.77)
Firm Return -0.027c [-0.010] (-1.67) -0.049a [-0.023] (-3.86)
Industry Return 0.039 [0.006] (1.06) 0.044 [0.007] (1.27)
Board Size 0.002 [0.006] (0.99) 0.001 [0.003] (0.40)
Frac SD 0.023 [0.002] (0.46) -0.118b [-0.010] (-2.01)
Frac Prof -0.053c [-0.011] (-1.71) -0.061c [-0.012] (-1.95)
Frac NonProf -0.030 [-0.006] (-1.11) 0.010 [0.002] (0.41)
Average Busyness 0.010 [0.005] (0.92) -0.003 [-0.001] (-0.23)
CEO 60 0.078a [0.025] (3.24) 0.072a [0.024] (3.66)
CEO Gender 0.020 [0.003] (0.92) -0.024 [-0.005] (-0.80)
CEO MBA -0.006 [-0.003] (-0.53) 0.019c [0.009] (1.68)
CEO Ivyplus -0.014 [-0.006] (-1.28) -0.017 [-0.007] (-1.54)
CEO Internal -0.007 [-0.003] (-0.64) -0.012 [-0.006] (-1.13)
CEO Connectedness 0.005c [0.008] (1.74) 0.001 [0.002] (0.41)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes
Y2 = NonProf Overlap Director Appointment
(1) Retired (2) Forced
NonOverlap Rep 0.121a [0.057] (5.12) 0.111a [0.052] (6.97)
Lag Prof App 0.001 [0.000] (0.01) 0.037 [0.009] (1.23)
Lag NonProf App -0.022 [-0.008] (-0.86) -0.016 [-0.005] (-0.91)
Lag NonOverlap Rep 0.008 [0.004] (0.41) 0.033b [0.015] (2.19)
Firm Size 0.013b [0.027] (2.21) 0.005 [0.011] (1.22)
Firm Return -0.011 [-0.004] (-0.48) 0.016 [0.007] (1.21)
Industry Return -0.018 [-0.003] (-0.31) -0.043 [-0.007] (-0.99)
Board Size -0.012a [-0.032] (-2.74) -0.007c [-0.017] (-1.77)
Frac SD -0.120 [-0.012] (-1.21) -0.130c [-0.011] (-1.67)
Frac Prof 0.044 [0.009] (0.84) 0.016 [0.003] (0.42)
Frac NonProf 0.461a [0.086] (9.00) 0.328a [0.070] (10.48)
Average Busyness 0.016 [0.008] (0.80) -0.001 [-0.000] (-0.07)
CEO Age 0.000 [0.002] (0.19) -0.001 [-0.010] (-1.46)
CEO Gender 0.084b [0.013] (2.48) -0.010 [-0.002] (-0.30)
CEO MBA 0.009 [0.004] (0.46) 0.007 [0.003] (0.46)
CEO Ivyplus -0.007 [-0.003] (-0.35) 0.051a [0.022] (3.17)
CEO Internal -0.032c [-0.015] (-1.70) 0.021 [0.010] (1.57)
CEO Connectedness 0.005 [0.008] (0.93) 0.000 [0.001] (0.08)
Event Year 1 0.090b [0.038] (2.10) 0.037 [0.016] (1.43)
Event Year 2 0.080c [0.032] (1.86) 0.015 [0.006] (0.60)
Event Year 3 0.113b [0.043] (2.43) 0.013 [0.005] (0.49)
Event Year 4 0.105b [0.038] (2.23) -0.006 [-0.002] (-0.21)
Event Year 5 0.083c [0.028] (1.69) -0.037 [-0.012] (-1.56)
Observations 1,507 3,064
Log pseudolikelihood -854.90 -2,014.37
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.264 0.165
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Table 31: Nomination Committee Trends
This table presents trends in the existence and composition of nomination committee for both the
2003 and the 2000 sample. Panel (a) and (c) present the number and proportion of firms with
nomination committee by fiscal year. Panel (b) and (d) present the proportion of nomination
committee members who have connections to the CEO.
(a) Existence of Nomination Com-
mittee - 2003 Sample
(1)
0 1 Total
2004 337 1,479 1,816
18.56% 81.44% 100.00%
2005 346 1,537 1,883
18.37 81.63 100.00
2006 342 1,574 1,916
17.85 82.15 100.00
2007 543 1,290 1,833
29.62 70.38 100.00
Total 1,568 5,880 7,448
21.05 78.95 100.00
(b) Connected Nomination Committee Members -
2003 Sample
Frac Prof Frac NonProf Frac Any
2004 0.02% 0.02% 0.06%
2005 0.03 0.03 0.06
2006 0.02 0.02 0.06
2007 0.03 0.03 0.05




(c) Existence of Nomination Com-
mittee - 2000 Sample
(1)
0 1 Total
2001 174 641 815
21.35% 78.65% 100.00%
2002 206 795 1,001
20.58 79.42 100.00
2003 323 702 1,025
31.51 68.49 100.00
2004 197 811 1,008
19.54 80.46 100.00
2005 161 709 870
18.51 81.49 100.00
2006 151 614 765
19.74 80.26 100.00
2007 198 447 645
30.70 69.30 100.00
Total 1,410 4,719 6,129
23.01 76.99 100.00
(d) Connected Nomination Committee Members -
2000 Sample
Frac Prof Frac NonProf Frac Any
2001 0.02% 0.02% 0.05%
2002 0.02 0.02 0.05
2003 0.02 0.02 0.04
2004 0.02 0.02 0.05
2005 0.02 0.02 0.05
2006 0.02 0.02 0.04
2007 0.02 0.02 0.04
Total 0.02 0.02 0.04
Observations 4,719
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Table 31: Robustness BIPROBIT Director Replacement Models Coefficients
This table presents the estimated coefficients of BIPROBIT director replacement models. z
statistics are in parentheses; Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Regression (1) uses the 2003 sample with industry dummies.
Regression (2) uses the 2000 sample without industry dummies. Regression (3) uses the 2000
sample with industry dummies.
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size -0.051a (-2.97) -0.010 (-0.49) 0.004 (0.19)
Firm Return -0.294a (-5.57) -0.388a (-5.33) -0.386a (-5.42)
Industry Return 0.314b (2.27) 0.316a (2.82) 0.382a (3.43)
Board Size 0.033b (2.49) 0.007 (0.63) 0.012 (1.12)
Frac SD -0.484b (-1.98) -1.041a (-4.14) -1.028a (-3.94)
Frac Prof -0.179c (-1.67) -0.150 (-1.18) -0.067 (-0.51)
Frac NonProf -0.032 (-0.30) -0.133 (-0.97) -0.107 (-0.76)
Average Busyness 0.093c (1.74) 0.082 (1.51) 0.059 (0.97)
CEO 60 0.519a (9.81) 0.642a (11.33) 0.650a (11.31)
CEO Gender 0.010 (0.09) -0.080 (-0.56) -0.055 (-0.39)
CEO MBA 0.006 (0.11) -0.021 (-0.40) -0.021 (-0.40)
CEO Ivyplus -0.027 (-0.50) -0.065 (-1.21) -0.066 (-1.21)
CEO Internal -0.025 (-0.54) -0.149a (-2.92) -0.143a (-2.80)
CEO Connectedness 0.029b (2.04) -0.002 (-0.18) -0.006 (-0.44)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes No Yes
Continue on next page
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Table 31
Table 31(a) – continued from previous page
Y2 = Director Replacement
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size -0.027a (-3.71) -0.012 (-1.49) -0.011 (-1.22)
Firm Return -0.021 (-0.91) 0.021 (0.89) 0.021 (0.87)
Industry Return 0.291a (4.86) -0.060 (-1.32) -0.040 (-0.89)
Board Size 0.031a (5.70) 0.022a (4.25) 0.025a (4.62)
Frac SD 0.664a (5.02) 0.469a (3.68) 0.495a (3.87)
CEO Age 0.001 (0.86) 0.004b (2.02) 0.005b (2.44)
CEO MBA -0.023 (-1.03) -0.004 (-0.17) 0.001 (0.03)
CEO Ivyplus -0.017 (-0.71) -0.009 (-0.39) -0.005 (-0.20)
CEO Internal -0.084a (-3.95) -0.095a (-4.27) -0.088a (-3.96)
CEO Connectedness 0.010 (1.53) 0.012b (2.17) 0.010c (1.81)
Director Yrs on Brd 0.012a (9.31) 0.009a (6.97) 0.010a (7.06)
Director Busyness -0.031b (-2.41) -0.043a (-3.62) -0.044a (-3.67)
Director MBA -0.007 (-0.37) -0.043b (-2.15) -0.041b (-2.07)
Director Ivyplus 0.036c (1.89) -0.012 (-0.62) -0.019 (-0.96)
Director Connectedness 0.008b (2.44) 0.006b (2.18) 0.006b (1.99)
Same Gender 0.020 (0.78) 0.042c (1.70) 0.035 (1.43)
Age Difference 0.017a (12.81) 0.023a (14.45) 0.023a (14.64)
Prof Overlap -0.069a (-2.72) -0.049c (-1.76) -0.042 (-1.48)
NonProf Overlap 0.050a (2.62) -0.001 (-0.02) 0.000 (0.02)
Event Year 1 0.136a (4.09) 0.113a (3.28) 0.115a (3.32)
Event Year 2 0.011 (0.32) 0.029 (0.85) 0.031 (0.91)
Event Year 3 -0.008 (-0.23) 0.003 (0.08) 0.006 (0.17)
Event Year 4 -0.008 (-0.23) 0.012 (0.33) 0.015 (0.40)
Event Year 5 -0.024 (-0.72) 0.005 (0.13) 0.005 (0.15)
Industry Dummies Yes No Yes
Observations 52,820 48,699 48,699
Log pseudolikelihood -32,463.40 -29,225.70 -29,110.04
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.081 0.000 0.000
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Table 32: BIPROBIT Director Appointment Models Coefficients
This table presents the estimated coefficients of BIPROBIT director appointment models. z
statistics are in parentheses; Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Regression (1) uses the 2003 sample with industry dummies.
Regression (2) uses the 2000 sample without industry dummies. Regression (3) uses the 2000
sample with industry dummies.
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size -0.073a (-3.77) -0.011 (-0.47) 0.004 (0.18)
Firm Return -0.329a (-4.71) -0.254a (-2.69) -0.264a (-2.79)
Industry Return 0.400b (2.18) 0.229 (1.50) 0.276c (1.78)
Board Size 0.022c (1.74) -0.000 (-0.01) 0.000 (0.02)
Frac SD -0.283 (-1.03) -0.386 (-1.23) -0.322 (-1.00)
Frac Prof -0.278b (-2.00) -0.236 (-1.52) -0.166 (-1.01)
Frac NonProf 0.006 (0.05) 0.027 (0.16) 0.041 (0.25)
Average Busyness 0.066 (1.10) -0.001 (-0.02) -0.009 (-0.13)
CEO 60 0.420a (6.52) 0.501a (6.90) 0.507a (6.91)
CEO Gender -0.027 (-0.19) -0.113 (-0.66) -0.072 (-0.42)
CEO MBA 0.022 (0.39) 0.036 (0.57) 0.039 (0.60)
CEO Ivyplus -0.029 (-0.46) -0.145b (-2.06) -0.134c (-1.87)
CEO Internal 0.024 (0.45) -0.078 (-1.22) -0.080 (-1.24)
CEO Connectedness 0.034c (1.95) 0.012 (0.68) 0.009 (0.53)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes No Yes
Y2 = Director Appointment
(1) (2) (3)
Replacement 1.040a (27.71) 0.924a (22.23) 0.929a (22.28)
Lag App -0.211a (-5.57) -0.190a (-4.69) -0.195a (-4.78)
Lag Rep 0.306a (8.04) 0.260a (6.34) 0.264a (6.41)
Firm Size 0.126a (9.24) 0.114a (7.01) 0.116a (6.61)
Firm Return 0.083b (2.00) 0.054 (1.10) 0.055 (1.11)
Industry Return 0.067 (0.53) 0.013 (0.14) -0.007 (-0.07)
Board Size -0.076a (-7.66) -0.074a (-7.45) -0.076a (-7.43)
Frac SD -0.536a (-2.63) -0.606a (-2.81) -0.604a (-2.80)
Frac Prof -0.084 (-0.96) -0.119 (-1.13) -0.111 (-0.98)
Frac NonProf -0.152c (-1.75) -0.165 (-1.55) -0.174 (-1.61)
Average Busyness 0.037 (0.89) 0.066 (1.57) 0.068 (1.54)
CEO Age -0.002 (-1.00) -0.001 (-0.41) -0.001 (-0.40)
CEO Gender 0.028 (0.30) -0.019 (-0.17) 0.008 (0.07)
CEO MBA -0.046 (-1.15) -0.009 (-0.22) -0.017 (-0.39)
CEO Ivyplus 0.071c (1.68) -0.031 (-0.72) -0.024 (-0.55)
CEO Internal -0.012 (-0.33) -0.038 (-0.96) -0.040 (-0.98)
CEO Connectedness 0.011 (0.94) -0.006 (-0.57) -0.006 (-0.51)
Event Year 1 0.165a (2.65) 0.152b (2.19) 0.151b (2.16)
Event Year 2 0.093 (1.52) 0.151b (2.22) 0.151b (2.22)
Event Year 3 0.019 (0.30) 0.060 (0.88) 0.059 (0.86)
Event Year 4 0.024 (0.39) 0.108 (1.58) 0.108 (1.57)
Event Year 5 -0.081 (-1.23) -0.077 (-1.06) -0.080 (-1.10)
Industry Dummies Yes No Yes
Observations 6,008 4,861 4,861
Log pseudolikelihood -5,035.71 -4,059.43 -4,043.45
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.005 0.000 0.000
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Table 33: BIPROBIT Prof Overlap Director Appointment Models Coefficients
This table presents the estimated coefficients of BIPROBIT Prof Overlap director appointment
models. z statistics are in parentheses; Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Regression (1) uses the 2003 sample with industry
dummies. Regression (2) uses the 2000 sample without industry dummies. Regression (3) uses
the 2000 sample with industry dummies.
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size -0.073a (-3.78) -0.011 (-0.47) 0.004 (0.15)
Firm Return -0.329a (-4.69) -0.248a (-2.62) -0.257a (-2.72)
Industry Return 0.400b (2.18) 0.219 (1.43) 0.263c (1.70)
Board Size 0.022c (1.77) -0.001 (-0.05) 0.000 (0.00)
Frac SD -0.272 (-1.00) -0.381 (-1.21) -0.315 (-0.98)
Frac Prof -0.287b (-2.06) -0.235 (-1.52) -0.170 (-1.03)
Frac NonProf 0.005 (0.04) 0.024 (0.15) 0.037 (0.23)
Average Busyness 0.067 (1.12) 0.000 (0.01) -0.005 (-0.08)
CEO 60 0.422a (6.56) 0.509a (7.01) 0.516a (7.01)
CEO Gender -0.030 (-0.21) -0.099 (-0.58) -0.059 (-0.34)
CEO MBA 0.022 (0.38) 0.037 (0.58) 0.040 (0.62)
CEO Ivyplus -0.030 (-0.47) -0.142b (-2.03) -0.133c (-1.86)
CEO Internal 0.024 (0.44) -0.076 (-1.19) -0.078 (-1.21)
CEO Connectedness 0.034b (1.97) 0.012 (0.72) 0.009 (0.56)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes No Yes
Continue on next page
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Table 33
Table 33(a) – continued from previous page
Y2 = Prof Overlap Director Appointment
(1) (2) (3)
NonOverlap Rep 0.498a (7.24) 0.424a (5.88) 0.430a (5.94)
Lag Prof App 0.281a (2.99) 0.243b (2.26) 0.237b (2.22)
Lag NonProf App 0.041 (0.44) 0.093 (0.96) 0.088 (0.92)
Lag NonOverlap Rep 0.001 (0.01) -0.004 (-0.06) -0.008 (-0.11)
Firm Size 0.034 (1.56) 0.060b (2.13) 0.037 (1.22)
Firm Return 0.078 (1.07) 0.142c (1.81) 0.133c (1.67)
Industry Return -0.157 (-0.74) -0.160 (-1.01) -0.193 (-1.20)
Board Size -0.032b (-2.15) -0.045b (-2.52) -0.045b (-2.55)
Frac SD -0.843b (-2.27) -0.586 (-1.47) -0.582 (-1.44)
Frac Prof 1.537a (11.31) 1.924a (11.66) 1.864a (10.97)
Frac NonProf -0.054 (-0.33) -0.087 (-0.43) -0.128 (-0.63)
Average Busyness 0.048 (0.73) 0.031 (0.46) 0.090 (1.28)
CEO Age -0.006 (-1.30) -0.001 (-0.14) 0.001 (0.13)
CEO Gender 0.197 (0.96) 0.167 (0.79) 0.137 (0.64)
CEO MBA -0.026 (-0.39) 0.047 (0.69) 0.066 (0.95)
CEO Ivyplus 0.021 (0.29) -0.008 (-0.10) -0.007 (-0.09)
CEO Internal 0.028 (0.41) -0.037 (-0.52) -0.027 (-0.38)
CEO Connectedness 0.066a (3.93) 0.049a (3.00) 0.052a (3.11)
Event Year 1 0.185c (1.87) 0.219c (1.86) 0.231c (1.95)
Event Year 2 -0.003 (-0.03) 0.129 (1.10) 0.134 (1.14)
Event Year 3 -0.108 (-1.02) 0.008 (0.07) 0.014 (0.12)
Event Year 4 -0.109 (-1.01) -0.023 (-0.20) -0.014 (-0.12)
Event Year 5 -0.137 (-1.27) -0.031 (-0.26) -0.027 (-0.23)
Industry Dummies Yes No Yes
Observations 6,008 4,861 4,861
Log pseudolikelihood -2,512.97 -1,957.76 -1,940.51
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.923 0.327 0.353
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Table 34: BIPROBIT NonProf Overlap Director Appointment Models Coefficients
This table presents the estimated coefficients of BIPROBIT NonProf director appointment
models. z statistics are in parentheses; Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Regression (1) uses the 2003 sample with industry
dummies. Regression (2) uses the 2000 sample without industry dummies. Regression (3) uses
the 2000 sample with industry dummies.
Y1 = CEO Replacement
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Size -0.074a (-3.80) -0.012 (-0.52) 0.002 (0.09)
Firm Return -0.329a (-4.70) -0.251a (-2.66) -0.262a (-2.76)
Industry Return 0.402b (2.19) 0.224 (1.46) 0.268c (1.74)
Board Size 0.022c (1.77) 0.000 (0.00) 0.001 (0.05)
Frac SD -0.275 (-1.00) -0.385 (-1.23) -0.319 (-0.99)
Frac Prof -0.287b (-2.06) -0.234 (-1.51) -0.167 (-1.01)
Frac NonProf 0.007 (0.06) 0.030 (0.18) 0.043 (0.26)
Average Busyness 0.068 (1.13) -0.001 (-0.01) -0.006 (-0.09)
CEO 60 0.423a (6.57) 0.508a (7.03) 0.516a (7.03)
CEO Gender -0.027 (-0.20) -0.098 (-0.57) -0.057 (-0.33)
CEO MBA 0.022 (0.38) 0.035 (0.55) 0.038 (0.59)
CEO Ivyplus -0.030 (-0.48) -0.145b (-2.07) -0.136c (-1.90)
CEO Internal 0.024 (0.44) -0.078 (-1.23) -0.080 (-1.25)
CEO Connectedness 0.034c (1.95) 0.012 (0.74) 0.010 (0.58)
Event Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes No Yes
Continue on next page
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Table 34
Table 34(a) – continued from previous page
Y2 = NonProf Overlap Director Appointment
(1) (2) (3)
NonOverlap Rep 0.533a (10.76) 0.454a (8.63) 0.460a (8.77)
Lag Prof App 0.098 (1.09) -0.050 (-0.51) -0.049 (-0.51)
Lag NonProf App -0.046 (-0.73) 0.023 (0.31) 0.013 (0.18)
Lag NonOverlap Rep 0.071 (1.43) 0.109b (2.04) 0.110b (2.05)
Firm Size 0.035b (2.12) 0.054a (2.78) 0.050b (2.36)
Firm Return 0.053 (1.11) 0.092 (1.59) 0.099c (1.69)
Industry Return -0.087 (-0.55) 0.011 (0.10) 0.007 (0.06)
Board Size -0.024c (-1.95) -0.013 (-1.10) -0.012 (-0.98)
Frac SD -0.838a (-3.21) -0.720b (-2.50) -0.815a (-2.77)
Frac Prof 0.089 (0.75) 0.204 (1.56) 0.203 (1.45)
Frac NonProf 1.796a (16.27) 1.987a (14.14) 1.982a (13.97)
Average Busyness 0.011 (0.20) 0.000 (0.01) -0.002 (-0.03)
CEO Age -0.005 (-1.60) -0.005 (-1.34) -0.005 (-1.31)
CEO Gender 0.139 (1.09) 0.141 (0.88) 0.149 (0.92)
CEO MBA 0.047 (0.99) 0.065 (1.27) 0.060 (1.18)
CEO Ivyplus 0.147a (2.99) 0.054 (1.02) 0.053 (1.00)
CEO Internal 0.044 (0.97) -0.029 (-0.55) -0.036 (-0.68)
CEO Connectedness 0.009 (0.62) 0.008 (0.57) 0.007 (0.48)
Event Year 1 0.167b (2.24) 0.123 (1.40) 0.122 (1.39)
Event Year 2 0.104 (1.38) 0.158c (1.85) 0.157c (1.84)
Event Year 3 0.084 (1.10) 0.075 (0.87) 0.073 (0.84)
Event Year 4 0.017 (0.21) 0.071 (0.82) 0.071 (0.81)
Event Year 5 -0.082 (-1.01) -0.098 (-1.06) -0.097 (-1.05)
Industry Dummies Yes No Yes
Observations 6,008 4,861 4,861
Log pseudolikelihood -3,690.99 -2,844.29 -2,829.74
Wald test of ρ = 0 0.145 0.033 0.036
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